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Abstract 
 
This study  examines why some Muslim women in Syria are turning towards an Islamist 
faith practice and devoutness in the context of the Syrian da‘wa movement. Based on 
interviews and participant observation from 2006 – 2011 it demonstrates that the quest for 
the power to live authentic religious lives as devout Muslims lies at the heart of the 
phenomenon. It argues that the individual development as illustrated by the in-depth 
profiles of five women, is facilitated by the new access to religious education for women in 
mosques and private lessons through female preachers that was advocated by the male 
religious elite. In previous research the compliance of women with restrictive Islamist 
practices such as veiling has often been explained as empowering women through aiming 
at mobility and the participation in public space. This thesis argues that the extent to which 
the participants went in adapting their lives to the Islamist ideal cannot be sufficiently 
explained this hypothesis. Rather, it points at their religious motivations to gain a 
meaningful, emotionally satisfying and correct religious practice in the hope of divine 
reward. In addition, this thesis analyses the ambiguity of the question of female 
empowerment as experienced by women in the social and political sense and as religious 
leaders on one hand and on the other the participants' own concept of empowerment as 
divine enablement to submission. Thus it contributes to a fuller understanding of devout 
Islamist women according to their values and self-perception, and offers insights into the 
unique Syrian context. 
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A note on transliteration and translation: 
 
For the transliteration of Arabic terms I have used the system of the International Journal 
of Middle East Studies. For terms that are common in English I have used the familiar 
writing, e.g. hijab instead of ḥijāb, sharia instead of sharī‘a.  
 
 
Qur’anic quotations in English translation are taken from: Abdel Haleem, M. A. S. The 
Qur'an: A new translation. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010 
Other translations from Arabic are my own unless otherwise specified. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
1  INTRODUCTION:  
RESEARCHING SYRIAN MUSLIM WOMEN’S JOURNEY TO DEVOUTNESS 
 
 
In the autumn of 2006 during my field research in Damascus my friend Dunya1 
accompanied me on my search to buy a new pair of shoes. Growing tired of the streets and 
shops, I suggested that we enter one of the new and fashionable ‘Western style’ food 
places and have a doughnut. Soon we were seated at a small table, two plates in front of us, 
each with a freshly baked doughnut, generously sprinkled with powdered sugar. It was 
only then that it crossed my mind how on earth Dunya was going to eat her doughnut since 
she had only recently decided to wear niqāb, a black face veil that covered all but her eyes. 
After a moment’s hesitation, Dunya lifted her niqāb ever so slightly, eating the sweet 
underneath it without compromising her veiling. After a couple of bites the black cloth was 
covered in white powdered sugar and we burst out laughing.  
 
My interest in Syrian Islamist women has a personal background. Four years before this 
incident I had moved to Damascus to study Arabic. Living in the student dormitories of the 
University, I got to know Dunya, a woman in her mid-twenties, who soon became one of 
my best friends. She helped me with my studies, taught me to cook delicious Arabic food 
and discussed Islam with me. Dunya was a modern, confident woman. She had fought hard 
to overcome the limitations of her traditional working class background, going to evening 
classes to gain access to higher education. She even broke off her traditional engagement 
enabling her to leave her coastal home town and fulfil her dreams of studying in 
                                                
1 All names of my research participants have been changed unless they were public figures 
who agreed to be identified. 
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Damascus. Therefore my astonishment was great when I witnessed how she turned more 
and more to a religiosity that seemed to contradict the freedoms she had struggled for over 
the next few years: From wearing trousers – ‘because they are so much more practical than 
skirts’ - and a white headscarf she turned to wearing long, loose coats with a headscarf, 
and finally to a black abāya with black gloves and the niqāb. She stopped smoking and 
started to spend most of her spare time reading the Qur’an, practicing for her private tajwīd 
classes, and petitioning God. Finally she changed her major to sharia law at the biggest 
Islamic Institute in Damascus, the Abu al-Nur Centre (ANC). On her journey Dunya broke 
a number of traditional concepts of proper female behaviour: She constantly fought with 
her parents about their everyday activities such as watching TV; she also left her family 
and travelled across the border to Jordan to live with a small community of ‘true 
believers’. Yet when she got there she succumbed to her teacher who prohibited her from 
traveling anywhere beyond 80 km without a maḥram, a man too closely related to her to 
marry her.  
Dunya surely did not fit any of the different categories of Muslim women that I had thus 
far perceived: Her choices could neither be explained as merely traditional, nor as an 
attempt to simply gain mobility, or even respectability as many of her peers would judge 
her as ‘backward’ and ‘uneducated’ just by the clothes she wore. 
 
What had motivated such a change? Why was she choosing to comply with such a limiting 
and suppressive way of life? In the following years I observed other Syrian women who 
seemed to undergo a continuous development towards more and more radical forms of 
Islamic practices and convictions. My desire to understand their choices triggered my 
research interest.  
 3 
1.1  ‘Becoming a true Muslim’ 
 
In my research on Syrian Muslim women’s journeys to devoutness I want to show how and 
why many Muslim Sunni women in Syria move from a nominal or traditional religious 
upbringing to a deeper religious perception, expression and faith practice while rejecting 
their past religiosity and projecting a religious ideal of uncompromising, literal adherence 
of what they call ‘true Islam’, and what is often called Islamism by Western observers. My 
focus is on women who made a conscious choice to follow practices that other women 
follow without choice or even against their choice. I hope that through this I will gain 
insight into the attractions of the Islamist movement in Syria for women. 
 
When I began this research I was wondering whether the transformation that I had 
observed in Dunya and other women could be understood in the terms of religious 
conversion in the sense of a personal turning towards faith, changing from a more or less 
nominal membership to personal religious conviction.2 My perception was founded on 
conversations with women who described their experiences as ‘becoming a real Muslim’, 
‘becoming alive’ or even ‘being born again’.3 This terminology sounded very much like 
the Christian vocabulary for personal conversion experiences which emphasizes the 
discontinuity between the old and the new identity. In addition, other Syrian women used 
the term jāhiliya for attitudes and practices that fell short of their understanding of ‘true 
                                                
2 Comp. the Oxford dictionary: www.askoxford.com/consise_oed/convert?view=uk   
3 comp. as well the choice of words used by some of al-fananāt al-tā‘ibāt, in the famous 
cases of Egyptian artists who publicly turned towards Islam rejecting their careers: Bärbel 
Reuter, Gelebte Religion: Religiöse Praxis junger Islamistinnen in Kairo  (Würzburg: 
Ergon Verlag, 1998). 70-75. a similar case is that of the German-Turkish singer Hülya 
Kandemir, comp. Hülya Kandemir, Himmelstochter: Mein Weg vom Popstart zu Allah  
(Munich: Pendo, 2005). 
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Islam’, a term which normally describes the ‘pre-Islamic’ time of ignorance. Yet my early 
perception was challenged when I started to ask more questions to understand how this 
terminology was understood within the Islamic framework. Nearly every woman I 
interviewed started the narrative of her own change with the affirmation that she had 
‘always been a Muslim’. As I will argue in this research, the phenomenon of the Islamic 
revival among women in Syria should be understood as a change that leads to an 
intensification of their religious identity rather than a total or about-turn change, and as a 
consequence, the appeal of the change consists largely in the hope to realise the maximum 
potential of who they already perceive themselves to be. In this sense, my title ‘becoming a 
true Muslim’ describes both the continuity and the discontinuity in the process of realising 
their religious identity that Syrian Muslim women have described to me. The concept that 
every human being is a Muslim from birth is a prevalent idea among my research 
participants, not only in the context of Muslims who become religious but even concerning 
persons of different or no religious affiliation. Accordingly, in the popular media some 
Muslim writers prefer the term ‘reversion’ instead of ‘conversion’ when they discuss the 
turn from another religion to Islam, defining a turning towards Islam as a re-turn to one’s 
original religion instead of moving into something new.4 The term plays a role especially 
in the polemic context of conversions from another religion to Islam.  
Neither ‘conversion’ nor ‘re-version’ was the term used by my participants. Rather, they 
would ask me: aslamtī? (‘Did you submit yourself [to God]?’) when they wanted to know 
whether I had become a Muslim. Sometimes the same verb was used in the context of 
becoming devout, to emphasise that they saw their own development as the basic Muslim 
response to God’s will, though it was not the primary terminology. Instead they 
                                                
4 For example Na’ima B. Robert uses this term in her book on conversion to Islam: Na'ima 
B. Robert, From my sisters' lips  (London: Bantam Books, 2006). 
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distinguished between a nominal Muslim, muslim bi-l-ism bas, and a Muslim in the full 
sense: muslim haqīqī. The process of changing from the former to the latter was mainly 
called ‘becoming religious’, tadayyun, and a woman who was seen as devout mutadayyina.  
 
Often they also used the word iltizām to refer to their new way of life. Iltizām in this 
context means the strict observance of the prescribed religious rules, yet in my 
conversations women often qualified ‘true’ iltizām as observant practice in connection with 
the right inner attitude. The inner state of the heart was seen as the mark of distinction 
between a woman who practiced an outward observance motivated by social pressures or 
mere conservatism, and one who was pious, muttaqiyya. My participants repeatedly 
discussed questions concerning this distinction among themselves, as well as making sure 
that I understood their goal of becoming a ‘pious Muslim woman’.  
 
According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam, taqwa, translated as ‘devoutness’, ‘piety’,  or 
‘pious fear of God’, is ‘one of the most frequently mentioned religious concepts in the 
Qur’an’, referring to a ‘faith animated by works, and works quickened by a genuine 
experience of faith’.5 I use the words ‘devoutness’ and ‘piety’ as synonym translations of 
taqwa. Notwithstanding the long and diverse discourse on the meaning of taqwa in the 
Islamic tradition,6 my research participants use this word to describe their ideal of a devout 
life in which the outer and inner reality correlate with each other. The ideal pious woman is 
multazima, ‘observant’, in her actions and in her thoughts and emotions, constantly 
fearing, loving and trusting God.  
                                                
5 L. Lewisohn, "Takwa," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. C.E. Bosworth, et 
al. (Leiden: Brill, 1980). 
6 Comp. Ibid., for example al-Ghazali’s discussion of taqwa in the iḥya ‘ulūm al-dīn. 
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While this terminology shows how inseparably the question of religious behaviour is 
connected to the question of religious conviction and inner attitudes in the minds of my 
participants, it also shows the unintentional subjectivity of this understanding of ‘piety’, 
because depending on the individual’s convictions, a woman may call herself multazima 
but may not be considered as multazima from another’s point of view. While the meaning 
of piety was not greatly contested in my observation, the question of which practices 
constituted iltizām was constantly questioned. For example, while the majority accepted 
that it was part of iltizām to wear hijab, what kind of hijab was obligatory (farḍ) was open 
to interpretation. A woman who called herself multazima would usually wear a headscarf 
and a long, loose black dress or a coat, the manteau. However, for some, the head covering 
was only correct if it covered not only the throat, but also the jaw up to the tip of the chin 
completely. Another discussion centered around the question whether niqāb or even 
khimār, a total face veil, should be worn, accompanied by black gloves, or whether it is 
only an additional, voluntary good deed. While the question of Islamic dress does take up a 
lot of space in Islamist discourse about women as well as in the Western perception of 
Islam, it is important to note the spiritual questions that motivated my participants. Their 
questions included how to lead a life acceptable to God, experience inner peace, come 
close to God and gain an optimistic outlook on the hereafter. A teacher of sharia at the 
Fatih Institute told me:  
There are three kinds of women: Those that wear ‘hijab’, [- here she pointed at her 
own clothes, indicating that the manteau and the niqāb were part of it -] and have 
real faith in their hearts, those that wear hijab but have no faith, and those that don’t 
 7 
wear hijab but have faith. Only the first kind, whose inner and outward lives agree, 
are truly multazimāt.7  
 
On the other hand, Syrians with a less strict understanding of religious observance would 
call this practice tashaddud, strictness, or even accuse them of taṭarruf, extremism. 
With the general movement towards Islam in Syria, there are many women who just follow 
this trend. Meanwhile, my research focuses on those women who experienced a personal 
change of direction towards devoutness because their accounts of their experiences and 
their reflections about their choices offer a deeper understanding of what is going on in the 
centre of the Islamist movement in Syria. 
 
 
 
1.1.1  ‘Become a true Muslim’: Women calling other women to devoutness  
 
Furthermore, the title of my research also expresses the appeal of how a woman who is 
already ‘religious’ calls other women to follow her example and to become as religious as 
she is: I will show in this research that the development of the role and the model of the 
female preacher within the Islamic revival movement in Syria has led to the integration of 
modern influences on the understanding of female roles with a literalist, puritan 
understanding of Islam. The combination of these two factors opened the doors for an 
unprecedented, wide involvement of Syrian women in public religious activism. 
 
                                                
7 Interview with Amal in my home in Damascus, 27.06.2007. 
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My research participants were not isolated individuals but the change I observed happened 
in the context of wide spread religious activism, which I call the da‘wa movement, 
following Saba Mahmood’s terminology (2005).8 Da‘wa, literally ‘invitation’, is used as a 
technical term for the propagation of Islam. In Chapter 4 I will argue that one of the great 
changes in Syrian society since the 1980s is the emergence of the women’s da‘wa 
movement. With the term ‘women’s da‘wa movement’ I describe the mobilisation of large 
numbers of women to engage in a variety of activities for the sake of da‘wa, ranging from 
charity work to public preaching and teaching, to every day interaction and conversations 
between people. The female preacher is called dā‘iya. 
 
The organisational structures within the women’s da‘wa movement in Syria vary. At one 
end of the spectrum there are organisations like the very hierarchically-structured and 
officially recognised organisation of the Qubaisiyat9. At the other end there are women 
who partake in da‘wa at a private level amongst their personal acquaintances.  
All the women I interviewed for my case studies were in one way or another connected to 
the women’s da‘wa movement: Some were activists and private or public preachers, others 
were committed attendees of lessons. In addition, I interviewed women at the periphery of 
the movement, who had started the process of making some changes in their lives and 
often discussed their desire for more. 
 
 
 
                                                
8 Saba Mahmood, Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject  
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005). 3. 
9 For more information on the Qubaisiyat comp. 4.2.2, page 105-108. 
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1.1.2  Devoutness and Islamism 
 
The women whose lives I researched desire to follow Islam as uncompromisingly as 
possible, while following an Islamic interpretation that can be described as ‘Islamist’. 
‘Devout’ and ‘Islamist’ is an unusual combination of words. However, it describes the 
focus of this research appropriately, as I will argue that turning attention to the devoutness 
of my participants will give a more complete portrait of the Islamist movement. They want 
to model their personal lives, as well as society, according to their religious beliefs; not 
through holding on to traditions, but through going back to the Qur’an and the Sunna, even 
if this means criticising traditional ways of life and common interpretations of sharia. I use 
the label ‘Islamist’ not without hesitation. In the popular media ‘Islamism’ is too often 
equated with violence and terrorism or understood mainly as ‘political Islam’, aiming at an 
Islamic state. Yet my participants at the time of my research from autumn 2006 to winter 
2011 were not aiming at political change. They were focusing on the change of the 
individual and - through the individual - the society. Nevertheless I use the term ‘Islamism’ 
because of their understanding of Islam as a ‘total way of life,’10 and the differentiation of 
Muslims into those who belong to ‘true Islam’ and those who are part of the jāhiliya or are 
nominal Muslims. The da‘wa movement, though aiming at the devoutness of the 
individual, is not apolitical because of its intentional impact on society through the 
individual. 
 
                                                
10 William Shepard, "The Diversity of Islamic Thought: Towards a Typology," in Islamic 
Thought in the twentieth century, ed. Suha Taji-Farouki and Basheer M. Nafi (London: I.B. 
Tauris, 2004), 63. 
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However, I am focusing my research on women’s journeys to devoutness and not to 
Islamism because I am interested in understanding their religiosity. Obviously, devoutness, 
as a quality of the believer, can be observed in all the different segments of Islam and other 
religions. Yet the understanding of devoutness that is prevalent in my research focus 
group, is devoutness as a quality of the adherent to ‘true Islam’ in the Islamist sense.  
 
This focus on devoutness has challenged the way I perceive Islamist women. When I 
started out, my bias was towards researching women who displayed, to my understanding, 
radical ideas and practices. Getting to know the people behind the appearances made me 
more interested in ‘normal’ women with an Islamist persuasion.  
 
This characterisation is coherent with Shepard’s typology of Islamic tendencies (2004) and 
his description of ‘radical Islamism’ as a movement that is totalitarian in the way that 
religion is seen as encompassing all aspects of life, social and personal. Therefore it calls 
for an Islamic state as part of following the sharia and the elimination of all un-Islamic 
practices. Yet, as Shepard points out, not all Islamists are directly concerned with working 
towards an Islamic state nor even politics in general, be it that they co-operate with the 
existing political system or retreat into the private sphere under state pressure.11 For 
Islamists, what is ‘Islamic’ is defined by the Qur’an and the practices of Muhammad and 
the first three generations during the ‘golden age’. Ijtihād, independent reasoning, is 
practiced in the way that the sources, especially the example of Muhammad, are used to 
criticise traditional customs and sharia interpretations. According to Shepard, Islamism is a 
modern movement in so far as it uses not only modern technology and modern political 
                                                
11 Ibid., 77 and 79-80. 
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and social organisations and structures, but it may also adapt to some degree to modern 
thoughts and values through claiming them for Islam. Progress is seen as the true 
realisation of Islam. Within the movement, Shepard distinguishes between Islamists that 
want to reach their goal gradually, through personal and political reform without violence, 
or those that pursue change through a revolution, accepting violence.12 My participants 
belong to the first group. 
 
Since Bayat’s research on Iranian Islamism in the late 1980s,13 the term ‘post-Islamism’ 
has entered the academic debate, promoted especially by Olivier Roy (1994; 2004).14 
According to his distinction, post-Islamist revivalism targets the individual instead of 
aiming for an Islamic state: ‘Post-Islamism means the privatization of re-Islamisation’.15 
However, this terminology has been challenged. Sherif (2006) has argued that the 
transformation observed in Islamist parties and movements was a change in strategy rather 
than in content, and that Islamists had merely adjusted to political reality.16 In addition to 
this debate, the recent upheavals in the Arab World raised the question whether the focus 
on individual reformation was only a tactical manoeuvre, since Islamist parties in Tunisia 
and Egypt have come to power, and Islamist militant groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra are 
                                                
12 William Shepard, "Islam and Ideology: Towards a typology," International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 19(1987): 314f. Shepard lists other characteristics as well, as being 
less apologetic towards the West and less critical towards the pre-modern Muslim society 
then Modernists, a tendency to simplify symbols and to be less knowledgeable concerning 
sharia and traditions then traditionalists. 
13 Comp. Asef Bayat, "The Coming of a Post-Islamist Society," Critique: Critical Middle 
East Studies 9(1996); Asef Bayat, "What is post-Islamism," ISIM Review 16(2005). 
14 Comp. Olivier Roy, The failure of political Islam  (London: I.B.Tauris, 1994); Olivier 
Roy, Globalized Islam: The search for a new ummah  (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2004). 
15 Roy, Globalized Islam: The search for a new ummah: 97. 
16 Ashraf El Sherif, "Democratic Islamic Yuppies: Post-Islamism or another Islamism?," in 
AMSS 35th Annual Conference “Muslim Identities: Shifting Boundaries and Dialogues” 
(Hartford2006). 
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taking part in the civil war in Syria.17 In the case of the Syria, the involvement of militant 
Islamist groups on a larger scale was a comparatively late development. It seems yet 
unclear how much of the militant Islamist propaganda is due to opportunism, foreign 
influences, or other non-religious factors, rather than an indigenous political Islamist 
movement that has finally surfaced after decades of government suppression. In light of 
this lack of clarity concerning ‘post-Islamism’, I prefer to use the term ‘Islamist’.  
 
While I am using Shepard’s typology I am aware of the diversity between Islamists and 
that a clear demarcation line between ‘neo-traditionalists’, ‘modern Islamists’ and ‘radical 
Islamists’ does not exist in ‘real life’. ‘Islamist’ women don’t call themselves ‘Islamists’; 
like those in the other categories they call themselves ‘true Muslims,’ which shows 
simultaneously both the problems of any categorisation and yet the need for it. There seem 
to be two areas in which the differences with other trends are less distinct: Firstly, the use 
and reception of tradition: My focus group read traditional literature. Even though they 
verbally distinguished themselves from those who follow the taqālīd, a term often used for 
human traditions, which they saw as deviations from Islam, the question remains as to how 
far their Islamic ideal is nevertheless influenced or derived from traditions rather than from 
original sources. In addition, they were very practically oriented, something which they 
had in common with ‘neo-traditionalists’. Secondly, apologetic issues such as the 
discrimination of women or scientific questions were addressed in ways that can have a lot 
in common with modernist thinking. For example, an Islamist student at the Sharia College 
of Damascus University explained to me the egalitarian view of men and women in Islam. 
                                                
17 Comp. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi, "Jihad in Syria,"  Accessed 25.06.2013, 
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/jihad-in-syria-by-aymenn-jawad-al-tamimi/. 
 13 
To prove this in the case of polygamy she used Muhammad Abduh’s (1849-1905) 
argument, saying: 
The Qur’an allows the man to marry more than one woman only on the condition 
that he treats both totally equally. No man can do that, so the Qur’an practically 
forbids marrying more than one wife.18 
  
Yet this argument did not hold her back from expressing other more conservative Islamist 
views, during the same conversation: 
The Qur’an provides for the situation when [polygamy] is necessary because of the 
nature of men, e.g. when the first wife cannot have children, or when she gets older 
and doesn’t want to sleep with her husband as often as he wishes.19  
 
This example shows how women in my research focus group tried to make sense of their 
religion in the context of modern ideas, sometimes through harmonising, sometimes 
through apologetics. These observations coincide with Reuter’s (1998) research among 
Islamist women in Cairo, who detected a tendency towards a new emphasis on gender 
equality while at the same time neglecting the issue of discrimination of women under 
sharia law.20 However, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 5, the rejection of taqālīd and the 
hope of finding ‘true Islam’ through the correct interpretation, and a radical, purist 
adherence to its practices, play such an important role in their developments that the term 
‘Islamist’ seems more suitable than ‘neo-traditionalist’. 
                                                
18 Comp. Sura 4:3  and 4:129; concerning Abduh comp. Wiebke Walther, "Die Situation 
von Frauen in islamischen Ländern," in Der Islam in der Gegenwart, ed. Werner Ende and 
Udo Steinbach (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2005), 640. 
19 Conversation with Nasrin, Damascus, 12.06.2007. 
20 Comp. Reuter, Gelebte Religion: Religiöse Praxis junger Islamistinnen in Kairo: 59 and 
83. 
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My understanding of my participants as ‘Islamist’ was questioned when I realised that 
many of the devout Muslim women I had met were in some way connected with Sufism. 
Generally Islamism is seen as condemning Sufi thought and waging war against Sufi 
practices.21 However, Commins (1990) and Weisman (2001; 2007a) have argued that 
historically Islamist and Salafi movements have been less antagonistic to Sufism in Syria 
than in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, or even in some cases, like in the propagation of Sa’id 
Hawwa (1935-1989), identical. During the 19th century, Damascene scholars like Abd al-
Bitar al-Razzaq (1837-1917) propagated salafi thought in combination with a reformed 
Sufism, practicing those Sufi elements which he saw as coherent with orthodox Islam and 
rejecting others.22 Hawwa was a leading ideologist of the Islamic revival, a leader of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Hama and a Sufi sheikh. He propagated what he called salafi 
tasawwuf.23 He critised Wahhabi Islam for rejecting Sufism in general, arguing that 
knowledge without Sufi devoutness and practice remained without the power to change a 
person to truly submit to God.24 According to Commins and Weismann, the tendency for 
the last 200 years has been towards greater commitment to ‘orthodoxy’ especially of the 
Naqshibandi and Shadhili Sufi orders, the most widely spread orders in Syria. 
Additionally, in the past, members of Sufi orders have shared the Islamist goal of 
                                                
21 E.g. William C. Chittick, Sufism: A short introduction  (Oxford: Oneworld Publication, 
2000). 29; Elizabeth Sirriyeh, Sufis and anit-Sufis: The defense, rethinking and reflection 
of Sufism in the modern world  (London: Curzon Press, 1999); Valerie J Hoffman, Sufism, 
mystics, and saints in modern Egypt  (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 
1995). 6-7.               
22 Itzchak Weismann, "al-Bitar, Abd al-Razzaq," Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition.  
Accessed 02.07.2013, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-
islam-3/al-bitar-abd-al-razzaq-COM_23479. 
23 ‘Salafi Sufism’; comp. Itzchak Weismann, "Sa'id Hawwa and Islamic Revivalism in 
Ba'athist Syria," Studia Islamica 85(1997): 140. 
24 Paulo G. Pinto, "Dangerous Liaisons: Sufism and the State in Syria," in Crossing 
Boundaries: From Syria to Slovakia, ed. S. Jakelic and J. Varsoke (Vienna: IWM Junior 
Visiting Fellow's Conferences, 2003). 
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Islamising society and government in Syria, mainly through the reform of the individual, 
but in some cases also through violence.25 This agrees with the practices and beliefs of the 
Syrian women with Sufi connections that I have met. They emphasised orthodoxy and the 
observance of the sharia as well as elements of Sufi religiosity, arguing for the latter on the 
basis of the Qur’an and aḥadīth (sing.: ḥadīth), the traditions. On this basis, they would 
also criticise other traditional practices as un-Islamic and see the traditional Muslim 
religiosity of their society as a corrupted form of the ideal Muslim community. Yet they 
combined a focus on orthodox faith and sharia conform practice, with a focus on 
devoutness and the desire to shape their inner beings and emotionality through Sufi 
practices like dhikr (meditation).  
 
Sufism was influential in the women’s da‘wa movement because historically, Sufism has 
been more inclusive of women as religious authorities. Even though they were usually not 
the formal leaders of Sufi orders, many were sought as spiritual guides and teachers like 
the legendary Rabi‘a al-‘Adawiyya (d.801).26  
 
Generally, the affiliation of my participants with Sufism fluctuated. Some were formal 
members of orders, others had left formal membership behind but kept some Sufi 
practices, still others would sometimes take part in such practices. Dunya, for example, 
became a disciple of the Naqshbandiyya-Kuftariyya, and later changed her affiliation to the 
Shadhiliyya. She also took part in dhikr sessions of other Sufi orders. Sufi dhikr, the 
                                                
25 Itzchak Weismann, "Sufi Brotherhoods in Syria and Israel - a Contemporary Overview,"  
Accessed 30.06.2007, http://www.ou.edu/mideast/Additional%20pages%20-%20non-
catagory/Sufism%20in%20Syriawebpage.htm; Weismann, "Sa'id Hawwa and Islamic 
Revivalism in Ba'athist Syria," 132. 
26 Hoffman discusses this aspect in: Hoffman, Sufism, mystics, and saints in modern Egypt: 
228-30 and 32-33.  
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meditative worship, and the mentor relationship between teacher and disciple as practiced 
among Sufis significantly impacted my participants’ journeys towards devoutness. I will 
argue in this research that often, this combination of Sufi elements with Islamism 
specifically attracted them and shaped their journey.  
 
 
 
1.2  The importance of researching the role of devout Muslim women in Syria  
 
Part of today’s growing polarisation between the West and the Muslim East is the Western 
image of Muslim women, who are often seen as victims of both traditional Islam and 
Islamism. As Leila Ahmed (1992) has shown, this categorical judgment goes back to a 
long history of using Muslim women as boundary markers.27 On the other hand, Islamic 
feminism, which has gained some interest in the West, is relevant only to a minority of 
intellectuals, while according to my observations the masses of Muslim women in Syria 
are either oblivious to the discussions or reject many of their conclusions as un-Islamic.28 
Both the Orientalist and the feminist perception ignore that many Muslim women claim to 
live a certain expression of Islam because of their own religious convictions. This has led 
to the marginalisation of Islamist women’s devoutness in Western research.29 
 
                                                
27 Leila Ahmed, Women and gender in Islam: Historical roots of a modern debate  (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1992). 150-55. 
28 For representative examples of many conversations with Syrian women on this subject 
see 5.4.3, page 190-195, and 6.3.1, page 254-258. 
29 I discuss this in 1.3, page 21-29. 
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Yet, in Syria, in the years between the defeat of the Muslim Brothers in 1983 and the 
beginning of the uprising in 2011, large parts of the Muslim population turned towards 
Islam, parallel to the developments in other Arab countries. After a short period of 
apparent secularism during the 1970s and 1980s when Islamic dress had more or less 
disappeared from the streets of Damascus and men shaved off their beards in fear of being 
seen as Islamists, religious symbols had a huge comeback: Hijabs, face veils and black 
gloves had become a normal sight in the main shopping areas in the city centre, Islamic 
flags and banners were hung during religious holidays, and religious book stores and 
private Islamic schools increased. This revival happened at all levels of society: the 
popular level, the Islamist, and, at least rhetorically, the governmental-official level.30 
 
The renewed vigour of Islamic religiosity and apparent conservatism alienated parts of the 
more secular and non-Muslim population and seemed to justify their fears of Islamist 
tendencies.31 Wahhabi tendencies were noticeable, especially amongst some of those 
Syrians who returned home from periods of working in Saudi Arabia. However, Islamism 
generally seemed to be of a more tolerant kind, at least on the surface, which may partly 
have been due to the political situation in the country; even though Islamists were explicit 
and public about the goal of a changed society, it was only related to questions of morality  
                                                
30 I discuss this in detail in Chapter 3.2, page 75-82.  Similarly comp. Anders Strindberg, 
"Letter from Damascus: Syria under pressure," Journal of Palestine Studies 33, no. 4 
(2004). Joshua M. Landis, "'Islamic education in Syria: Undoing secularism',"  Accessed 
29.092005, http://www.WatsonInstitute.org/events_detail.cfm?id=329; Roula Khalaf, 
"Bashar al-Assad is making unfamiliar displays of piety to defuse Islamist discontent with 
his rule," Financial Times, 11.05. 2006. 
31 I am discussing this more in-depth in 3.2.1, page 82-87, and 3.3, 87-94. Concerning the 
implications for the da‘wa movement see 6.1, page 219-236. 
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and piety. Islamists that were perceived as a possible political opposition to the 
government were imprisoned.32  
 
The outward appearance of Islamist women had become a symbol of the influence of 
Islamism in society. The ban of the niqāb in schools and universities in June 2010, which 
was lifted in April 2011 illustrates this.33 The discourse within the da‘wa movement 
focuses constantly on women’s behaviour and clothing: subjects like proper Islamic dress, 
how to lead your daughter towards accepting the hijab, or the dangers of the immodestly 
dressed woman take up a lot of space in classes, TV shows and books, while remaining 
silent on the issue of men’s clothes, or only mentioning in an Appendix that they, also, 
should dress modestly. During my year as a auditing student at the Sharia College of 
Damascus University in 2005/2006, students would challenge me to become mutaḥajjaba, 
a woman wearing a headscarf, or even munaqqaba, a woman wearing a niqāb, just as 
much as they would challenge me to accept Muslim doctrine. It is difficult to say whether 
this focus is mainly a reaction to Western stereotyping.34 Reuter (1998) suggests that the 
Muslim woman is not only a central symbol of Islamism, but also the link to the one area 
                                                
32 e.g. in June 2007 Abdel Jabbar Allawi was sentenced to death, but had his punishment 
commuted to 12 years' imprisonment, for membership of the Muslim Brotherhood: 
http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=20961; see as well PuriNaresh Puri, "UK 
man tells of 'kidnap' in Syria,"  Accessed 01.07.2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6651793.stm. 
33 Joshua Landis, "The niqab and Syria's private girls schools,"  Accessed 23.09.2010, 
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/?p=6910. 
34 This is indirectly how Ustaz Muhammad, a teacher at the ANC who asked to remain 
anonymous, explained to me why the Islamic discourse focuses on women: 
Women issues take up a large part of our thinking because of the obligation that is 
put on the men to protect and provide for them. The Muslim East and the West 
agree on all other subjects of conduct. But concerning the ethics of gender relations 
and women the West is changing towards secularist extremism while Islam has 
remained moderate. This causes a lot of debate among the Muslims. 
Interview in the ANC, Damascus, 03.07.2007. 
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in real life that Islamism has a hold on, the private sphere, because no society can claim to 
have realised the Islamist ideals of an Islamic state.35  Trying to change society through 
changing the individual, families are the basic cells in which Islamism is lived and passed 
on. Women as mothers play the central role in this. 
 
Serving as the symbol of Muslim identity shows the importance that women play in the 
Islamist movements. The fact that the image of the extremely veiled woman has been used 
to push the Islamist agenda in the political and social sphere has monopolised the focus of 
research, and yet the religious questions and answers that many of these women seek and 
offer have been neglected. Seemingly unengaged with the public sphere, these women are 
easily judged as conservative conformists and legalists. Such judgements hinder 
understanding and dialogue. Rather, by engaging in da‘wa, many Islamist women rise up 
to the challenges of secularism, materialism, and other alternative worldviews that have 
become accessible in radically new ways. 
 
Women are not only a symbol in the discourse between East and West, they are an 
important key for the general understanding of Islamist movements, as a measure of its 
extent as well as its means of perpetuation. To understand this development, it is important 
to hear what they themselves say about their motivations, experiences and apprehensions 
because it is through the individual that the movement first begins to impact society. 
 
Recently, I have been questioned as to whether it is legitimate to focus research on Islamist 
women at a time when Islamist parties and militias are trying, and often succeeding, to 
                                                
35 Reuter, Gelebte Religion: Religiöse Praxis junger Islamistinnen in Kairo: 83. 
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dominate the political and social sphere in many Arab countries. For example, since the 
Arab Spring in 2011, the parties of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists have 
manoeuvred themselves into power in Egypt and Tunisia respectively. Reports from Syria 
mention atrocities committed by Islamist militias in the name of Islam.36 Is it justifiable to 
try to understand the motivations, aims and practices of Islamist women and to paint a 
picture of their lives as a credible interpretation of Islam? Writing this research I do not 
aim to give undue space to Islamism or marginalise the secular voices among Syrian 
Muslim women. However, whether or not I sympathise with my participants’ zeal or 
dislike the oppressive reality of some Islamist groups, according to my observations the 
women’s da‘wa movement was the most prevalent trend among women in pre-Arab 
Spring Syria. Understanding Islamist women is necessary to understand the 
transformations that have happened since then.  
 
However, I am aware that my focus will show only certain sides of the picture. Ingersoll 
(2002) argues that the recent trend in research on women in conservative religious groups 
and the attempt to respect their interpretations leads to silencing the feminist voice and 
supporting the status quo, because the theory that conservative religions empower women 
is true for some, but excludes the fact that many women struggle with it.37 This is certainly 
                                                
36 Such as Matthew Barber, "The Raqqa Story: Rebel structure, planning, and possible war 
crimes,"  Accessed 25.06.2013, http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/the-raqqa-story-rebel-
structure-planning-and-possible-war-
crimes/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A%20Syr
iacomment%20%28Syria%20Comment%29; Matthew Barber, "Oil Wars - Nusra's 
Expanding reach - Syrian Taliban,"  Accessed 25.06.2013, 
http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/oil-wars-nusras-expanding-reach-syrian-
taliban/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Syriac
omment+%28Syria+Comment%29. 
37 Julie Ingersoll, "Against univocality: Re-reading ethnographies of conservative 
protestant women," in Personal knowledge and beyond: Reshaping the ethnography of 
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true for Muslim women, but in the Western academic perception the feminist voice is 
widely heard, and the voice that speaks about empowerment and the ‘new mobility’ that 
Islamism offers is gaining ground, but the religious values and interpretations that many 
women offer themselves are too often overlooked. Thus my research adds another voice to 
the ‘multivocality’ that Ingersoll demands to gain a more truthful picture. 
 
 
 
1.3  Women and the Islamic revival in prior research  
 
The Islamic revival and its attraction for women was little mentioned in literature on 
Muslim women a couple of decades ago because of the prevailing view that Muslim 
women were more involved in ‘folk religion’ and superstition than in ‘orthodox’ Islam.38 
Many books dealing with the Islamist movement in general still barely address the role that 
women play in it,39 yet from the 1990s onwards, researchers have taken a growing interest 
in this subject because of the growing visibility of female participation in the Islamist 
movement e.g. in the Iranian revolution and the Algerian civil war. This is reflected in the 
inclusion of two texts related to women and the Islamic revival in the second edition of 
                                                                                                                                              
religion, ed. James V. Spickard, J. Shawn Landres, and Meredith B. McGuire (New York: 
New York University Press, 2002), 163f.  
38 E.g. Lois Beck and Nikki Keddie, eds., Women in the Muslim world (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1978); Jane I. Smith, ed. Women in contemporary Muslim 
societies (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 1980). 
39 Such as John L Esposito, The Islamic threat: Myth or reality?  (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999); Khaled Abou El-Fadl, The great theft: wrestling Islam from the 
extremists  (San Francisco: Harper, 2005). 
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Everyday Life in the Muslim Middle East in 2002,40 which the first edition in 1993 did not 
contain. Many publications focus on the reasons why Muslim women are starting to wear 
the veil.41 The one-sided emphasis on this phenomenon in Western research means that 
other elements of women’s roles in Islamism have been overlooked. My research therefore 
focuses on the religious self-perception and sentiment in relation to religious practices in 
the context of personal biographies to aim at a more complete understanding of Islamist 
women.   
 
Most of these studies are concerned with the question of whether Muslim practices, and 
more specifically Islamism, are oppressive or liberating for women, along with the 
political, economic and social implications of the new veiling.42 The compliance of 
Muslim women with apparently gender-discriminating practices has been explained mainly 
in two ways: either through Post-colonial theory, which understands the phenomenon in 
the context of resistance and protest to the political, economic and cultural domination of 
the West, or through the theory that Islamism empowers women, granting greater mobility 
and participation in the public sphere. In this vein, Kamla (n.d.) discusses practical 
                                                
40 Annabelle Böttcher, "Islamic teaching among sunni women in Syria," in Everyday life in 
the Muslim Middle East, ed. Donna Lee Bowen and Evelyn A Early (Bloomington, 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002); Elizabeth Warnock Fernea, "The veiled 
revolution," in Everyday life in the Muslim Middle East, ed. Donna Lee Bowen and Evelyn 
A Early (Bloomingtin, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2002). 
41 E.g. Wilhelmina Jansen, "Contested identities: Women and religion in Algeria and 
Jordan," in Women and Islamization, ed. Karin Ask and Marit Tjomsland (Oxford: Berg, 
1998); Soraya Duval, "New veils and new voices: Islamist women's groups in Egypt," in 
Women and Islamization, ed. Karin Ask and Marit Tjomsland (Oxford: Berg, 1998); Karin 
Werner, Between Westernization and the Veil: Contemporary Lifestyles of Women in Cairo  
(Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 1997). 
42 Sondra Hale, "Ideology and Identity: Islamism, Gender, and the State in Sudan," in 
Mixed Blessings: Gender and religious Fundamentalism cross culturally, ed. Judy Brink 
and Joan Mencher (New York: Routledge, 1997); A. E. Macleod, Accommodating protest: 
working women and the new veiling and change in Cairo  (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991). 
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advantages of veiling for Syrian women, such as freedom from consumerism and increased 
chances of employment or marriage.43 While aspects such as political resistance and the 
advantages of cultural and social empowerment are present in the lives of my participants, 
the question of personal power, compliance and choice is much more ambiguous than 
suggestions that see the root of the phenomenon in practical compromises, because the 
lengths to which these devout women go cannot be sufficiently explained through the 
above theories. The research focus on these theories has side-lined the religious 
dimensions of their choices. For example, in Muslim women’s choices: Religious belief 
and reality El-Solh and Mabro (1995) argue that the West has overemphasised the role that 
Islam has played in shaping cultures that are to a certain degree oppressive to women.44 
Their volume contains articles with a wide geographical and cultural scope. The two 
chapters that deal with the Islamic revival in Nigeria and the Philippines interpret women’s 
involvement in terms of social and political empowerment.45 The editors’ evaluation of the 
diversity of situations of Muslim women is a necessary reminder of how their lives are 
influenced by a multitude of aspects and not just by Islam, yet the volume omits the 
religious dimensions of Muslim societies. A record of Islamist women is missing in this 
book. 
 
                                                
43 Rania Kamla, "Syrian women accountants' attitudes and experiences of the hijab in the 
context of globalisation,"  Accessed 05.05.2012, 
http://www.organizzazione.unina.it/cms7/proceedings/proceedings_stream_33/Kamla.pdf. 
44 Camilia Fawzi El-Solh and Judi Mabro, "Introduction: Islam and Muslim women," in 
Muslim women's choices: Religious belief and social reality, ed. Camilia Fawzi El-Solh 
and Judi Mabro (Oxford, Providence, RI,: Berg, 1995), 19-20. 
45 Gloria Thomas-Emeagwali, "Islam and gender: The Nigerian case," in Muslim women's 
choices: Religious belief and social reality, ed. Camilia Fawzi El-Solh and Judi Mabro 
(Oxford, Providence, RI: Berg, 1995); Jacqueline Siapno, "Gender relations and Islamic 
Resurgence in Mindanao, Southern Philippines," in Muslim women's choices: Religious 
belief and social reality, ed. Camilia Fawzi El-Solh and Judi Mabro (Oxford, Providence, 
RI: Berg, 1995). 
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Egyptian Islamist women have been the subject of a number of publications. Reuter 
(1998), for example, argues that Egyptian Islamist women gain a positive self-perception 
and theoretical power through the highly idealistic responsibilities for the welfare of the 
Muslim community that Islamist teaching ascribes to them.46  
 
The literature on Syrian Islamist women is very limited. Annabel Böttcher has written a 
number of texts in which she explores, among other questions, Islamic tendencies among 
Syrian women. In Islamic teaching among Sunni women in Syria (2002) she describes how 
Islamic education of women in Syria and their access to religious knowledge is changing 
the society.47 In Portraits of Kurdish women in contemporary Sufism (2001)48 and Syrische 
Religionspolitik unter Asad (1998)49 Böttcher describes the women’s activities at the ANC. 
Her research focus is on the relationship between the religious leadership and the Syrian 
government under Hafez al-Asad. Böttcher analyses mainly political factors that caused 
women to turn towards devout Islam, as the government tried to channel the religious 
interest it could not quench through promoting Islam in pro-government institutes and 
mosques, while Islamists targeted women because in a traditional Sunni society women’s 
religious activities are less accessible to the government. Focusing on the political 
dimensions of Syrian religious life, Böttcher offers many insights into the organisation of 
one of the most prominent groups of the non-militant Islamist movement in Syria and its 
relations to the government. Yet the religious motivations that drive women to join the 
                                                
46 Reuter, Gelebte Religion: Religiöse Praxis junger Islamistinnen in Kairo. 
47 Böttcher, "Islamic teaching among sunni women in Syria." 
48 Annabelle Böttcher, "Portraits of Kurdish women in contemporary Sufism," in Women 
of a non-state nation: The Kurds, ed. S Mojab (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers, 2001). 
49 Annabelle Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad  (Freiburg i. Br.: Arnold 
Bergstrasser Institut, 1998). 
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Islamist movement are not the focus of her research. In contrast, in this thesis I will 
explore their motivations in depth.  
 
Similarly, a few articles on devout Syrian women have been published recently. Kamla 
(n.d.) returned to the question of why women are choosing the hijab and understands it as a 
tool to negotiate space and mobility in a patriarchal society.50 Kalmbach (2008) discusses 
the limited female religious leadership51 and describes the trans-national character of the 
Islamic women’s network of the Qubaisiyat.52 While I am building on these different 
research projects, none of them gives an in-depth answer to the question why many Syrian 
women are becoming devout.  
 
Islamist women’s devoutness has been the research subject of two recent publications. 
Most prominently, Saba Mahmood (2005) wrote about the women’s mosque movement in 
Egypt in Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject.53 In her book, 
Mahmood aims to answer the question why Egyptian Muslim women apparently choose to 
accept the limitations of Islamist interpretations, rather than supporting the re-
interpretations of their religious sources by Muslim feminists. Based on her field research 
on women’s da‘wa and religious lessons in mosques in Cairo in 1995-1997, she concludes 
that the women belonging to the women’s mosque movement have chosen to model their 
                                                
50 Kamla, "Syrian women accountants' attitudes and experiences of the hijab in the context 
of globalisation". 
51 Hilary Kalmbach, "Social and religious change in Damascus: One case of female Islamic 
religious authority," British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 1 (2008). 
52 Sarah Islam, "The Qubaysiyyat: The Growth of an international Muslim Women's 
Revivalist movement from Syria (1960 - 2008) " in Women, leadership and mosques: 
Changes in contemporary Islamic authority, ed. Masooda Bano and Hilary Kalmbach 
(Leiden, Bosten: Brill, 2012). 
53 Mahmood, Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject. 
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lives on their perception of authentic piety. Accordingly, she argues that female agency 
cannot be understood exclusively in terms of feminist theory as resistance and liberation, 
but that her research participants’ choices of moral practices with the goal of shaping the 
inner pious self, demonstrate an alternative female agency in their particular cultural and 
historical context. 
 
With a similar purpose of questionning the Western view of Islamist women, Lara Deeb 
studied the notions of piety and modernity among Shi’ite women in Beirut. In An 
enchanted modern: Gender and public piety in Shi’i Lebanon (2006) she argues that the 
‘Western’ notion of ‘being modern’, which sees modernity and secularism as inseparable, 
is only one possible understanding. In comparison, her research focus group’s notion of 
modernity was based on material, as well as spiritual, progress.54 According to Deeb, the 
Islamist search to establish ‘true Islam’ is a modern process to ‘authenticate’ Islam. Her 
research focus group understood spiritual progress as the process to establish the true 
meaning and character of Islam, which happened through the acquisition of textual 
religious knowledge and everyday conversations in which her participants exchanged 
information and ideas, shaping each others’ views. At the same time, the authenticity of 
personal piety became visible through public displays of piety with religious and social 
activism going hand in hand. Deeb pays special attention to the social community work 
that her participants undertake as a vehicle of female resistance against economic and 
political oppression.  
 
                                                
54 Lara Deeb, An enchanted modern: Gender and public piety in Shi'i Lebanon  (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2006). 
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Mahmood’s and Deeb’s research show some parallels between devout Muslim women in 
Lebanon and Egypt and my Syrian participants, which validate my observations and 
analysis. Yet the different religious, social, cultural, economic and political contexts 
necessarily lead to distinct pictures and analysis of Muslim women’s piety. This is 
especially obvious in the areas of social activism and Sufi influences: Deeb showed in her 
research that Shi’ite women in Beirut gained a new visibility mainly through social 
activism. The Syrian women participating in my research have also moved into the public 
sphere yet this mostly happened through religious activism using both visibility and 
hiddenness as I will discuss in Chapter 6.1. Looking at Mahmood’s study, Sufism and its 
strong focus on divine love apparently plays no role in the Egyptian mosque movement 
among women, in contrast to my participants’ lives, as I will deliberate in 7.2.2 and 7.4.3. 
 
These differences demonstrate the diversity among Islamist Muslim women and the need 
to research and understand them in their particular contexts. In addition, while I share with 
Mahmood and Deeb the goal of challenging the monolithic view of pious Muslim women 
as either oppressed and passive or utilizing religion to gain power, their research answers 
different questions to my research. Deeb’s main argument is, that for her participants, 
modernity and piety are not incompatible, but necessary mutually influencing aspects of 
their worldview, which she describes as both ‘enchanted,’ (as opposed to materialistic), 
and modern. This focus in Deeb’s research highlights a difference between the Lebanese 
and the Syrian context, because claiming ‘modernity’ did not play an important role in my 
participants’ discourse. Their claims of not being ‘backward’ (mutakhallifīn) in apologetic 
contexts, is often linked with the claim of not being ‘terrorists’, showing their awareness of 
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Western stereotyping.55 However, this question was rarely discussed among themselves, 
nor did it feature in lessons.  
 
Mahmood uses a philosophical approach to understand the women’s mosque movement in 
terms of the Aristotelian concept of habitus. In her fascinating discussion of her 
participants’ religious lives, she shows how the performance of pious acts is used to train 
and create the permanent pious character that her participants desire. However, her 
research triggers the question as to where this desire for piety comes from in the first place. 
Mahmood refers to the underlying social and cultural discourse in Egyptian society, yet 
this does not explain why some Egyptian women desire to become pious and others do not, 
nor how women make the transition to become agents of their own piety. It is this gap that 
I am aiming to bridge with my research. Therefore, I am looking at the development of 
particular women to understand their desire to change in the context of their personal past, 
present and future. The wider da‘wa movement is the context in which my participants 
experienced this change. Looking at the construct of ‘true Islam’ in the Syrian context, I 
focus on how religious activism among my participants succeeds because of the desire for 
authenticity in the context of self-perception before God. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
55 Interestingly, Deeb also introduces the claim of modernity versus backwardness in the 
context of Western – Muslim relations, comp. Ibid., 3. 
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1.4   My research and the Syrian uprising since March 2011  
 
I finished my field research in Syria in June 2011. Since then, from what I hear and read 
Syrian society has changed immensely as the country has slipped into a brutal civil war 
and groups of Islamists have surfaced, monopolising the news about the ongoing uprising 
in Syria today. This poses the question whether the evidence of militant Islamism 
invalidates my research conclusions about the central importance of devoutness in the 
Islamist movement among women. Unfortunately I cannot include these recent 
developments in my research as information that comes out of Syria is contradictory and 
confusing. I also have lost contact with nearly all my participants as phone lines and 
internet connections have become unreliable, and the very rare conversations remain vague 
and superficial. However, the following observations support that the current violence in 
the name of Islam should not be understood a consistent continuation of the Islamist trend 
before the uprising. 
 
During the first five months of the uprising, militant Islamism played no important role 
even though the government labelled the protestors as Islamist terrorists from the very 
beginning. Demonstrators in all major cities picked up slogans that denounced political 
Islam and sectarianism. It was, and is, impossible to say how strong different elements 
within the protest movement were exactly, because of the absence of any systematic data 
collection and the fragmentary nature of all evidence. To my knowledge, until June 2011 
no religious demands were made nor were religious concepts used to mobilize people. That 
does not mean that the protests were free from religious language or symbols. However, 
they were used in general or even explicitly inclusive ways. With the rising numbers of 
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killed protesters more religious slogans were used, e.g. the popular al-janna rayḥīn, 
shuhadāʾ bi-l-malayīn: ‘To heaven we go, millions of martyrs.’ However, I observed the 
expressed hope of divine justice in the face of death rather than religious militancy.  
 
So long as the authoritarian government in Syria successfully supressed all expression of 
political opposition in the country, the invisibility of a political Islamist movement led to 
all kinds of speculations about the secret strength of under-cover Islamist groups and the 
influence of the exiled Muslim Brotherhood. The protests opened up a new opportunity for 
political activism, which the Islamist groups did not take during the early months. At this 
stage my research participants were split about 50-50 when it came to the support of the 
protests.56  
 
It seems from all these observations, that the growing phenomenon of militant Islamism 
from summer 2011 onwards originated from the radicalisation of parts of the protest 
movement in response to the failure to succeed and the violence of the government,  not 
from an intrinsic bias among Islamists. The failure to distinguish between militant 
Islamists and Islamists aiming at devoutness, bred fear between different groups of the 
population and, according to many conversations during the early months, an acceptance 
of the abuse of political power among those Syrians who supported the government.57  
 
                                                
56 Acc. to conversations and interviews March 2011 – June 2011; e.g. Zaynab supported 
the government (Interview, Damascus, 18.06.2011) while Farida supported the uprising 
(Interview, Damascus, 16.06.2011). 
57 Comp. for similar observations "Syria in Fragments: Divided minds, divided lives,"  
Accessed 08.07.2013, http://www.joshualandis.com/blog/syria-in-fragments-divided-
minds-divided-lives-by-an-american-in-syria/. 
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These thoughts reinforce the relevancy of my research focus to grasp the appeal of the 
religious dimensions of Islamism for women. Even though it is yet unclear whether 
militant Islamism is going to be a permanent strong influence in Syria, a better 
appreciation of the women’s da‘wa movement during the last 30 years will promote 
greater understanding of recent developments once more data is accessible.  
 
 
 
1.5  Structure of this thesis 
 
In the following chapter I will discuss the different methods I used to collect and analyse 
my data, and reflect on the challenges of researching and understanding Muslim women's 
devoutness from the bias of a Christian and Western academic.   
 
I will show in Chapter 3 how the Islamic revival in Syria has been particularly influenced 
by the confrontation between Islamist groups and the Baath government during the 1970s 
and 1980s, because in its wake, the strong trend towards secularisation turned towards a 
renewed religiosity. The ensuing acceptance or rejection of religious choices as well as the 
government’s attempts to control the Islamic milieu, shaped my participants’ journeys 
through support and opposition.    
 
In Chapter 4, looking at the history of the development of the women’s da‘wa movement 
in Syria as one manifestation of the Islamic revival, I will discuss the major changes in 
secular and religious education as well as the changes concerning female morality and 
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roles that facilitated it. Finally, I will explore the educational activities of the da‘wa 
movement and the way it recruits. Looking at the da‘wa movement will shed light on the 
external factors that initiated and permitted my participants to move beyond traditional 
Islamic practice and sentiment.   
 
Chapter 4 contains my case studies of the religious developments of five women, three 
dā‘iyāt and two women on the margins of the da‘wa movement. Based on in-depth 
interviews, I will explore their family backgrounds, developments, their current religious 
commitments and the way they understand themselves as women who are reaching out for 
devoutness, portraying their individual personalities and histories as well as delineating the 
parallels between their stories. Emphasising my participants’ own interpretations of their 
journeys, each particular case will add unique facets to the understanding of the 
attractiveness of Islamism to some Muslim women.  
 
In the last two chapters I will look at the differences and similarities between my 
participants and analyse the different aspects that promoted the turn towards devoutness in 
their lives. As a framework for my analysis I discuss the question of whether Islamism has 
been empowering for my participants or not, and how ‘becoming a true Muslim’ has 
helped them to gain greater satisfaction in their lives. In Chapter 5, I will argue that the 
social empowerment of Syrian women through the da‘wa movement cannot explain the 
phenomenon sufficiently. Therefore, I will analyse the meaning that my participants 
assigned to the question of empowerment as a religious category in Chapter 6.  
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Throughout my analysis I will demonstrate that, while the cultural, social and political 
developments facilitated my participants’ journeys, their desires to gain a meaningful, 
emotionally satisfying and correct religious practice and love of God in the hope of divine 
reward in the hereafter were their major motivations. Thus I hope to contribute to a fuller 
understanding of devout Islamist women according to their values and self-perception in 
the Syrian context. 
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2 METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS 
 
In my research, I follow an ethnographic approach to come to a presentation and an 
understanding of the research participants’ point of view. At the outset of my research I 
planned to focus mainly on interviews and use participant observation of my informants' 
lives to deepen my understanding of the interviews. However, eventually I used a number 
of tools. Religious questions were part of many everyday conversations and I had already 
started to take notes of information and opinions that shed some light on how my Syrian 
friends and acquaintances related to these questions. In my writing I have therefore 
identified the source of such data as conversations, as distinguished from the intentional, 
planned interviews that I have listed in Appendix 9.2. Opportunities for interviews 
developed out of these conversations, either directly with my acquaintance or I was passed 
on to someone else that my acquaintnace deemed helpful for my research. However, the 
difficulties to find enough women who were willing to participate in in-depth interviews 
about their personal lives, that I discuss in Section 2.3., led me to try different approaches. 
When I met two da‘iyāt, Sawda, who invited me to partake in her private lesson, and a few 
months later Zaynab, who introduced me to Rajab Deeb's public lesson at ANC, I initially 
followed their invitation to widen my research network and find more interview partners. 
As the list in 9.2. shows, I had already attended some religious events before joining these 
two lessons regularly. Yet the frequent attendance of these and further lessons proved to be 
an invaluable source of learning more about the da‘wa practice and discourse, the religious 
concepts that played a role in attracing women to the movement, and how the women 
within the movement related to each other, though only two of my case studies, that of 
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Sawda and of Zaynab, resulted from my attendance. The other three case studies ensued 
from my personal network independent of mosque lessons.  
 
Another tool I used was a small survey of women's dress in three shopping locations in the 
city centre of Damascus. The need for this kind of data collection arose from the fact that 
some of my interview partners offered observations concerning extreme forms of Islamic 
dress, which contradicted my own estimations that a significant portion of extremely veiled 
women had become part of the modern public business areas of Damascus. I decided to 
verify either observation as well as the common claims of how many women veil through a 
quantitative survey of the dress of 1882 women in total and discuss this survey in 6.1.1. 
 
While in my case studies I focus on individual women's narratives of their religious 
journeys according to one to three interviews of varying lengths for each case study, using 
these different methods of data collection has enabled me to situate my case studies in the 
context of an exploration of the women's da‘wa movement and to examine the validity of 
my analysis of the interviews against this backdrop. This was of particular importance 
because as a non-Muslim, studying the religious experiences, ideals and lives of Muslim 
women I faced a number of methodological challenges that needed to be dealt with so that 
my research project would result in valid, reliable knowledge. In the following, I reflect on 
the theory of how to study a subject that is related to claims of metaphysical truths and 
experiences through ethnographic research methods. Then I discuss my identity as an 
‘outsider’ in relationship with my research. And finally I discuss my research practice. 
These reflections will help to disclose how my identity and bias have affected this research 
as part of the process of validating it.  
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2.1  Reflections on the theory of ‘methodological atheism’ in the study of  
  Religion 
 
As I have discussed in 1.2 and 1.3 the devoutness of Islamist women has not received 
adequate attention in Western research. This is due partly to the difficulty of evaluating 
faith-related notions from a secular point of view. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), the 
founder of the phenomenological school, argued that sociological research should only be 
concerned with what can be proven and demonstrated, and that therefore other dimensions 
should be ‘bracketed out’. In the case of the study of religion, this means that research 
should only be concerned with the social dimensions of religion. Religion as a cultural and 
social structure is separated from the question of metaphysical truth.58 In its extreme form, 
this approach leads to ‘methodological atheism,’59 the a priori judgement that the studied 
religion is a human projection. This is seen as a guarantee for the neutrality of the 
researcher. On the contrary, Hufford (1995) argues that an atheistic epistemological 
approach is not ‘more scientific,’ but just a different kind of bias: Rather, facing the bias of 
‘faith,’ scholarly scepticism should ideally lead to the ‘suspension of judgement in the 
process of gaining certainty’.60  
 
If the possibility of metaphysical realities is excluded from the research a priori the 
consequences are huge. From this perspective, research looks at religious acts and 
sentiments, claiming to describe them with neutrality and disinterested objectivity. The 
                                                
58 acc. to Fiona Bowie, The Anthropology of Religion: An introduction  (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2006). 4-6. 
59 Ibid., 26, note 5. 
60 David J Hufford, "The scholarly voice and the personal voice: Reflexivity in belief 
studies," Western Folklore 54, no. 1 (1995): 68-69.  
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problem is, however, that the descriptions and consequently the interpretations are a priori 
in contradiction of the descriptions and interpretations of the research participants. The 
specifically religious significance that the participants ascribe to their religious lives is 
either ignored or judged from the beginning as the projection of something else. Thus, the 
religious significance is discarded as inferior and invalid;  contrary to the evaluations of 
the ‘believers’. This can hardly be called ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’. The claim that 
neutrality about questions of belief is possible and that this neutrality leads to objectivity is 
in itself a contradiction to the claims of the ‘believers’.  
If, for example, a woman tells me that at the beginning of her turning towards greater piety 
she had a divinely inspired vision of Muhammad, there is scientifically no method to 
decide whether this happened or not: To assume a priori that she had nothing else but a 
dream and that her evaluation of the dream was an emotional overreaction is not more 
scholarly than to assume that possibly Muhammad really came and visited her. Both are 
positions of belief. 
 
The choice of methodological atheism also affects how the participants react towards the 
researcher. Informants who feel that their beliefs are seen as irrelevant to the understanding 
of the research subject may rightly feel patronised. Or if they realise that part of what they 
believe is unacceptable to the researcher, they may exclude those aspects and meanings 
when talking, because they do not want to be seen as backward or superstitious. The 
incomplete collected data will lead at best to imbalanced, at worst to incorrect, 
explanations as the interpretation is reduced to theories that fit into an agnostic world view. 
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Instead the researcher should be aware of the reductionist tendencies of his own beliefs and 
make them known, aiming at differentiating between scholarly knowledge on one hand, 
and the participants’ beliefs and the personal beliefs of the researcher on the other. 
Therefore, how the personal bias and the identity of the researcher influences the research 
process has to be part of the written account.  
 
In addition, our own worldview acts as a filter to what questions researchers ask, what 
areas or remarks they think important or not to take note of, or to explain what they see. If 
they use only secular paradigms to understand religion, they may only find the traits of 
religion that equal secular life. As Goldstein (1995) has argued, because belief has mostly 
been treated as ‘essentially external to the scope of research,’ in the ethnographic research 
of religion the study of religious meaning has been neglected.61  
The literature on Muslim women and Islamism gives a good illustration of this problem. 
Instead of looking at Islamism as a complex religious phenomenon in which a variety of 
dimensions interact with each other, the prevalence of the question of women’s 
emancipation has led to a focus on the social, economic and political reasons that make 
women turn towards Islamism. Other dimensions like the ritual, the narrative, or the 
doctrinal dimension, have consequently been neglected.62  
 
 
 
 
                                                
61 Diane E Goldstein, "The secularization of religious ethnography and narrative 
competence in a discourse of faith," Western Folkore 54, no. 1 (1995): 23-24. 
62 Comp. Chapter 1.3, page 21-29. 
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2.2  Worldview bias and the power of interpretation 
 
The problems of the impossibility of the neutrality and objectivity of the researcher are 
further aggravated in research about Muslims. One of the challenges encountered is the 
various conflicting interests concerning knowledge and interpretation, because the ability 
to define reality is a question of power. With the current polarisation of the public view 
and discussions about Muslims and Islam, my research subject is highly emotional, 
whether it is judged for its apologetic or polemic possibilities. Whenever I explain my 
research purpose of gaining a better understanding of devout Islamist women, reactions 
differ according to the worldview, but they are always emotional and often action-oriented. 
For example, one Syrian student of sharia in her early twenties commented: ‘Great! When 
you have come to a real understanding you can become a preacher for Islam in your 
country.’ A British friend said: ‘My first thought is: this must be really interesting for 
governments who want to stop Muslim women from becoming more extremist.’ A middle-
aged man, making small talk after a church service in Germany, asked me: ‘Why are you 
advocating Islam?’ These reactions show that even the goal of gaining ‘understanding’ is 
not neutral but depends on the real or assumed intention of the person who seeks it. 
 
In addition to the question of power in the current geopolitical context, the power of 
interpreting religion is uniquely related to one’s personal worldview because it is 
impossible to be disinterested in the essential questions that religions claim to answer, like 
the meaning of life, or the question of whether there is an afterlife or not: Everyone is 
either a believer or not, and one’s view of life is questioned by the other side, including the 
secularist perspective. In my research I am constantly confronted with the following 
 40 
interests: the interest of different Islamic groups to have their particular interpretation of 
Islam accepted as the correct one; the interest of most Muslims to have Islam in general 
regarded as the final truth for all humankind; the interest of those sympathetic to Islam to 
see it depicted as a tolerant religion; the opposite interest of those who see Islam involved 
in a battle with the West; the vested interest of the women participating in my research to 
have their faith and practices portrayed as credible; and my personal interest as a Christian 
to see my own religion respected and recognised as credible by the women I encounter, 
especially if they question my beliefs. 
 
In concrete terms this is not only a question of simply ‘Muslim’ versus ‘non-Muslim’, 
‘atheist’ versus ‘theist’. As a German woman with a conservative protestant upbringing, an 
education in the context of a Western materialistic worldview and a personal commitment 
to the Lutheran church I see myself as someone who shares some convictions with both 
sides of the spectrum. As a believer in a monotheistic faith I have many convictions in 
common with my participants, but as a believer in critical thinking my approach to 
knowledge including religious knowledge is shaped in many ways by scepticism and the 
ideal of critical distance to the subject. 
 
In the face of these challenges it seems unrealistic to claim that objectivity can be reached 
through disinterestedness. Instead my responsibility as a researcher is to reflect on my 
emotions and convictions, to be aware of the ways they are affecting my data collection 
and interpretation, and to identify the different conflicting interests. As a person with my 
own convictions I do make judgements about questions of metaphysical truth according to 
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my own worldview. However, through attempting as much transparency as possible I will 
avoid assigning them the character of research results.  
 
The question of the identity of the researcher is of course not only one of religious 
convictions and scientific objectivity. Each person has ‘multiple identities’ which also 
affect the researcher’s relationship to the participants. Whether they see me as an ‘outsider’ 
or ‘insider’, influences the way they represent themselves to me, and in what ways they see 
my presence as inviting or threatening. It goes without saying that being a woman is a 
precondition to this research in a community that practices strict gender segregation. My 
age and my family status are always of high interest for my informants: Differences, 
commonalities and cultural hierarchies are usually established as part of the ‘small talk’ 
during first encounters. For example, to be unmarried and in my thirties puts me at odds 
with the cultural norm, and as such opens up possibilities to relate to Syrian women who 
are in the same situation. For these women my identity as an ‘outsider’ to the Syrian 
cultural norm is attractive because I am seen as being outside the system that judges the 
value of a woman by her marriage status and motherhood. This is especially relevant for 
my research because I have encountered a number of female religious activists that are 
single and have to deal with the additional stigma that their singleness is an expression of 
religious extremism: Their ‘unnatural’ status is discussed in articles and internet chat 
rooms,63 and it is hardly an accident that in the recent Syrian soap opera Mā malakat 
                                                
63 comp. e.g. Bisan Al-Sheykh, ""Al-sahariyyat" fi beyrut mu'minat nashitat wa fi 
madarisihunna munhazat dadda al-sibyan,"  Accessed 13.5.2009, 
http://www.daralhayat.com/archivearticle/134980; Nabil Fayad, "Al-khalfiyya al-jinsiyya 
lil-qubaisiyyāt," online.  Accessed 09.02.2007, http://www.annaqed.com. 
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‘aymānukum64 the character of an extremist female preacher is portrayed as a middle-aged 
unmarried woman.65  
 
This example demonstrates that there is no simple answer as to whether it serves the 
research better if the researcher is an ‘insider’ or an ‘outsider’. On the one hand, the 
‘insider’ may have a better general access to informants, and a deeper, long-term 
knowledge of the history and context of the research group. On the other hand, the 
closeness can be a handicap because of the emotional connection with which the ‘insider’ 
relates to the research subject and participants and which stretches not only into the past 
but also into the future: Her research will affect her ongoing position and role within the 
research group. Looking at my religious identity, a Muslim researcher would probably 
have to deal with her emotional reactions to the claims of ‘true Islam’ in a much more 
personal way.66  
 
I do not aim at judging any of the claims to be a ‘true Muslim’ versus ‘corrupted’ versions 
of Islam. A meaningful discussion on such a topic, if at all, has to come from within a 
religion because only Muslims share the same norms in deciding this question on the 
authority of their sources.67 Obviously, there are beliefs and norms that are a consensus 
among the majority of Muslims. However, the problem is that if I label something that my 
participants see as part of their religious lives as ‘un-Islamic’ behaviour, thought or 
                                                
64 ‘What your right hand possesses’ 
65 This series was broadcasted in Syria during Ramadan 2010. 
66 Some Muslims I encountered who distance themselves from Islamism have been the 
strongest critics concerning the legitimacy of my research. 
67 Contrary to Düzgün, e.g., I do not think that a fruitful theological approach can be based 
on a common norm of the religious experience of the numinous. Comp. Saban Ali Düzgün, 
"Contextualizing the term 'religious experience' in theological discourse," Islam and 
Christian-Muslim Relations 15, no. 4 (2004). 
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interpretation, it has to be explained through external factors and the meaning it has for its 
adherents may be overlooked.  
 
In the following, I want to look at some of my multiple identities as a researcher and their 
potential as barriers and bridges towards my research participants: 
 
I observed a great awareness among Syrian Muslim women of the Western research 
interest in Muslim women in a general way. However this awareness is associated with the 
sense that the interest of those ‘outside’ of Islam is necessarily directed against Islam and 
Muslims. Many Muslim women feel that Western researchers have greatly misrepresented 
them, maybe even ‘twisting’ their words to convey a ‘different meaning’. I was confronted 
with this again and again as I tried to explain my research goals to Muslims in Syria. As 
Leila, a student in the da‘wa program at the ANC, explained to me:  
There is a lot of fear among us [Muslim women] to talk to researchers because 
Westerners explain Islam in a way that makes us look suppressed even though [our 
religious practices] are our own choice. We all feel attacked and have to be very 
careful. It is better not to talk to orientalists. The only way for you as a Christian to 
get any information is to find a friend who knows that she can trust you.68  
 
This quotation addresses four of my multiple identities in my relationship to the research 
participants. While Leila identifies herself and possible research participants simply as 
‘Muslim women’, she labels me as a ‘researcher/orientalist’, a ‘Westerner’, a ‘Christian’ 
and possibly a ‘friend’. The first three labels describe me as an ‘outsider’ in the cultural, 
                                                
68 Interview with Leila, Damascus, 23.06.2007. 
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religious and functional sense. They have negative implications, such as someone who is 
untruthful and aggressive: Someone who has a hidden political agenda of domination. To 
withhold information and not to take part in my research seems the only sensible reaction. 
However, Leila also pointed to the identity of ‘a friend’ that could possibly bridge the gap, 
as I proved myself trustworthy nonetheless.  
 
When I started my research in 2006 I expected that my religious and cultural identity 
would be the highest barrier for my data collection. By that time I had lived for two years 
in Damascus, first as a language student and then as a listening student at the Sharia 
Department of Damascus University. Many Syrians were very open to encounters with 
foreigners. In my experience even strangers on the street or in parks would be interested in 
exchanging opinions on current affairs with a ‘Westerner’ that was willing to listen to their 
views. However, higher barriers existed to meeting religious Sunni women, partly due to 
issues of segregation and lesser mobility. The women of my landlord’s family, for 
example, who counted themselves among the ‘devout’, rarely went outside the house 
except for specific errands, covering their faces with a niqāb, and the men checked that 
they returned home promptly. Nevertheless, they truly welcomed me in the context of 
neighbourly relations. On the other hand, the notion that anyone who does not follow strict 
gender segregation herself is a bad influence and should be avoided is also not uncommon 
among conservative Damascenes.69  
 
                                                
69 Comp. e.g. the opinions quoted in: Mayar Mnini and Jennifer Mackenzie, "Traditional 
marriage under the microscope," Forward Magazine, no. 43 (2010). In some lessons the 
listeners were warned against friendships with non-Muslims and the bad influence they 
would have. 
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However, when there was a natural platform no barriers seemed to exist: During my time 
as a listening student, students often had spare hours between classes and many fellow 
students, no matter how conservative or Islamist, were interested in talking to me, in 
starting friendships and in telling me about their religious views and experiences. Through 
my appearance I was easily recognized as a foreigner, whereas my religion was not visible 
as I was wearing the obligatory hijab. Once the women knew about my religious identity, 
my being a ‘Christian’ - contrary to my expectations - helped me to form friendships with 
religious students who as acquaintances explored whether I was a serious believer in a 
monotheistic faith, and the discovery of similar moral values opened up opportunities for 
deeper relationships. As to the ‘insider – outsider’ discussion, my religious identity as an 
outsider considering religious membership and certain doctrinal questions, identified me at 
the same time as an ‘insider’ to the wider circle of monotheistic believers. This gave me 
credibility and supported my claims of integrity as a person in a society where someone 
who can be trusted is often described as ‘khāyif min allah’, someone who fears God.  
 
When I started my research project I expected that building trust and recognising common 
ground would also help me to find participants for my research and to gain acceptance of 
my function as a researcher among my focus group. This proved to be much more difficult 
than dealing with my cultural and religious identity. Many times during the process of data 
collection I encountered women who became willing to talk to me when they found out 
about my research interest or would withhold information in other ways. For example, 
when I first met Manar, a woman in her thirties who was working on her PhD in ḥadīth 
science at a private Islamic University in Damascus while also pursuing a secular career, 
she told me about her ‘wild teenage years’, when she had rebelled against her traditional 
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upbringing and been fascinated by Western culture. However, when I did a formal 
interview with her about her life story, she refused to talk about this period. In another 
instance, a friend tried to connect me to her religious teacher who was known for her 
radical transformation experience. My friend was sure that her teacher, whom she 
described as a very well educated, open-minded and easily accessible person, would help 
me. Yet the teacher not only refused to receive me, she also told this friend not to talk to 
me. Rabi‘a, one of the participants of my research, told me when we met for the first 
formal interview that her two daughters, through whom I had initially met her, warned her 
not to give me an interview because of the incorrect picture that my research would 
propagate. 
 
These incidents, and many more like them, show that my identity as a researcher was a 
much greater handicap for my data collection than being a ‘Westerner’ or a Christian. 
There are a number of reasons for this. First of all, there were religious, epistemological 
objections: While as a Christian I could connect with them as someone who was also 
interested in the question of spiritual truth, my ethnographic research approach ascribes 
value to the subjectivity of Muslim women’s lives. Although all my participants agreed 
that obviously Muslims live out their religion in different ways, they did not recognise any 
value in this other than being closer or farther away from living in the one correct Muslim 
way. From their perspective, nothing could be gained from looking at ‘imperfect’ human 
beings. If I was interested in truth, I should study ‘true Islam’, which meant the original 
Islamic sources. Looking at people instead was suspicious because if I were not interested 
in ‘true Islam’ my agenda would probably be the denigration of Islam.  
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Secondly, this threat was exacerbated through the public character of research. This 
concerned not only the loss of control over the information and the question of whether the 
research would present a distorted picture, but also a general uneasiness of having 
women’s private lives dragged out into the open. Publicity contradicts the cultural value of 
female seclusion which is seen not necessarily in the sense that women should stay at 
home, but as the value of not directing attention to women.70  
 
Thirdly, there was the question of the political threat and how the research could be used to 
gain power over my participants. These included the possibility of repercussions from the 
government or the objections from their own Muslim community who might disagree with 
the information that they gave me or see a lack of loyalty in their having participated at all; 
and, again, a denigrated picture of Islam would be used against Muslims in the conflicts 
between ‘Muslims’ and ‘the West’. For all these reasons my identity as a researcher was 
perceived as threatening.  
 
Despite these handicaps, some women were still attracted to talk to me as a researcher. 
While, for example, the cultural value of female seclusion worked against the participation 
of some women, others took the opportunity to talk about themselves and be listened to. 
They tried to make sure that I understood what they were talking about, writing down 
important quotations for me, or encouraging me to use a voice recorder. When I 
interviewed a private study group of women what they would want to communicate to 
people in ‘the West’, their answers showed their emotional interest in having an 
                                                
70 I will discuss this more in depth in Chapter 6.1.1, page 220-228. 
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opportunity to correct the Western picture of Islam: ‘That we are not terrorists!’ ‘It is the 
[Muslim] non-believers that are dominating the picture of Islam in the West.’71 
 
Another reason for women to seek contact with me was their interest in converting me to 
Islam. For this group, my identity as a researcher was more promising because of my 
religious identity: Even though I was an ‘outsider’ they saw me as someone close on the 
faith spectrum once they had established that I was a person with spiritual interests. 
Consequently, my interest in Islamic studies was seen as an indicator that I was already on 
my way to converting, so for some women I became a target of their attempts. The results 
are a disproportionate number of dā‘iyat among the participants as well as a huge amount 
of da‘wa discourse in the data that I collected. This leads to the next area of this chapter, 
the area of my research practice, where I discuss the reasons and the implications of this. 
 
 
 
2.3  My research practice and the delineation of my research focus group 
 
As is obvious from the above, the greatest challenge for my research was to find women 
willing to participate in my research and talk about their religious experiences in a personal 
way, beyond the standards of their Islamic ideal. This raised the question of how I should 
introduce myself. For the sake of presenting myself as a morally trustworthy person I 
decided to adapt my life style to a certain degree to the standards of my research 
participants: For example I limited my interaction with men and usually did not receive 
                                                
71 Group interview during Sawda’s private lesson, Damascus, 29.11.2008. 
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male visitors in my home. I changed my wardrobe to long sleeves and mainly long, loose 
skirts to meet the specific demands of modesty. I did not, though, don the hijab unless 
asked to, e.g. when attending lessons at mosques, because I decided that this would give 
me the appearance of a Muslim which would contradict the ethical standards of this 
research.72 When I met women through my personal network the reason for my presence in 
Syria was naturally part of my conversations with Syrians. I introduced myself as a 
student, doing PhD work in Islamic studies. At the beginning of my research I then 
described my research project as researching the change towards a religious life of Muslim 
women. I tried different Arabic terms, such as taḥāwul īla -l-ḥayāt al-dīniya wa –l-ʾiltizām 
73 or tadayyun al-mar’a al-muslima fī Surīya74 or al-taghyīr īla -l-dīn wa -l-ʾiltizām bayn 
al-muslimāt.75 I soon realised to what degree the objections and emotional barriers I have 
described in 2.2 affected people in how they saw my research project, no matter in what 
way I phrased my research interest in Arabic. Then I tried to communicate my personal 
interest through telling the story of how I came to desire an understanding of very religious 
Muslim women through Dunya’s story.76 The response to this approach was usually much 
more sympathetic and opened up opportunities for women to share similar experiences. 
 
In my original research design I had identified two groups that I wanted to focus my 
research on: students at the Fatih-Institute’s program for women, and the Qubaisiyat, a 
hierarchically-organised movement of women for the propagation of Islam. I had hoped 
that through researching women’s lives in these two groups, I would gain a framework for 
                                                
72 Comp. 2.4, page 57-58. 
73 ‘Changing towards a religious life and observance’ 
74 ‘The growing religiosity among Muslim women in Syria’  
75 ‘The change towards religion and observance among Muslim women’ 
76 Comp. 1, page 1. 
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my interpretation through comparing how the different settings and age groups influenced 
the process of turning to Islamist religiosity.  
 
The possibility of doing research at the Fatih-Institute closed down after meetings with one 
of the teachers, Amal, a relative of one of the leaders, who told me about the policy of the 
institute that no non-Muslim was allowed to be involved in the institute or to take part in 
any of their activities. Even though she was very friendly towards me and helpful in other 
ways, she said there was no way around this policy.77 During the following months I 
focused my energy on gaining access to the Qubaisiyat. I was able to meet a number of 
their members due to the wide extent of the movement at social functions and visits to 
homes of acquaintances or via a passed-on contact through one of my Syrian friends. 
However, none of these contacts led to a second meeting no matter how amiable the first 
one had been. For example, during the holiday after Ramadan 2008 I went to visit a friend 
to congratulate her according to the custom in Damascus where relatives, friends and 
neighbours spend the holidays visiting each other. Usually these are short visits where the 
guest drinks a cup of coffee and eats some sweets and then moves on to the next visit. 
Shortly after I had arrived, my friend’s aunt came. She was wearing a navy blue manteau 
and the typical blue hijab that marked her as a member of Qubaisiyat. At first she seemed 
intimidating as she started to rebuke my friend for wearing trousers, and I was glad that I 
was wearing a long skirt. Soon enough, though, she took an interest in my studies and the 
visit extended beyond the usual time as we chatted about the importance of mutual 
understanding between her society and mine. At the end we exchanged phone numbers and 
she invited me several times to come and visit her. After that, I rang her up a couple of 
                                                
77 Interview with Amal, Damascus, 27.06.2007. 
 51 
times, but she was always busy and could not meet with me. Other women simply did not 
answer my phone calls. There were a number of instances like this, but never one that 
turned out differently. In one event another follower of the movement was inviting a friend 
of mine with very persuasive words to come with her to attend her teacher’s lessons in a 
mosque. I asked if I could join them as well, and she called her teacher for permission. The 
teacher denied this, and I was never again able to contact this woman. My conclusion from 
this and many similar experiences is that even if individual members of the Qubaisiyat 
were potentially be open to start an acquaintance, which could lead to an involvement with 
my research, it was possibly the leaders who stopped them. This was confirmed in an 
interview with Jamal Barout, a Syrian academic in social sciences, who said that the 
government had granted the Qubaisiyat legal status under the condition that they would 
reject research into their movement.78 For this practical reason I had to give up my plan to 
research women within this movement even though the influence of the Qubaisiyat on the 
religious milieu in Syria has still to be taken into account as part of the context of other 
women’s religious activism. 
 
Even outside these two groups it proved much more difficult to find research participants 
than I had expected, for the reasons I described under 2.2 Therefore I broadened my 
approach. To make this research at all possible the group of cases in this study is defined 
through two characteristics: The first concerned Syrian Sunni women who had turned from 
nominal membership with little religious observance, or merely traditional practice, to a 
devoutness that goes beyond the basic demands of religious observance. The second 
characteristic is that they were willing to participate in my research. To identify these 
                                                
78 Interview with Jamal Barout, Aleppo, 04.12.2009. 
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women I adopted the method of ‘snowballing’, meeting women through the personal 
network that I had built over the years in Damascus as well as via the networks of Syrian 
friends who wanted to help me and who knew about women who had experienced a radical 
religious change.  
 
Beyond these two common denominators it turned out that nearly all of the research 
participants had a connection to the ANC. In some cases this connection was indirect; for 
example one interviewee was recruited through a teacher who went to lessons at ANC, 
while the interviewee herself had never been there. In other cases the connection was much 
stronger. For example the private study group that I attended for a year was formally 
connected to ANC: The teacher who also gave public lessons at ANC, was a disciple of its 
founder, Ahmad Kuftaro (1915-2004), and her students saw themselves as standing in the 
line of these sheikhs through their teacher. Together they regularly attended the Friday 
lessons at ANC. Other participants I met through going to public lessons at the centre. 
Still, I decided not to limit my case studies to women connected to ANC for the reason that 
even though there was greater openness to research there, I could still find only a small 
number of women who fit my focus group and were willing to be interviewed at length.  
 
Looking at the women who were willing to participate in my research raises the question 
of why they were interested in it and whether there were other common denominators. The 
most obvious factor is the disproportionate number of dā‘iyāt, female preachers. There are 
a number of reasons for this: The dā‘iyāt are more confident and articulate to talk about 
religious questions to others. In addition, in this milieu, to be active in Islamic da‘wa is 
seen as one of the essential characteristics of the ‘true Muslim’, which explains why there 
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are many dā‘iyāt among the devout Muslim women. The most influential reason, however, 
according to my observations, was the desire of the dā‘iya to convert me to Islam as a 
motivation to relate to me. This was enforced by my religious identity because of the 
prevalent thought among these women that anybody sincerely seeking God will necessarily 
become a Muslim if they are taught well and come to an understanding of Islam. I 
communicated that the purpose of my research was a deeper understanding of Islam, even 
though I was aware of the different meaning this had for me and my participants: from a 
religious studies approach Islam encompasses, among other dimensions, diverse cultural 
realities, whereas for my participants, Islam is an objective, unchanging, monolithic and 
ideal entity. Although I tried to communicate from the beginning that I did not want to 
participate in religious activities with the goal to convert, many seemed to believe that I 
was close and only needed some teaching and encouragement.  
 
My research practice has been greatly affected by this because it was necessary to establish 
my sincerity through showing an interest in ‘understanding Islam’ but this was not without 
ambiguities. Over time I changed my interview practice from a list of questions that was 
only aiming at querying the interviewee’s religious development and subjective religious 
experience to include questions about Islamic teaching to prove the sincerity of my 
interest. The benefits were that I learned more about the Islamic interpretation of my 
participants. The downside was that it was sometimes difficult to move on from these 
questions to conversations about the personal experience of my interviewee. 
 
Another effect was that I shifted largely from conversations and interviews with 
individuals to mainly participant observation during religious group activities such as 
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lessons, mawlid celebrations (celebrations of saint days, especially Muhammad’s 
birthday), and group dhikr, because my research participants were interested in motivating 
me to take as much part in such activities as possible. In two cases I felt I had been ‘lured’ 
to attend lessons under false pretences: I met Sawda for the first time while visiting 
someone sick at her cousin’s. I did not know that she was a preacher when I talked to her 
about my research. After initial objections to my approach and my attempts to explain why 
I thought it was valuable, as well as telling Dunya’s story, she finally said that there were 
many women who answered to the description of my focus group in a lesson that was 
taking place weekly in her home. She invited me to come and see if there would be an 
opportunity to talk to some of the girls who attended the lesson. It was only when I 
accepted her invitation that I realised that she herself was the teacher. I attended this group 
for a year, even though none of the students actually were possible participants for my case 
studies. In a second case, I was invited in a similar way to attend lessons to be introduced 
to possible participants, which also never happened.  
 
When I prepared to do this research I decided that I would not talk about my own religion 
with my research participants except to establish common ground, for the sake of 
collecting as much unadulterated data as possible. This turned out to be unrealistic. Apart 
from the fact that my very presence was so much part of the whole process of data 
collection, in practice the participants did ask many questions about my faith, and to refuse 
an answer would have been patronising and disrespectful towards them. Looking back on 
these experiences, rather than aiming at an illusory ideal as if reactivity in this specific 
research project could be avoided, the awareness that all conversations and interviews 
always took place in the space between individuals, whose religious convictions, explicitly 
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or implicitly, questioned each other, was necessarily part of the data collection and 
analysis.  
 
This leads to the question of how much my own reactivity towards being the receiver of 
this kind of da‘wa has influenced my research practice. My emotional responses depended 
a lot on how this happened and whether I felt respected as a person or de-personified as an 
‘object’ to be converted. There was one instance during a small, public lesson at the ANC 
where Sawda attacked my beliefs in an extremely aggressive and ridiculing way.79 I was 
wondering whether she included this attack especially for my benefit, or whether she 
thought that after a couple of months my presence as an obstinate ‘unbeliever’ was 
unsettling to her followers. In any case, it left me feeling sad and disrespected. Many other 
times the welcome that I received as a participant in religious activities made me feel 
included, but it also brought up the issue of where the limits of my participation lay. For 
example, at the first mawlid that I attended with Sawda’s followers early on with this 
group, the women made me get up and dance with them while they were singing religious 
songs.80 My feelings were very ambivalent. I enjoyed being included, but afterwards I felt 
uncomfortable and decided not to do it again. Throughout my research I tried to reflect on 
my emotional reactions and to pinpoint any tendencies towards women who made me feel 
attacked or respected, - which could possibly have led to either an estranging or a 
harmonising picture, and then to analyse how much this bias influenced my observations. 
 
My research findings have also been greatly affected by the interest to convert me: I 
moved more towards the question of how women were involved in the Islamic da‘wa and 
                                                
79 Public lesson in the ANC, Damascus, 08.04.2009. 
80 Mawlid in Sawda’s home, Damacus, 26.07.2008 
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how da‘wa affected their lives. Though the participant observation did not give me any 
direct answers to my original research questions about individual women’s religious 
biographies, it actually opened up the possibility of a framework for understanding the data 
I collected during conversations and interviews. It gave me the opportunity to observe 
first-hand how da‘wa was practiced and made me question whether my original plan to 
focus my data collection mainly on individual interviews was based on my own cultural 
assumption that religious choices were experienced predominantly as individual processes. 
Through these observations I started focusing more on what role the community dimension 
plays in the process of ‘becoming devout’. 
 
Another question that needed in-depth consideration was how much and in what ways the 
data that I collected from the dā‘iyāt had been influenced by their motivation to present to 
me an attractive picture, or to what degree interviews and conversations moved beyond 
this. My own experiences of the methods of da‘wa in how my research participants aimed 
their activism towards me became part of my data.  
 
The exploratory character and the sensitivity of the subject of this research demanded a 
very flexible research design that needed on-going reassessment. The definition and the 
delimitation of my research group, while disclosing the practical difficulties of researching 
women in the Syrian religious milieu, had the benefit that it worked against the ‘outsider’s’ 
bias towards sensational cases. Especially considering the political emotionality of my 
research project, to study women who were not part of a pre-defined group helped to 
reduce problematic labelling and generalisations. 
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2.4  Ethical issues 
 
The hesitation of many Syrian women to take part in my research was also founded in the 
fear of possible repercussions from the Syrian government. Under the political 
circumstances at the time, which I will discuss further in Chapter 3, it was of major 
importance to my participants that I would protect their privacy and conceal their 
identities. During the years of my field research I was questioned by security personnel 
four times. Among other questions I was asked for the names of my contacts. For that 
reason I often got to know women by their first names or honorary titles only. In addition, 
the participants remain anonymous in my writing. Names and details which could lead to 
their identification have been altered with the exception of public persons who agreed to be 
named. 
 
To gain the consent of the people I wanted to research I was open about what I was doing 
and the true nature and purpose of my research. As I have described in 2.3 the process of 
finding participants, explanations and proving myself as trustworthy, took time. While I 
felt frustrated at my slow progress, the general negative attitude towards my research 
meant that those women who decided to take part had the opportunity to think well about 
their decision and only participated if they really wanted to.  
I did not use a signed consent form. To ‘sign up’ for something and give written consent 
would have created even more distrust and fear. Rather, it was important that my 
participants knew that they were free to withdraw from the research process at any time, 
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and that they gained a clear understanding of what the research was about, as part of the so 
called ‘fully informed consent’.81  
 
The questions of consent were more complicated in the area of participant observation that 
often included larger groups of women during mosque lessons. In these cases the consent 
took the form of the female preacher’s invitation to attend for the sake of my research. In a 
few cases an attendee took me along and introduced me as a researcher to the teacher. 
Often the teacher then introduced me to her class. When I went to large public lessons 
taught by male preachers the preacher was less accessible to me. However, these lessons, 
very public in nature, often were recorded and distributed afterwards anyway. 
  
Yet even with the full consent to my research, the awareness of my function as a 
‘researcher’ decreased over time and many observations and conversations that influenced 
my interpretation may not have been conscientiously given to me, such as tensions and 
conflicts among the attendees. Another area was the personal details of women’s lives that 
were usually not made public in cross gender settings. For example one of my interviewees 
discussed at length her history of falling in love with different men. However, there were 
precedents of situations in which it seemed acceptable for such details to be discussed in 
public if anonymity was guaranteed, such as seeking advice from male preachers through 
written questions which women would throw from the balustrades separating the women’s 
space from the men’s hall in mosques. Another example was the radio broadcasts in which 
a Muslim scholar would discuss such questions with listeners who called in during the 
programme. According to these examples, public discussions of otherwise embarrassing 
                                                
81 Comp. Colin Robson, Real world research, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 
2002). 67. 
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subjects seemed acceptable if anonymity was granted. My goal in my writing is to respect 
their narratives and abstain from descriptions and interpretations that could be seen in any 
way as belittling, no matter how ‘bizarre’ their narratives might look from the bias of my 
own worldview.  
 
I kept the data I collected as accessible as possible to the participants. After putting my 
interviews in writing I revised what I had written with my participants. In a couple of cases 
this was not possible. In some cases the participant was too busy or relied on the 
correctness of the recording if she permitted me to record the interview. Another 
participant had left her family and apparently went into hiding. After the uprising started in 
March 2011 it became increasingly difficult to meet. In one case a participant asked me not 
to use part of an interview concerning third parties. While I accommodated her demand, 
the information she had given me did shape my insight into the workings of the da‘wa 
movement among women. Another problem was the issue of language. Most interviews 
and participant observation were conducted in Arabic but the research thesis is written in 
English. This will diminish the accessibility of the research to the participants.  
 
I am aware that my participants will not agree with everything I have written due to the 
different angles of my critical distance and their faith. Yet I am aiming at a portrayal and 
analysis of their understanding, choices, and experiences that is not only truthful to the 
data that I collected but also pays credit to my participants’ desire to be presented as 
credible Muslim women.  
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PART ONE: CONTEXT 
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2  ISLAMISM IN SYRIA 1963 - 2011 
 
 
During the year 2005/2006 I was attending classes as a listening student at the Sharia 
Department of Damascus University. I was allowed to choose freely which lectures to 
attend, which resulted in me attending different lectures in all four years of the 
undergraduate programme. Wearing a headscarf and loose, long clothing was obligatory 
for female students, but what really struck me was that from year to year the colours of the 
students’ clothes became increasingly dull and the number of girls wearing black and with 
partial to complete face coverings increased from just a few in the first year to far more 
than half in the final. On the last day of class, one of the girls asked the lecturer in an 
anonymous note: ‘I want to wear niqāb but no one in my family encourages me. What 
shall I do?’ The lecturer answered: ‘We encourage you. Don’t we?’ The whole hall, 
overcrowded with more than 300 male and female students, shouted in unison: ‘We 
encourage you!’ ‘That should be enough encouragement,’ the lecturer said to close the 
issue.82 
 
While this incident illustrates both the current support as well as the opposition to the 
display of extreme religious symbols, only two decades ago, during the 1980s, such public 
endorsement of the niqāb in a government institution would have been impossible. In the 
1980s and 1990s the government prohibited the hijab in government institutions including 
                                                
82 Lecture at Damascus University, 14.05.2006. 
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schools.83 The social climate among well-educated Syrians was largely against even 
moderate Islamic dress. The example of my friend Jihan’s family illustrates this further:  
My grandfather was modern and progress-oriented and not religious at all. He 
didn’t want any of his daughters to wear hijab. They were wearing relatively short 
dresses and short sleeves. Everybody was.84 
  
Today, for these women and their daughters, the hijab has become the normative dress for 
a Muslim woman, albeit other Syrians still associate any form of Islamic clothing as 
backward, like one of my neighbours, a woman in her late 40s, who told me: ‘Only the last 
remnant of traditional Syrians is still wearing hijab, but not the educated women.’85   
 
Like other choices, the changes that the women of my research have gone through cannot 
be appreciated without reference to its historical, political, social and economic context. 
During the second half of the 20th century, Syrian society has undergone a process of great 
transitions. The secularisation, which was part of the Baath party programme, and the 
Islamist struggle until the 1980s, gave way to a contemporary ‘new religiosity’.86 These 
                                                
83 Comp. Kamla, "Syrian women accountants' attitudes and experiences of the hijab in the 
context of globalisation" 6. 
84 Interview with Jihan in her home, Damascus, 28.03.2011. 
85 Conversation with Um Majid, Damascus, 02.11.2008. 
86 Comp. e.g. Paulo G. Pinto, "Embodied morality and social practice in Syria," ISIM 
Review 17(2006); Kim Ghattas, "Syria witnesses Islamist revival,"  Accessed 24.02.2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/4735240.stm; IRIN, "Syria: Secular Syria 
allows Islam to flourish," UN Office for the coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
Accessed 14.02.2008, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=26933. Hugh Naylor, 
"Secular Syria faces up to growing Islamic power: Damascus reaching out to moderates to 
head off conflict," San Francisco Chronicle, Accessed 14.02.2008, 
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-
bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2007/07/16/MNG9TR15OT1.DTL&hw=Lebanon&sn=081&sc=131.. 
Sami Moubayed, "Preserving secularism in Syria,"  Accessed 08.04.2013, 
http://www.mideastviews.com/articleview.php?art=135. 
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three major aspects have to be taken into account to understand the ‘macro-context’87 of 
Syrian Islamist women. In this chapter I will first look at the historical conflict and the 
contemporary religious trend in Syria.88 
 
 
 
3.1  The confrontation between the Baath party and the Islamists 1963-1982 
 
After reaching independence in 1946, Syria was caught up in political instability. Between 
1946 and 1963, there transpired five general elections, seven military coups, three 
constitutions and the union with Egypt during the years 1958 – 1961, embraced at first by 
many Syrians with enormous enthusiasm but ending in great disillusionment.89  
 
The Baath Party was one of the various political groups that were based on the new 
nationalist sentiment that had started under the late Ottoman rule but gained strength under 
the French mandate 1920 - 1946. Officially founded in 1947 by a Christian: Michel Aflaq 
                                                
87 Comp. Lewis R. Rambo and Charles E. Farhadian, "Converting: stages of religious 
change," in Religious Conversion: Contemporary Practices and Controversies, ed. 
Christopher Lamb and M Darrol Bryant (London: Cassell, 1999), 38. 
88 For in-depth discussion of the Islamist uprising in Syria 1963 - 1983 see e.g. Umar F. 
Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria  (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983); Hanna Batatu, 
Syria's peasantry, the descendants of its lesser rural notables, and their politics  
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik 
unter Asad; Abdallah Sami Ibrahim Dallal, al-,, Al-islāmiyūn wa al-dīmūqrāṭiya fi sūrīya: 
ḥaṣīd wa ṣarīm  (Cairo: Madbouly, 2007); Nikolaos Dam, van, The struggle for power in 
Syria, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996); Ulrike Freitag, "In search of 'historical 
correctness': The Ba'th Party in Syria," Middle Eastern Studies 35, no. 1 (1999); Hans 
Günther Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien  (Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-
Institut, 1995); Patrick Seale, Asad: The struggle for the Middle East  (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988); Thomas Mayer, "The Islamic opposition in Syria, 
1961-1982," Orient 24, no. 4 (1983). 
89 Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien: 88-92. 
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(1910-1989), an Alawite: Zaki al-Arsuzi (1899-1968), and a Sunni: Salah al-Din al-Bitar 
(1912-1980),90 it was part of the Baath programme to overcome sectarianism to forge a 
new national identity based on the principle of ‘urūba, ‘Arabism’. However, early on the 
Baath party had strong connections with the military and a failed coup in 1956.91 The 
military started to have a disproportionate number of members from the religious 
minorities in their higher ranks and developed into the real political power in Syria.92 
 
In March 1963, a group of young Baath officers staged a coup together with Nasserist and 
independent officers. They issued a declaration handing over the power to the Baath party. 
However, this government was only a façade behind which the officers governed the 
country through the new and secret National Council for the Revolutionary Command.93 
The next seven years were characterised by external and internal struggles. Externally, the 
government’s reforms were met with strong riots in all the major cities of Syria as private 
companies and parts of the trade were nationalised in 196594 and a land reform 
redistributed the land in favour of poorer rural population, all of which enraged the middle 
class.95 In 1967, both Muslim and Christian private schools were taken over by the 
government although religious instruction remained part of the curriculum and until 1970 
                                                
90 According to Lobmeyer, the date for the official founding of the Baath party differs 
between 1947 and 1952. This seems to be due to the genesis of the party: In 1947 al-
Arsuzi’s nādi al-‘urūba merged with Aflaq’s and al-Bitar’s shabāb al-iḥyā’ al-‘arabi, 
while later in 1952 with al-Hawrani’s ḥizb al-‘arabi al-ishtirāki another major group was 
added, comp. Ibid., 32-33. 
91 Ibid., 77.  
92 Ibid., 74-79. The opening of the military academy in Homs offered the possibility of a 
career to educated members of the lower classes like the rural population, which consisted 
of relatively higher percentage of religious minorities than the Sunni dominated cities. 
93 For a more detailed description of the coup and the military influence on the Syrian 
government see: ibid., 101-10; Seale, Asad: The struggle for the Middle East: 74-80. 
94 Seale, Asad: The struggle for the Middle East: 97. 
95 Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien: 156-59. 
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religious property had been centralised under the new awqāf- ministry.96 The emergency 
state allowed for censorship of the press and general repression of any kind of opposition.  
Internally, the struggles within the party led to the marginalization of Christians and 
Sunnis and brought Hafez al-Asad (1930-2000) into power in 1970.97  
 
The roots of the Islamic revival in Syria go back to the 19th century. Part of the ‘ulamā’ 
such as ‘Abd al-Razzaq al-Bitar and Tahir al-Jaza’iri (1852 – 1920) started to assess 
traditions critically and to uphold the first three generations of the pious forefathers, al-
salaf al-ṣāliḥ, as the normative ideal.98 Early Islamist organisations such as the shabāb 
Muhammad in Homs in 1934 and the dār al-arqām in Aleppo in 1936 formed during the 
1930s.99 Between 1942 and 1946 these organisations merged together to become the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood.100 Although they understood themselves as part of the Egyptian 
Brotherhood, their genesis from various Syrian groups as well as their later development 
was quite independent of the latter: The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was less zealous and 
revolutionary. It took part in parliamentary elections in 1947, 1949 and 1961101 and 
propagated the Islamisation of society through sermons, classes, and social activities. 
                                                
96 Suzanne Stiver Lie and Kari Vogt, "Islamization in Syria: Gender, Education and 
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Between 1961 and 1963 the Brotherhood was on the summit of its parliamentary influence 
having won 8.7% of the votes in 1961.102  
 
After the Baath party outlawed all opposition parties and the door for legal political 
activism was closed in 1963, the Brotherhood underwent a radicalisation in search of other 
channels of influence. The younger generation was more willing to follow radical leaders 
like Marwan Hadid, Sa‘id Hawwa, and ‘Abd al-Fatah Abu Ghudda (1917-1997), who took 
over ‘Issam al-‘Attar’s (b.1927) leadership of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood in 1970. 
Terrorist acts against the government committed by the Islamists from 1976 to 1982 
involved a number of different groups, whose organisational connection and cooperation 
with the Brotherhood had become so close in the process of its radicalisation that a clear 
distinction seems impossible. Those active in the revolt called themselves mujāhidūn, 
‘Islamic fighters’.103 
 
The Baath party secured its power through suppression of any kind of opposition and the 
years 1963 – 1982 witnessed cycles of growing violence and counter violence: In April 
1964 and January 1965, demonstrations and riots broke out in Syria’s major cities. 
Islamists, Nasserists and merchants joined forces but were defeated by the military. 
Mosque infrastructure played an important role from the beginning and the government 
                                                
102 Thomas Pierret, "Syria: Old-Timers and Newcomers," in The Islamists are coming: 
Who they really are, ed. Robin Wright (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wison Center Press, 
2012), 72. 
103 For example Marwan Hadid, the leader of the radical ṭalīca al-muqātila li-ḥizb allah, 
had many followers among the Muslim Brothers. Some of them went with him to Jordan 
where they got military training in one of the camps of the Palestinian Fatah organization. 
Abu Ghudda was a Muslim Brother and the leader of the militant hizb al-taḥrīr al-islāmi. 
Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien: 174. 
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felt threatened enough to declare the ‘abuse’ of religious buildings for political agitation a 
capital offence.104  
Even though the conflict had economic, social and political roots, religious grievances 
played a role from the very beginning: In October 1963 ‘Isam al-Attar, the leader of the 
Muslim Brothers, accused the government of atheism and was imprisoned and finally 
exiled.  Four years later, an article in the Syrian army magazine jaysh al-sha‘b stated, 
‘God, religion …are mummies in the museum of history’.105 The article was taken and 
widely publicised, enlivening mass demonstrations in all major cities as both Muslims and 
Christians protested against this ‘blasphemy’ and the responsible government.  In 
Damascus alone about 20,000 people took part. The imprisonment of Muslim and 
Christian religious leaders enraged the people even more. The riots ended only when the 
Six-Day War with Israel started on June 5th, 1967. 
 
Due to internal discord, the Muslim Brotherhood did not play a prominent role in any of 
the riots until 1973. By then, a new sectarianism was symptomatic of the radicalisation of 
the Brotherhood as the accusations against the government shifted from socialism to 
accusing it of being Alawite. The Brotherhood’s radical, militant wing had prevailed 
against the more cautious voices.106 
 
At the beginning of his rule in 1970, Asad was welcomed by many Syrians. The country 
had undergone seven years of unrest and violence, economic isolation, and the war with 
Israel in 1967, whereas Asad promised economic liberalisation, stability and reconciliation 
                                                
104 Ibid., 145. 
105 As quoted in: ibid., 177. 
106 Ibid., 175-77 and 99-201. 
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and declared an amnesty for a number of political opponents. In 1971 and 1972 he offered 
limited political participation to opposition parties.107 Food prices were cut by 15 %. The 
economy started to grow. However, behind this façade of democracy, the regime started to 
persecute its opponents with great brutality. The secret police services were extended as a 
tool to control the population through terror as individuals were imprisoned and 
interrogated arbitrarily.108  
 
Asad was aware of the problems that could arise from opposition against an Alawite 
president. According to a fatwa from Ibn Taymiya (1263-1328), ‘Nuṣairis’ (the old name 
for the Alawites) are not Muslims but heretics that should be fought.109  The name 
Nuṣairiya goes back to the extreme shi’ite Ibn Nuṣair (9th century), as Alawites claim.110 
The necessity to prove their orthodoxy led them to adopt the name ‘Alawites’ at the 
beginning of the 20th century to integrate themselves into ‘Islam’ as a Shi’ite sect, with 
limited success.111 Accordingly, when Asad came to power in 1970 he set up the Sunni 
Ahmad al-Khatib (1933-1971) as ‘head of the state’ for the first few months, but then took 
the presidency for himself. In the constitution of 1973, the article that the president had to 
                                                
107 Ibid., 185-86. 
108 An example of the arbitrariness of the secret services is the story of my friend’s uncle: 
his brother stayed over at his house with a friend for a night. The next day after the guests 
had left, the secret police took the uncle and for years his family did not know where he 
was or what had happened to him. Only during the 1990s he was granted amnesty, and the 
family got to know that the secret police had taken him in place of the brother’s friend who 
was accused of being a member of a secret communist cell. (Conversation with Najma, 
Sahnaya, 20.04.2005) 
109 H. Halm, "Nuṣayriyya," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. C.E. Bosworth, 
et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1995). 
110 Comp. Kais M. Firro, "The Alawis in modern Syria: From Nusayriya to Islam via 
'Alawiya," Der Islam 82(2005): 3-9; Halm, "Nuṣayriyya." 
111 Firro, "The Alawis in modern Syria: From Nusayriya to Islam via 'Alawiya," 12-13. 
Later Muslim Brothers quoted Ibn Taymiya to justify the murder of Alawites, comp. 
Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad: 8.   
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be a Muslim was omitted. After protests, the clause was added and Asad tried to legitimise 
his presidency through a fatwa by the Lebanese Shi’ite cleric Musa al-Sadr (1928-1978), 
that Alawites are ‘Muslims’. To win over the ‘ulamā’, religious scholars, Asad raised the 
salary of imams and preachers.112 He performed the‘umra (minor pilgrimage) in 1974, but 
could not convince the Islamists who doubted his sincerity.113 
 
Yet, besides religious reasons, the revolt against Asad had many causes: The loss of 
influence of the old ruling class, urban versus rural animosities and confessional 
grievances. The Syrian intervention in Lebanon in support of the ‘Christians’ in 1976 
functioned as a catalyst for the violence. Islamists, the leftist opposition, Palestinians and 
other groups committed acts of terror and assassinations; the government retaliated with 
brutality.114  
 
The conflict between the government and the militant religious opposition escalated 
between 1976 and 1981. The death of Hadid in July 1976, in prison under dubious 
circumstances,115 seems to have provoked a first wave of assassinations through the 
Islamists, who at first killed mainly politicians, members of the military and government 
officials.116 Later, Muslim clergy who condemned the violence such as Muhammad al-
                                                
112 Batatu, Syria's peasantry, the descendants of its lesser rural notables, and their politics: 
260. 
113 Mayer, "The Islamic opposition in Syria, 1961-1982," 593. The idea and practice of 
tāqiyya among the Alawites had discredited their efforts through the centuries. 
114 See for example the protests of the fours guilds of the lawyers, the doctors, the 
engineers and the pharmacists: Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien: 294-302. 
115 According to Seale he died in June because he would not end his hunger strike, 
compare Seale, Asad: The struggle for the Middle East: 324. 
116 Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien: 262-63. 
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Shami were murdered,117 as were hundreds of civilians just because they were Alawites, 
and their ‘executions’ were announced in al-nāḍir, the Brotherhood’s magazine.118 The 
government’s response was imprisonment, torture and executions. The secret police 
indiscriminately searched homes in the traditional Muslim quarters of the towns, taking 
Islamists as well as uninvolved neighbours or family members.119 
 
In March 1980, demonstrations, riots and strikes spread from Aleppo to Hama, Homs, 
Idlib, Hasaka, Deir al-Zur and Jisr al-Shughur. In response, Asad mobilised new 
paramilitary units and Defence Battalions, leaving hundreds detained, or killed the 
inhabitants of whole neighbourhoods.120 
 
On June 26th, an attempt to kill Asad failed, but his brother Rif’at took revenge and ordered 
his Defence Companies to massacre between 300 and 800 political prisoners, most of them 
Islamists, in Tadmor. On July 8th, membership of the Muslim Brotherhood was declared a 
capital offense.121 
 
In August, September and October a number of bombs exploded close to government 
buildings, the last one in response to a more symbolic but highly emotional act of violence 
                                                
117 Seale, Asad: The struggle for the Middle East: 325. 
118 As quoted in: Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien: 263. 
119 Ibid., 291-92. 
120 Mayer, "The Islamic opposition in Syria, 1961-1982," 604. Batatu, Syria's peasantry, 
the descendants of its lesser rural notables, and their politics: 273. 
121 For discussion of the different numbers see Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in 
Syrien: 306; Seale, Asad: The struggle for the Middle East: 329. 
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of the regime: On September 29th, members of Rif’at’s revolutionary youth federation tore 
off the hijabs of a number of women in the centre of Damascus.122  
 
Towards the end of 1981, the opposition had gained power over substantial parts of Hama 
and Aleppo. When a coup failed in January, the government reacted in sending troops to 
besiege Hama. At the beginning of February, the city was cut off from the rest of the 
Syrian infrastructure. The ‘ulamā’ declared jihad from the minarets and hundreds of 
Islamist fighters started to attack. Not only the security forces, but also officials and 
members of the Baath party, and communists and their families, were killed. On February 
10th, the Muslim Brotherhood declared the ‘liberation of Hama,’ but the military, by now 
about 12,000 soldiers, started to shell the city with heavy artillery and to bomb it from the 
air. The fighting continued till February 23rd.  
 
The extent of the loss of life in Hama was beyond anything that had happened in Syria 
before. The numbers vary between 5000 and 40 000 dead among the civilians alone, in 
addition to about 5000 army soldiers and 500 Islamist fighters.123 At the end, tanks rolled 
into the city and demolished most of the old city centre, burying uncounted people under 
the rubble.124 
 
 
                                                
122 After this, the veil started to become a symbol of defiance of the regime. Comp. Mervat 
F Hatem, "Toward the development of post-Islamist and post-nationalist feminist 
discourses in the Middle East," in Arab women: Old boundaries, new frontiers, ed. Judith 
Tucker (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 31. 
123 Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien: 325-26. 
124 Batatu, Syria's peasantry, the descendants of its lesser rural notables, and their politics: 
273-74. quotes an Amnesty International report, estimating the number of dead civilians of 
10,000 to 25,000. 
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3.1.1  The ideological foundation of the conflict 
 
After independence most new political parties subscribed to secularism because of the 
heterogeneous population in Syria,125 the majority being Sunni Muslim. The main 
minorities were different Christian denominations, Shi’a sects, (among which the largest 
group were the Alawites), Druze and Ismaelis.126 The religious identity was, and is, felt 
very strongly. Secularism seemed to be the best option to unite the new nation, rather than 
separation along confessional lines or the domination of one religious group over the 
others. 
 
Nevertheless the Baath ideology was not ‘atheistic.’  Its interpretation of secularism meant 
that a particular religion was seen to have a limited significance according to historical and 
cultural circumstances. Religion as a factor of sectarianism was rejected. The claim of 
Islam – or any other religion – to be universally valid, was given up for the sake of an 
understanding of Islam as the means to forge the Arabic nation through an Arabic religion, 
message, and values. In this sense, even the Christian Aflaq could describe Islam as the 
                                                
125 Comp. Roded, "Lessons by a Syrian Islamist from the life of the Prophet Muhammad," 
857-59. The two main secularist parties besides the Baath were the Syrian Socialist 
National Party (SSNP), and the Syrian Communist Party. According to Roded the SSNP 
was the first party who wanted to overcome sectarianism and the marginalisation of the 
minorities with secularism. 
126 In 2007 74% of the just over 19 million Syrians were Sunni, 10% were Christian, 16% 
belonged to other Muslim sects. During the first half of the 20th century the Sunnis were a 
smaller majority, as differing in birth rates and emigration changed the set up of the 
population. CIA, "The World Factbook: Syria,"  Accessed 10.02.2008, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html#People. 
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most sublime expression of the Arab nation, and Muhammad as the ‘incarnation of the true 
and noble Arabic spirit’.127  
‘Unity, freedom, socialism’ was the motto of the Baath Party. The goal of unity of the 
Arab nation and its freedom from imperialistic determination were the most prominent 
demands.  Aflaq defined ‘nation’ similar to Fichte, as a cultural unity, constituted through 
a common language and history. Therefore, the value of Islam lies in its role of forming 
Arab history and culture, but it was not essentially part of the principle of ‘urūba. 
Accordingly, it was not necessarily relevant for the formation of the new political and 
social system; rather, with the development of different sects, it had become a 
disintegrating factor.  
 
The aim of the Muslim Brotherhood was to oppose the growing influence of secularism in 
Syria. It was based on al-Banna’s (1906-1949) writings, although modified by al-Siba’i 
(1915-1964) and Hawwa to suit the Syrian situation, but generally included the usual 
features of the Islamist discourse: Religious diversity was seen as the main threat. For 
example, Hawwa argues for the necessity of jihad because the Islamic community has to 
be saved from ‘unbelievers’ who are trying to turn Muslims away from their faith.128 Al-
Siba’i agreed concerning the problem of diversity, even although he rejected violence, 
demanding that diversity should be overcome through da‘wa.129  
 
                                                
127 As quoted in: Andreas Christmann, "Syrien," in Der Islam in der Gegenwart, ed. 
Werner Ende and Udo Steinbach (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2005), 513. 
128 Comp. Mayer, "The Islamic opposition in Syria, 1961-1982," 594. 
129 For a discussion of al-Siba’i’s reluctance to use violence see Roded, "Lessons by a 
Syrian Islamist from the life of the Prophet Muhammad," 865. 
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For the Brotherhood, ‘true Islam’, the divine revelation and its interpretation through the 
first three generations, was the solution for every dilemma. Hawwa envisioned the 
realisation of the rule of Islam in five steps: The Islamisation of the individual, the 
Islamisation of the government, i.e. the Islamic state, the union of the Islamic states, the 
reinstatement of the caliphate, and last but not least, universal Islamic rule in one universal 
Islamic state. According to this concept, the monotheistic religious minorities would have 
the status of the ahl al-dhimma, protected communities, but not citizens with the same 
rights and obligations. Because for Hawwa, Islam is the highest principle, the unity of the 
umma, the universal community of Muslims, is the unity that should be aimed for.130  
 
However, the details of the varying demands of Hawwa and al-Siba’i show that ‘true 
Islam’ is an ideal that needs interpretation. Instances from history need to be made 
relevant. An example of this is the Islamists’ call for the unity of dīn wa dawla: The claim 
that the Islamic State would conform values, practices, and beliefs to the seventh century 
ideal sounds anti-modern, yet the Brotherhood’s writings about how the state should 
function show their dependency on the 20th century nation state with a constitution and a 
parliament, though the legislation has to be according to sharia law. This same 
contemporary influence is obvious in their pro-socialist thinking about economic and 
social questions.131  
 
                                                
130 On Hawwa’s concept of the umma see Weismann, "Sa'id Hawwa and Islamic 
Revivalism in Ba'athist Syria," 150. 
131 Comp. Jeremy Salt, "An Islamic scholar-activist: Mustafa al-Siba'i and the Islamic 
movement in Syria 1945-1954," Journal of Arabic, Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies 3, 
no. 1 (1996): 109; Ulrike Freitag, "Politische Religion im Nahen Osten: nationalistische 
und islamistische Modelle," in Zwischen Politik und Religion. Studien zur Entstehung, 
Existenz und Wirkung des Totalitarismus, ed. Klaus Hildebrand (Munich: Oldenbourg, 
2003), 142-43. Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien: 48-56. 
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Consequently, in the eyes of the Islamists, the Baathist primacy of Arabism over Islam and 
the nation over the umma, and the sovereignty of people in the place of God must have 
looked like blasphemy. For the Muslim Brotherhood, Sunni Islam was the principle that 
constituted identity and community: Integration into the community could only happen 
through conversion, and the attempt of the secular parties to subordinate religion was 
therefore a threat to their very identity. Though the concept of secular Arabism was very 
attractive to many Syrians, especially the minorities, it did not fulfil the hope that it would 
unite people. On the contrary, so long as the Sunni majority did not embrace it, it became 
one of the main divisive factors. Nevertheless, the high appreciation of Islam’s historical 
and cultural function kept the door open for the Baath party to reassign Islam a more 
important role. 
 
 
 
3.2.  The development of Syrian ‘Official Islam’ 
 
Hama was in many ways a turning point in Syrian history: The Islamists had lost their 
battle. It was practically the end of political religious opposition. Hama was also the 
turning point for the general trend to change from moving towards a more secular society 
to a slow but constant social Islamisation.132 The younger generation especially, started to 
rediscover Islamic values and norms for their daily life, a phenomenon resembling in some 
ways the turn to Islam after September 11: The negative image of Islam as presented by 
much of the Western media, and the rising anti-Muslim sentiment, gave many Muslims a 
                                                
132 Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad: 147. 
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sense of the need to defend their religion. It reinforced their emotional identification with 
Islam. In a similar way, the trauma of the brutal suppression of the Islamist’s revolt 
resulted in the return of many Syrian Muslims to root their identity more deeply in Islam.  
 
Hama was also a turning point for the government to develop a different approach to 
Islam. Already, during the height of Islamist’s uprising in 1979, the government changed 
their tactics. Earlier on, it had denied the existence of a religious opposition and any 
sectarian issues. That was no longer possible after the massacre of about 80 Alawite cadets 
in Aleppo in June 1979.133 Following Böttcher’s (1998) terminology I am calling the 
government’s new approach ‘Official Islam’,134 which describes an expression of Islamic 
religious practices, institutions and teaching that supports and legitimises the Baath 
government. It offered the possibility to form an Islamic movement that would absorb 
those searching for religious guidance before getting involved in radical Islam. After the 
disintegration of Syria’s old ally, the Soviet Union, in 1991, this new strategy gained even 
more prominence.135  
 
As part of the new strategy, Asad started using his propaganda machine to claim ‘true 
Islam’ for the government:  
We understand religion and Islam as love, but they as hatred. We understand it as 
patriotism, they as agency for foreign powers. We understand it as generosity and 
faithfulness, they as betrayal and murder …136 
                                                
133 Mayer, "The Islamic opposition in Syria, 1961-1982," 589 and 95. 
134 Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad: 109. 
135 Christmann, "Syrien," 513. 
136 Asad’s speech at the regional congress of the party in December 1979, as quoted in: 
Lobmeyer, Opposition und Widerstand in Syrien: 280. 
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While the government failed in setting up an Islamic ‘dummy’ party to give the rising 
religious sentiment a political outlet,137 it interfered successfully in all public religious 
matters via the awqāf-ministry, the ministry for religious affairs, and surveillance through 
the secret police. The main targets of control were the clergy, the mosques and Islamic 
education. The state controlled media played its role in disseminating ‘Official Islam’. 
Government publications incorporated ever-increasing religious language.138 
 
Important functions were staffed with regime-friendly officials from the beginning of the 
Baath rule. A prominent example is Ahmad Kuftaro, who became Grandmufti in 1964 
against the majority of the ‘ulamā’139 and remained in this office until his death in 2004. 
He was a friend of Hafez al-Asad and bore witness to the president’s orthodoxy on many 
occasions. He also lacked the support of the ‘ulamā’ and the old families, that was 
necessary to strengthen his position beyond the limited function that the government 
wanted him to fill.140 At the lower levels, the appointment of preachers, imams and mosque 
teachers became dependent on the government. In 1979 and 1980, and later in 1986, the 
government sacked a huge number of mosque staff. Prospective preachers were 
interviewed by the secret police about their political loyalties and asked to be informants.141 
 
                                                
137 In 1990 Asad tried to set up an ‘Islamic Party’ to legitimise the government through the 
party’s participation in the National Progressive Front, comp. Ibid., 342. 
138 E.g. on 1.3.1995 the eulogy of Muhammad, common after mentioning his name, 
appeared for the first time in the newspaper Al-thawra, comp. Böttcher, Syrische 
Religionspolitik unter Asad: 148. 
139 Christmann, "Syrien," 512. 
140 For more details about his political involvement compare Böttcher, Syrische 
Religionspolitik unter Asad: 56-62. 
141 Ibid., 97. 
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As the recent events in the Syrian uprising in 2011 have shown, mosques play a major role 
in the mobilisation of Muslims. They are the place where the religious community is 
formed and experienced in common prayer five times a day and through teaching. 
Therefore they became a focus for the intervention of the government under Hafez al-
Asad, encouraging religious activities at mosques and under strict government 
surveillance. The awqāf-ministry very actively built new mosques. Though the finances 
often came from private or foreign sources, the ministry had to give permission, and 
supervise the building process. After a mosque was finished, it becomes the property of the 
ministry. According to Poidomani (2006), between the early 1980s and 2006, 6000 new 
mosques were built, with 600 annexed sharia secondary schools. 142  
 
The Friday sermons, often transmitted via loudspeakers onto the streets for the benefit of 
the whole neighbourhood, became a tool to propagate ‘Official Islam’: Since the beginning 
of the 1980s, preachers received monthly guidelines on the subjects of the sermons with 
their paychecks. Usually the sermon’s first part taught Islamic knowledge from the Qur’an 
and the hadith. The second part dealt with social and political questions such as Syria’s 
international relations, the government’s vaccination programs and the battle against 
illiteracy.143 According to Böttcher (1998), in 1989 the ministry even distributed complete 
sermons in some areas. Secret police informants would guarantee that the sermons would 
stay within the guidelines and preachers acting too independently were interrogated, 
detained or suspended.144 
                                                
142 Simona Poidomani, "Syria: Islamic women's movement gains a foothold,"  Accessed 
16.01.2006, 
http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level.php?cat=Trends&loid=8.0.244196250&par=0. 
143 Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad: 99-100. 
144 Ibid., 100-01. 
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In 1980, all Qur’anic schools were renamed into ma‘āhid al-Asad li-taḥfīẓ al-Qur’ān al-
karīm, Asad Institutes of Qur’an memorisation, propagating Asad’s image as protector and 
supporter of Islam. Between 1986 and 2006, about 120 new institutes were built.145 In 
these institutes, groups for men, women and children met weekly to memorise the Qur’an 
under the guidance of a government employed teacher. They also offered classes in tajwīd, 
the art of reciting the Qur’an. Since 1981 the government was organising international 
Qur’an memorisation competitions.146  
 
The Islamic holidays offered another opportunity for the government to display its ‘piety’. 
Especially in 2006, after the Danish cartoon affair and the attack on the Danish and the 
Norwegian embassies in Damascus, which arguably could not have happened without 
official ‘passivity’ at least, the government had the whole of Damascus decorated with 
colourful flags and lights for the mawlid al-nabi, though in previous years the festivities 
had been much more sober.147 Similarly, the celebration of Ramadan experienced a revival 
at this time.148  
 
One of the major successes in promoting the Syrian ‘Official Islam’ has been the popular 
ANC. Founded by Ahmad Kuftaro in 1972 and led by his son Salah al-Din Kuftaro since 
his father’s death in 2004, the huge structure on the edge of the traditional Muhyi al-Din 
                                                
145 Comp. Poidomani, "Syria: Islamic women's movement gains a foothold". 
146 Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad: 117-19.  
147 Comp. Landis, "'Islamic education in Syria: Undoing secularism'"; Khalaf, "Bashar al-
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quarter in Damascus extends over seven floors. It houses two elementary schools, one for 
boys and one for girls, middle and secondary schools, a language institute to teach Arabic 
to foreigners, dormitories for male and female students, and four sharia colleges. In 2004, 
there were 5000 students studying at the ANC, 500 of them foreigners.149 In addition to the 
formal study programme, regular lessons open to the public took place throughout the 
week. The main mosque hall, catering up to 15,000 men and women,150 was regularly 
overcrowded during my attendance of Rajab Deeb’s Thursday evening classes. In the 
summer, the centre offered courses for mosque teachers and preachers. The centre was the 
largest of its kind in Syria, and very well known among the population in Syria: Most 
Sunnis that I talked with about my studies recommend the centre as the place to learn 
about ‘true Islam’. During the lessons that I attended, motivational sermons with detailed 
information on correct Islamic practices were the main message preached. In parallel with 
the educational institutions, the ANC was also intertwined with the Naqshbandiyya-
Kuftariyya. While the syllabus taught at ANC was not specifically Sufi, students were 
encouraged to enter into a ‘mentor relationship’ with a teacher, who belonged to the 
hierarchical organisation of the Sufi order.  
 
Ahmad Kuftaro’s  interpretation of Islam illustrates the combination of religiosity and 
morality with anti-sectarianism and government support, both of which characterise 
‘Official Islam’. On the one hand, it shares much of the Islamist diagnosis of the state of 
society: ‘Man … has deteriorated and fallen back into a dark state of ignorance and 
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barbarism’.151 Materialism has led to a ‘lack of God-consciousness’152 and atheism, an 
‘irreligious extremism’ resulting in family breakdowns, prostitution, pornography, drug 
abuse and general immorality in the West and in Muslim countries. 153 The solution is the 
return to the ‘rational spirituality’ of early Islam.154 On the other hand, Kuftaro distanced 
himself from radical Islamic ideology concerning the question of denominations and 
politics. It is interesting that in his writings he talks about a ‘Muslim society’ rather than an 
‘Islamic state’.155 The‘ulamā’ should work together with their government to re-establish 
Islamic morals and to safeguard the society against Islamic extremism. He depicts Asad as 
a model of faith, quoting him on religious matters, and assuring: ‘Our president is a 
believer and he prays.’156 Al-ra’īs al-mu’min is one of the common epithets with which 
Kuftaro described Asad.157  
 
However, the relationship between the government and the ‘ulamā’ was not always so 
clear-cut. As Pierret (2009) has argued, there were at the same time a number of influential 
Islamic leaders who only partially cooperated with the regime.158 Yet, notwithstanding the 
limitations of the government’s approach, the development of  ‘Official Islam’ signals a 
major shift in ideology as the regime changed from secular Arabism to Sunni Islam as the 
integrated principle. It offers religious satisfaction while supporting and legitimising the 
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government and funnels the desires for activism to focus on public morals. Above all 
‘Official Islam’ is a tool to control the Islamisation process. 
 
At the same time, at the beginning of the 21st century, a strange tension prevailed as the 
‘old’ symbols of the Baath party co-existed side by side with ‘new’ Islamic symbols. Huge 
statues and pictures of Hafez and Bashar al-Asad still dominated the streets and buildings 
everywhere; slogans such as ‘with spirit, with blood, we serve you, oh Bashar!’ or ‘God, 
Syria, Bashar only!’ were shouted at every rally. This cult of the president was offensive to 
many Muslims.  
 
 
 
3.2.1  The Islamic revival under Bashar al-Asad’s government 
 
Notwithstanding the governments’ efforts to create a controlled, ‘moderate Islamism,’ the 
general trend towards Islamic religiosity led to diversity within the Islamic revival. On the 
one hand, clerics like Kuftaro and his disciples cooperated with the government. On the 
other, many others, though not necessarily extremist in their interpretation, strove for 
greater independence.159 In addition, there were some growing radical Islamist trends in 
Syria even before the uprising of 2011.160  
 
                                                
159 For examples see Thomas Pierret and Kjetil Selvik, "Limits of 'authoritarian upgrading' 
in Syria: Welfare organizations, Islamic charities and the rise of the Zayd movement," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies 41(2009). 
160 Comp. Ibrahim Hamidi, "Al-tayarāt al-islāmiyya tataqaddam fi surīya wa al-sultāt 
tashunna "'amaliyāt istibāqiyya" didd bu'r takfīriyya,"  Accessed 13.05.2009, 
http://www.daralhayat.com/archivearticle/98421. 
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Not all Sunnis accepted the religious legitimacy of the Alawite president, nor believed his 
public demonstrations of piety. While the relationship between the government and the 
pro-government religious milieu strengthened the government’s legitimation and the open 
propagation of Islam, non-conformist ‘ulamā’ faced repression.161  According to my 
observations, even moderate Islamists often expressed their fear of government repression. 
162 Leila explained the sense of being under attack among religious Muslims: ‘Our 
government may imprison us.’163  The fear of disclosure of religious activities indicates the 
impact of mistrust towards the government’s display of religiosity. Dunya, for example, 
went to private tajwīd lessons. When one day she called to cancel and mentioned the 
lesson in her telephone conversation – telephone calls being potentially under secret police 
surveillance - the teacher got so upset that she stopped teaching her because Dunya had 
been careless about security. Another woman told me about a group of Salafist students 
that her brother belonged to, and whose leaders had been imprisoned in 2006, even though 
the group’s main goal had been the moral reformation of students on campus.164 
 
During most of my field research, discussions about any internal political issues were 
extremely cautious. None of my informants would debate political alternatives like an 
Islamic state with me, though they did subscribe to the idea that a Muslim cannot accept 
the domination of a non-Muslim in general discussions. At the same time, in talking about 
international affairs, some openly voiced their expectations of a future universal Islamic 
state. This only changed partly during the first few months of the Syrian uprising in 2011, 
                                                
161 Pierret, "Sunny clergy politics in the cities of Ba'thi Syria," 79-80. 
162 Christmann supports my observations, writing about secret Islamist groups. Comp. 
Christmann, "Syrien," 514.  
163 Interview with Leila in her home, Damascus, 23.06.2007. 
164 Interview with Aisha, Afrin, 22.10.2006 
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when some of my participants accused the government of being hypocritical in its stance 
towards Islam, while others defended the government as ‘Muslim’. Interestingly, both 
sides, though politically opposed to each other, propagated a similar Islamist ideal of piety. 
 
However, due to the traditional religious milieu and the growing strength of the Islamic 
revival, the government had to compromise on secular policies, e.g. the discrimination of 
women concerning divorce and inheritance.165 Another area in which the influence of an 
idealistic, monolithic notion of Islam prevailed against a more moderate interpretation is 
the religious education in Syrian schools. 
 
Islamic education played a major role in the recent Islamisation of Syria. During the 1960s 
and 1970s, while the government ‘Baathised’ the administration, many Islamists entered 
the educational system. Regime friendly teachers joined the administration and with a 
growing number of students there was a shortage of instructors.166 Of special significance 
is the religious education in schools, which is obligatory for all students. While Christians 
have their own religious studies, all other religious groups join in Muslim religious 
education. Landis (2003) has shown how the textbooks used for this subject in 2002/2003 
teach a traditional, Sunni and conformist picture of Islam and an Islamic society, in which 
God is the sovereign and the Muslim leader guides his people based on the principles of 
sharia law and in consultation with the‘ulamā’. Christians and Jews are mentioned as 
dhimma, protected communities, whereas pagans and atheists have no right of co-
                                                
165 On the legal situation of women in Syria see Leila Djabari, "The Syrian woman: Reality 
and aspirations," in Women and empowerment, ed. Haleh Afshar (London: Mc Millan, 
1998); Suha Sabbagh, "An Interview with Syria's Kamar Keilani," in Arab women: 
Between defiance and restraint, ed. Suha Sabbagh (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996). 
166 Hans Günther Lobmeyer, Islamismus und sozialer Konflikt in Syrien  (Berlin: Das 
Arabische Buch 1990). 19 and 24. 
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existence. There is no mention of the 16 % of Syria’s non-Sunni Muslims, nor the 
possibility of a pluralism of Islamic interpretations in the textbooks. 167  
 
According to Landis, one of the effects of this education was that many Alawites were 
trying hard to get accepted as proper Muslims by assimilating to Sunni Islam.168 According 
to my own observations, there were similar trends among the Druze youth, even though the 
older generation held on to the traditional separation from the Sunnis. For instance, two 
Druze students that I lived with started to fast and sometimes perform the ritual prayer; one 
during her secondary school years, the other in her first year at university. One of them 
even wanted to wear hijab but didn’t because of her parents’ opposition. As her major 
influence she quoted her Sunni religion teacher. 169 Quite a few of their Druze friends 
showed similar acceptance of Sunni practices that are not accepted among the Druze. For 
example, they defended polygamy with the same arguments I have otherwise heard from 
Sunni women, so long as the context of the discussion was religious and not practical.  
 
Not only students from a minority background, but in many cases my Sunni participants, 
mentioned their religious teachers as important influences in their desire to become more 
pious. The religious education they received in school reinforced their religious identity 
without questioning which Islamic interpretation they were adhering to, and which was 
often later continued in religious lessons in the context of the da‘wa movement, as I will 
discuss in 6.2 and 7.4.1. 
 
                                                
167 Landis, "'Islamic education in Syria: Undoing secularism'" 28. 
168 For example, some women are starting to cover, mosques have been built, Alawites 
have started to go on Hajj and to fast during Ramadan. Ibid., 32. 
169 Conversation with Joumana, Sweyda, 11.10.2006. 
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Government support of religious institutions and religious education flourished at a time 
when the international trend in many Muslim societies moved towards greater religiosity 
after the disillusionment with secularism and nationalism resulted in an observably more 
religious Syrian society. As Hamidi (2006) describes this change, well known bookshops 
that used to sell Marxist literature are today specialising in religious media, many 
restaurants in the Barada Valley stopped serving alcohol and decorated their walls with 
photographs of religious leaders, with omnipresent religious slogans.170 My language tutor 
Bushra noticed how this change affected the relationships between members of the 
different sects: 
When I grew up no one spoke about sects, we didn’t even know who was Sunni, 
who was Shi’ite. Today, the first thing people do when they meet is to find out to 
which sect the other person belongs.171  
 
I will now look at how the cultural, political and religious developments during the 
twentieth century affected Syrian women. 
 
 
 
3.3.  Syrian women between secularism and Islamism 
 
During the conflict between the government and the Islamists in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
issue of women had been a particular bone of contention. For the Baath party, women’s 
                                                
170 Hamidi, "Al-tayarāt al-islāmiyya tataqaddam fi surīya wa al-sultāt tashunna "'amaliyāt 
istibāqiyya" didd bu'r takfīriyya". 
171 Conversation with Bushra, Damascus, 19.12.2009. 
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emancipation was connected to the fight against backwardness. Women were encouraged 
to enter higher education and the work force. Women in Western dress and without hijab 
became a symbol of the country’s progress by demonstrating gender equality. For the 
Muslim Brotherhood, they were not only undermining the morals of Syrian society, but 
also giving in to the imperialists’ accusation that Islamic practices were oppressing 
women.172 
 
Until the middle of the 20th century, seclusion of women was generally practiced in Syria 
and only slowly gave way to greater public participation. The ideal of seclusion aimed at 
an extreme form of gender segregation, by means of keeping women in their homes or 
fully veiled whenever they went out. Seclusion was not only about visibility but included 
audibility. Women’s voices were kept out of men’s reach even to the degree that women 
would not speak if there was a knock on their doors but would knock back so that the 
person on the other side could identify herself to avoid a man hearing her voice.173 
Seclusion also demanded that women were not objects of conversation with members of 
the opposite sex outside the family. It was mainly based on the cultural understanding of 
gender boundaries,174 the general value behind it being the thought that the accessibility of 
women in mixed gender public contexts was seen as shameful, ‘ayb. The opinion of 
religious scholars, especially of the Shafi’i and Hanbali madhāhib that the whole female 
body was ‘awra legitimised the practice.175  
                                                
172 See al-Siba’i’s argumentation according to Roded, "Lessons by a Syrian Islamist from 
the life of the Prophet Muhammad," 864. 
173 Interview with Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni and Zuhair Salim, London, 16.03.2010. 
174 Mona Siddiqui, "Veil," in Encyclopaedia of the Qur'an, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe 
(Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2006). 
175 A popular ḥadīth that supports this view is al-mar’a kulluha ‘awra (All of a woman is 
to be covered), which I could not verify but the following article attributes it to Sahih 
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Even before independence, a number of events pointed towards the end of generally 
practised seclusion: In 1928, Nazira Zeyn al-Din (b. 1905) wrote a book against the veil, 
arguing for female authority to re-interpret the Qur’an, and during the 1920s and 1930s the 
first Syrian women started to publicly unveil.176 While the unveiling among women in the 
upper classes provoked opposition from the majority conservative milieu in Damascus, 
more significantly, women played a public part in the nationalist battle against French 
colonial powers: About 70 Muslim women, many of them from traditional backgrounds 
and wearing face veils, demonstrated against the arrest of nationalist leader Abd al-
Rahman Shahbander (1880-1940) in 1922. In 1933, Damascene women besieged the 
parliament protesting against the attempt to impose an anti-nationalist treaty.177 In the 
following decades, the discussion about women’s morals and place in society shifted from 
the alternatives of private roles versus public roles to the question of what kind of public 
roles women should play and how. 
 
Equality is granted to women in Article 45 of the Syrian constitution of 1973, yet, in fact, 
it is superseded by the discrimination that they undergo according to the regulations of the 
civil code in questions of marriage, divorce, inheritance and the custody of children.178 
Any attempt to change this in the past has been met with the argument that ‘… we are a 
                                                                                                                                              
Ibn Hibban, 12:412-413 G. F. Haddad, "The veil in Islam,"  Accessed 11.07.2013, 
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176 Bouthaina Shaaban, "The muted voices of women interpreters," in Faith and Freedom, 
ed. Mahnaz Afkhami (London: Tauris, 1995), 64; Sami Moubayed, "Men should unveil in 
Syria,"  Accessed 08.04.2013, http://www.mideastviews.com/articleview.php?art=86. 
177 Interview with Jamal Barout, Aleppo, 04.12.2009. 
178 For a more in-depth discussion of the legal situation of women in Syria see Djabari, 
"The Syrian woman: Reality and aspirations."; Bärbel Meyer, "Frauenpolitik und 
Frauenalltag in Syrien," Orient 29, no. 3 (1988): 468. 
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religious society and we cannot anger the fundamentalists of both religions [Muslim and 
Christian]’, writes Shaaban (1996).179 Besides the legal issues, the traditional forces within 
the families and neighbourhoods are a strong factor in hindering women’s emancipation. 
For example, Shaaban writes about the difficulties of many Syrian women to choose their 
own husband, something she personally experienced during the 1980s.180 According to my 
observations, the situation has only changed for a minority of women. 
 
Despite the fact that the Baath government did not obliterate the discrimination against 
Syrian women in the personal status laws, it promoted female education and employment. 
The area of education, especially, improved greatly for Syrian women. School education 
for the first six years became obligatory for all children,181 which gradually impacted the 
numbers of girls enrolled in school: According to the World Bank, the ratio of girls to boys 
in primary education rose from only 0.62:1 in 1970 close to gender parity in 2003. 
Considering secondary education, the ratio improved from 0.39:1 in 1970 to 0.93:1 in 
2003.182 Likewise, the percentage of illiterate women was more than halved between 1980 
and 2003.183 
 
Today, women work as teachers, doctors, and lawyers as well as in many other 
professions. Interestingly, however, the number of women who joined the work force has 
                                                
179 Bouthaina Shaaban, "The status of women in Syria," in Arab women: Between defiance 
and restraint, ed. Suha Sabbagh (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996), 61.  
180 Comp. Ibid., 54. And Bouthaina Shaaban, Both right and left handed: Arab women talk 
about their lives  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988). 16.  
181Shaaban, "The status of women in Syria," 56.  
182The World Bank, The Road Not Traveled: Education Reform in the Middle East and 
Africa, MENA Development Report (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2008). 29-30.  
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only increased marginally since the 1970s.184 Especially in cities like Damascus, it is not 
unusual to find highly educated women with university degrees who are not employed and 
never were. Many women who started to work in the new industries during the 60s and 70s 
did so out of economic necessities. The reasons for unemployment differ from case to case: 
On the one hand, conservative family values mean that many women marry as soon as they 
finish their education and start to have children, and the conviction that it is the husband’s 
duty to provide for his family is still very deeply rooted in society. In addition, work that 
implies contact with unrestricted numbers of men, such as working as a shop assistant, is 
often still seen as detrimental for a woman’s reputation. On the other hand, unemployment 
is generally high in Syria,185 and especially well-educated women often cannot find work 
that corresponds with their qualifications. For instance, a number of my unmarried 
acquaintances with degrees in English or Arabic literature work as typists for very low 
wages of about 100 USD a month. For married women, employment often implicates a 
double workload. Syrian author Kamar Kailani voices the frustration of many when she 
says: ‘[…] it is questionable to what extent working outside the home is in fact the process 
of self-realisation that it is supposed to be.’186 
 
For the Muslim Brotherhood, the emancipation of women was connected to the 
deterioration of public morals. Though the education of women was not an issue,187 the 
gender-mixed youth organizations and work places led to the supposition of growing 
promiscuity. However, a new understanding of the role of women was also discussed 
                                                
184 Ibid., 64-65.  
185 Ibid., 212-13. 
186 As quoted in: Sabbagh, "An Interview with Syria's Kamar Keilani," 248.  
187 Education is an area that has traditionally been acceptable for women to work in, and is 
still one of the major work fields where women are employed. Comp. Shaaban, "The status 
of women in Syria," 56. 
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among religious scholars. According to al-Siba’i and Hawwa, the role for women was to 
work towards the Islamisation of their families through the religious education of their 
children and the promotion of Islam in their extended families. With these ideas, they 
prepared the way for today’s engagement of women in the Islamist movement. 
Furthermore, al-Siba’i called for women to take up the public role of the dā‘iya: Only then 
the masses would be reached.188 Accordingly, from the late 1950s onwards, individual 
women played an active role as preachers and in the Islamist uprising.189 Even though the 
Islamist discourse argues for the existential difference in nature between men and 
women,190 the new roles for women in the Islamic revival show a parallel development to 
the secularist discourse as religious education and public agency within the da’wa 
movement started to be propagated. 
 
Both the secular and the religious trend are based on the end of female seclusion. The 
Syrian political analyst Mohamed Jamal Barout and Muhammad Habash, Member of 
Parliament, independently identified the end of the seclusion and the widely accepted 
participation of women in the public sphere as the most significant changes for women in 
Syrian society during the last 50 years, caused by the economic necessity for female 
employment and the influence of global media through satellite TV and the Internet that 
                                                
188 For al-Siba’i comp. Roded, "Lessons by a Syrian Islamist from the life of the Prophet 
Muhammad," 864.  
189 Interview with Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni and Zuhair Salim. London, 16.03.2010; 
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190 I will discuss this more in 6.1.1 and 6.3.  
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led to a more pluralistic society.191 In particular, the image of veiled women changed under 
the assessment of both the government and the religious milieu. 
 
The Baath regime’s push toward secularism and rejection of the hijab as a symbol of 
backwardness resulted in the marginalisation of conservative and religious Muslim women 
in Syrian society during the 1970s and 1980s and prolonged the practice of seclusion in the 
conservative milieu. The change was caused mainly by economic reasons and the growing 
acceptance of female education and employment by religious leaders. Habash argues that 
the exposure to various interpretations of Islamic jurisprudence in the wake of 
globalisation led to a change of mind among many ‘ulamā’ and their subsequent support of 
female participation in the public space.192 The ideal of seclusion lost its religious 
legitimisation and instead, new demarcations of gender segregation were defined.193 At the 
same time, the difficult economic situation resulted in a wider acceptance of female 
employment among conservative Sunni families so that today both women with and 
without hijab are working outside their homes albeit the professions that are seen as 
acceptable for women are limited. The government stance towards women in hijab has also 
changed, viewing the mutaḥajjaba as a possible embodiment of a modern woman, since 
many started serving their society in various functions, from typists in the private sector to 
members of parliament.194 
 
                                                
191 Interview with Jamal Barout, Aleppo, 04.12.2009; Interview with Muhammad Habash, 
Damascus, 19.06.2011.  
192 Ibid. 
193 For a discussion of gender segregation among my participants see 6.1.1. 
194 Comp. 3.1.1 and 3.3. 
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While this development led some women to reject veiling and to socialise more freely 
across gender boundaries, other women left seclusion behind, yet went on to uphold 
conservative religious values, i.e. they found new ways to practice modesty and redefine 
the boundaries of acceptable interactive participation with men in public. For other 
women, the veil has become a fashion statement, wound around the head in stylish folds, 
worn with heavy make-up and skin-tight clothes. Concerning clothing, a strong 
polarisation was taking place during the years I lived in Syria with growing minorities on 
both ends of the spectrum: More women followed contemporary Western fashion. 
Towards the end of my field research in 2011 in the richer parts of Damascus such as Abu 
Roumani, sleeveless tops and even a rare belly button could be seen, something unheard of 
when I first came to Syria in 2002. At the same time, more women started to wear extreme 
forms of veiling. During the late 1980s, Dunya was beaten by her father to stop her from 
wearing a headscarf, because he felt ashamed of his daughter’s public ‘confession’. Today 
a woman in niqāb and black gloves is nothing out of the ordinary in the streets of 
Damascus. The majority are opting for moderate forms of veiling. Constant discussions 
among all my female acquaintances revolved around the subjects of modesty, sexual 
attraction, and divine commandments on clothing. A couple of times I was even 
approached by strangers in the streets with a titḥajjabi nafsik! – ‘Wear hijab!’   
 
Gender boundaries are not only set through clothing but through a diversity of behaviours. 
My research participants signalled modesty by actions such as refusing to shake a man’s 
hand or avoiding being alone with a man in a closed space even for a short time like taking 
an elevator. The same is true of devout men. After one of the classes I visited at the Sharia 
Department of Damascus University I went to ask the male lecturer a few questions. 
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Another student accompanied me and the door to his office was left open. During our 
conversation the lecturer spoke consequently facing away from me at about a 45-degree 
angle. This felt very strange to me but my fellow student praised his modest behaviour 
afterwards. Yet with the failure of the political struggle, Islamist discourse has focused 
more than ever on women and their behaviour.  
 
This goes hand in hand with the shift from violence to changing the society via institutions 
and personal da‘wa.195 The government-supported Islamisation has helped Islamist women 
in living out some of their convictions under the cover of the general religious trend and 
allowed for the development of the women’s da‘wa movement, which I will discuss in the 
next chapter.  
                                                
195 Compare Freitag, "Politische Religion im Nahen Osten: nationalistische und 
islamistische Modelle," 142-43.  
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4 WOMEN AND THE DA‘WA MOVEMENT IN SYRIA  
1970 – 2011 
 
 
The simultaneous trend of greater secularism and plurality in parts of Syrian society in the 
second half of the 20th century generated the growing need for da‘wa among Islamists. The 
development of the women’s da‘wa movement was a response to the loss of religious and 
moral dominance in society. In my experience, Islamist women were driven by a strong 
missionary zeal, working towards the Islamisation of their society on different levels: even 
while working at the level of the individual, they were influencing the change of the 
consensus of what is morally acceptable, and a general public adherence to morals. In the 
following, I discuss the historical roots of the women’s da‘wa movement and how it relates 
to the general da‘wa movement before I look at the role that education, family and mosque 
space play in this phenomenon.  
 
 
 
4.1  The development of the da‘wa movement in the 20th century 
 
The concept of da‘wa is based on Qur’anic verses that commanded Muhammad and his 
followers to engage with unbelievers in conversations about Islam. The verse that my 
participants quoted most often when asked why they engaged in da‘wa was: id‘u ilā sabīli 
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rabbika bi-l-ḥikma wa al-maw‘iẓa al-ḥasana wa jadilahum bi-llatī hiya aḥsan.196 Over the 
centuries Muslims have always engaged with preaching to and teaching of both Muslims 
and non-Muslims. Yet the use of the term da‘wa with the emphasis to call to religious 
observance and piety to Muslims, underwent a revival only since the 19th century, when 
Muslim societies were challenged by the military and technical dominance of the colonial 
powers and even more so during the 20th century after the struggle for decolonisation 
triggered a search for a new Muslim/Arab modernity.197  
 
The da‘wa movement in Syria is an educational movement. Historically, in the Ottoman 
Empire, basic Islamic knowledge and devout practice were passed on in the context of the 
family and Qur’an schools, more in-depth knowledge in study circles (ḥalaqāt) in homes 
or mosques and in the madrasas as institutes of religious and secular learning. Under the 
influence of Western colonial powers, religious education was marginalised due to the 
preference of Western-style secular education.198 Christian missionary activities 
aggravated this trend.199 The preference of Western education and the sentiment that 
associated Islam with backwardness, led many in the upper classes to adopt secularist life-
styles while triggering apologetic responses from Islamic thinkers such as Syed Ahmad 
Khan (1817 – 1898), Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), Rashid Rida (1865-1935) and 
                                                
196 ‘[Prophet], call [people] to the way of your Lord with wisdom and good teaching. 
Argue with them in the most courteous way’ Sura 16:125. 
197 For a discussion of the historical development of the Islamic discourse on da’wa 
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198 Masooda Bano, "Co-producing with FBOs: Lessons from state-madrassa engagement in 
the Middle East and South Asia," Third World Quarterley 32, no. 7 (2011): 1278. Thomas 
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Muhammad Iqbal (1877 – 1938), who called for a turning back to the original sources of 
Islam in rejection of the ‘backward’ taqālīd of the ‘ulamā’ to solve the marginalisation of 
religion in their societies.200 The first practical steps were taken to promote a reformed 
Islam, for example Rida founded the first institute to train du‘āt, the Dar al-Da‘wa wa-l-
’Irshad, in Cairo in 1911.201 
 
During the nationalist struggle, da‘wa became one of the tools to revive the identity of the 
new nations as Islamic nations, against the backdrop of anti-Western sentiment on the one 
hand and secular nationalist movements on the other. While Islamic parties and militant 
groups were trying to gain influence at the political level, the ideological battle for the 
influence over people’s minds and morals was fought through da‘wa. Hassan al-Banna 
(1906-1949) was one of the first to articulate the modern concept of da‘wa as the answer to 
what he saw as the moral decay of Egyptian Muslim society through the influences of 
Western secularism and materialism.202 He aimed his organisation, in addition to political 
and social activism, at the religious education of the people. Accordingly, he understood 
da‘wa as a call to the individual first of all, yet aiming at the step-by-step development of 
Islamic families, an Islamic society and an Islamic state. The Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood trained du‘āt, built mosques and created other educational institutes, in 
addition to publishing religious books and pamphlets to disseminate the ‘true’ 
interpretation of the Qur’an and the call to  ‘correct’ practices.  
                                                
200 Andrew Rippin, Muslims: Their religious beliefs and practices, 2nd ed. (London, New 
York: Routledge, 2001). 185-86.  
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The phenomenon of the Muslim brotherhood is not a unique case of a da‘wa oriented 
organisation in the first half of the 20th century. During the 1920s, Maulana Muhammad 
Ilyas (1885-1944) founded the Tablighi Jama’at movement on the Indian subcontinent in 
response to Hindu and Christian missionary activities. His da‘wa was directed at educating 
the rural Muslim population in particular, and correcting their basic beliefs and practices to 
ensure monotheism, the ritual prayer and dhikr.203 In contrast with the Muslim 
Brotherhood, they disclaimed political engagement. Today, the movement counts as one of 
the most successful international Islamic movements. 
 
In Syria, the period in the middle of the 20th century is sometimes called the ‘awakening of 
the sheikhs,’ as a new generation of religious leaders from the middle class started to react 
to the secularisation of the educated milieu.204 At the time, there was no institute of higher 
Islamic education in Syria, and many Syrian students of sharia studied at Al-Azhar in 
Cairo. During the 1940s and 1950s, students like al-Siba’i205 and Abu Ghudda206 were 
influenced by al-Banna while in Cairo, and returned with the goal to reform Syrian society 
through da‘wa. 
 
The following years saw the foundation of a number of Islamic networks and organisations 
with the gaol of da‘wa and Islamic education at different levels. For example, al-Siba’i and 
other Muslim Brothers founded the Faculty of Sharia at the University of Damascus in 
                                                
203 Wrogemann, Missionarischer Islam und gesellschaftlicher Dialog: Eine Studie zur 
Begründung und Praxis des Aufrufs zum Islam: 132-33.  
204 Comp. Pierret, "Sunny clergy politics in the cities of Ba'thi Syria," 72.  
205 Comp. 3.1, page 61-72. 
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1954.207 Salih al-Farfour (1901-1986) established al-Fatih Institute in Damascus’ 
conservative quarter of Midan in 1956.208 At the same time, the traditional method of 
private studies with a sheikh and gaining a number of ijāzāt remained in practice. Each 
ijāza is the permission to teach a specific subject or book. Ahmad Kuftaro had a growing 
following for his lessons at the Abu al-Nur Mosque, the predecessor of ANC, and started a 
sharia elementary school for boys and girls each during the 1950s.209 The Islamic scholar 
Abd al-Karim al-Rifa’i (1901 – 1973) started the Zayd network of ‘ulamā’ and laypersons. 
Centered at the Zayd bin Thabit Mosque in Damascus, his followers met in study circles in 
mosques around the city. These movements provided Islamic education at different levels, 
offering study opportunities to bigger numbers of Syrians at the institutes of basic and 
higher education, while at the same time maintaining the relationship-based approach of 
learning with a sheikh, and facilitating Islamic education to wider circles of laypersons 
through mosque lessons and many smaller ḥalaqāt. While only the certificate from the 
Sharia Faculty was acknowledged by the government, the system of attaining ijāza 
provided the basic principle that facilitated the da‘wa movement to become a grassroots 
movement as numerous individuals were coached to teach what they had learned.210 
 
While these different groups and clerics shared the goal of re-Islamising Syrian society, the 
diversity within the da‘wa movement in Syria becomes obvious with the various 
approaches to politics. In particular, during the power struggles between the Baath 
government and the Islamists, different ‘ulamā’ and organisations have taken dissimilar 
                                                
207 Pierret, Religion and state in Syria: The Sunni ulama from coup to revolution: 36.  
208 For more information see "al-Fatih Institute webpage,"  Accessed 06.06.2007, 
http://alfatihonline.com/en/main.htm. 
209 Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad: 151-52 and 56.  
210 Interview with Sheikh Rajab Deeb, Jdeida, 10.03.2009.  
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stances concerning the government. The Muslim Brotherhood as political opposition was 
targeted from 1963 onwards, even though it was divided over the use of violence. Even 
before the 1979-1981 uprising, many of its leading sheikhs were imprisoned or exiled, 
such as Abu Ghuda and Issam al-‘Attar. Al-Rifa’i’s sons, who had taken over the 
leadership of the Zayd movement after their father’s death, were exiled, too, 
notwithstanding their attempts to remain neutral in the conflict. They returned in the 1990s 
and there seems to have been a short period of rapprochement between the government and 
the Zayd network, yet tellingly, in March and April 2011 during the uprising, the Zayd bin 
Thabit Mosque became one of the major centres of opposition in Damascus. On the other 
hand, Kuftaro and al-Farfour supported the government and could engage their movements 
in da‘wa under its patronage. In addition to the leading sheikhs, less important ‘ulamā’ 
within the da‘wa movement were to varying degrees dependent or independent of the 
government’s ‘Official Islam’.211 
 
The sheikhs who initiated the da‘wa movement among men also started the women’s 
da‘wa movement. Understanding the relationship between the male religious elite and the 
women involved in da‘wa, supports my argument that I will develop in depth in Chapter 
5.3, that the movement among women has no emancipatory objective because of the 
dependency and support that the dā‘iyāt receive from the male sheikhs. I will portray this 
relationship in the following section. 
 
 
                                                
211 For an in-depth discussion see Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad; Pierret, 
"Sunny clergy politics in the cities of Ba'thi Syria."; Pierret, Religion and state in Syria: 
The Sunni ulama from coup to revolution. 
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4.2  The development of the role of the dā‘iya 
 
Throughout the history of Islam, there are some examples of female religious authority, 
starting with Aisha and the other wives of Muhammad, who played an important role in 
the transmission of the aḥadīth in particular.212 In Syria, early examples include Um 
Dardat, who taught mixed gender classes in the Ummayad Mosque in Damascus at the turn 
of the 8th century.213 An example from the 19th century is Fatima, the daughter of Sheikh 
Khalid Naqshbani (1776-1826), who received training in Islamic sciences and was a well-
known teacher in the Naqshbandiya-Khalidiya order.214 However, higher religious 
learning, preaching and teaching were mainly male domains. At the beginning of the 20th 
century, most girls learned basic religious practices like prayer and fasting within the 
family context and practised them at home.215 Even during my field research the question 
of whether mosques were for men and women should only pray at home was discussed, 
and one of the aḥadīth I have heard quoted many times was: ‘A woman’s prayer in her 
house is better than in her courtyard, and her prayer in her own room is better than her 
prayer in the rest of the house.’216 Yet other aḥadīth such as: ‘Do not forbid the mosques of 
Allah to the women of Allah’217 could be used to legitimise women’s participation in 
                                                
212 Comp. Shaaban, "The muted voices of women interpreters," 61-63; Kalmbach, "Social 
and religious change in Damascus: One case of female Islamic religious authority," 38 and 
46-47. On the question of religious authority of Muhammad’s wives comp. Ahmed, 
Women and gender in Islam: Historical roots of a modern debate: 72-75. On religious 
education of women see ibid. 
213 Kalmbach, "Social and religious change in Damascus: One case of female Islamic 
religious authority," 46-47. 
214 Sean Foley, "The Naqshbaniyya-Khalidiyya, Islamic sainthood, and religion in modern 
times.," Journal of World History 19, no. 4 (2008): 533.  
215 Interviews with Shirine Dakouri, Damascus, 12.12.2009, and Jamal Barout, Aleppo, 
04.12.2009. 
216 Abu Dawud, 570. 
217 Sahih Bukhari, vol. 13, bāb 23. 
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public religious activities. Notwithstanding the question as to whether these aḥadīth are 
authentic, the fact that they are part of the religious discourse and often unquestioned gives 
them influence over the way male and female religious space are understood.  
 
The da‘wa movement tended towards including women early on. In Egypt, Zaynab al-
Ghazali (1918-2005) founded the Muslim Women’s Association for religious education 
and charity in 1936. She met Hassan al-Banna in 1939, and swore allegiance to him in 
1949. In the 1950s she gave weekly lectures in the Ibn Tulun Mosque in Cairo, which was 
attended by 3-5000 women. Her goal was to convince women of ‘true Islam’ in the hope 
that they would bring up the new generation as ‘true Muslims.218 Similarly, the Tablighi 
Jama’at started to include women in their religious activism under the protection and 
leadership of male preachers. The men focused on da‘wa in the mosques, while the women 
reached out to women in private homes. 219 However, in order for the women’s da‘wa 
movement, including large numbers of female religious activists, to develop in Syria, the 
areas of religious education, role and space for women needed to change.     
 
 
 
4.2.1  Providing religious education for women 
 
During the 1950s, as a professor at the Sharia Faculty at Damascus University, al-Siba’i 
advocated that women should follow the example of Muhammad’s wives who had not 
                                                
218 On Zaynab al-Ghazali see Valerie J Hoffman, "An Islamic Activist: Zaynab al-
Ghazali," in Women and the family in the Middle East: New voices of change, ed. 
Elizabeth Warnock Fernea (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985). 
219 I discuss the effect of female activities in homes in Syria in 6.1.3. 
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been passive but active members of the early Muslim community and propagated Islam 
within their families and beyond, and argued for the importance of religious education for 
women.220 Yet public lessons, accessible to large numbers of women, remained an 
exception. For example, during the 1960s, Sheikh Abdu al-Qadir ‘Isa (d. 1991) taught 
lessons which were attended by women in Aleppo,221 and women also listened to Ahmad 
Kuftaro’s lessons in the yard of the Abu Nur Mosque, hidden behind a curtain.222 
Alternatively, a female relative of the imam, most often his wife, taught women in private 
lessons. However, these two approaches to reach women were quite limited: On the one 
hand, women who listened to male preachers had only inadequate interaction with the 
teacher, while the majority of women were still affected by seclusion and would therefore 
not attend a men’s lesson at a mosque. On the other, the few women who gave lessons 
were not trained in da‘wa or religious knowledge, as Huda Habash, herself a dā‘iya  and 
supervisor for the ministry of awqāf, pointed out to me: This older generation of female 
religious teachers often only taught some limited Qur’an memorisation or read from a 
religious book.223 Therefore one of the important factors for the successful development of 
the women’s da‘wa movement was the creation of opportunities for higher religious 
education for women. During the 1960s and 1970s the first steps were taken to provide 
this. The al-Fatih Institute opened its women’s branch on a separate women’s campus in 
1965.224 ANC opened a girl’s sharia secondary school in 1975, its faculty of da‘wa studies 
                                                
220 Comp. Roded, "Lessons by a Syrian Islamist from the life of the Prophet Muhammad," 
863-64. 
221 Interview with Jamal Barout, Aleppo, 09.12.2009. 
222 Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad: 152.  
223 Interview with Huda Habash, Damascus, 23.12.2009. On Huda Habash see Kalmbach, 
"Social and religious change in Damascus: One case of female Islamic religious authority." 
224 "al-Fatih Institute webpage". 
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having opened in 1974.225 To my knowledge, women were admitted to the Sharia Faculty 
at Damascus University from its foundation in 1954, but the numbers of female students 
were small. In 1967/68, for example, out of a total of 1254 students only 197 were 
women.226 
 
When the ANC, which was still a small institute with only two storeys, opened its sharia 
school for girls in 1975, the male teachers used their influence to recruit and encourage 
families to send their daughters to receive an Islamic education.227 There were 23 girls who 
started together in the first year, Huda Habash being one of them. She remembered how 
she first got drawn to become a preacher during the 1970s: 
When we studied with Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro he emphasised that we would be 
du‘āt. He told us that we were now studying sharia in order to become du‘āt. We 
were not studying sharia only for our own good but for the sake of the people, to 
save them from sin, injustice and evil to good, light and righteousness.228 
 
For the generation of dā‘iyāt who grew up in the 1980s or later, the situation has changed 
in many ways. With the general rise of the percentage of men and women with higher 
education229 there is also a rising demand to study sharia. According to the government, in 
2006 there were 7603 students enrolled at the four-year course of the Sharia Faculty of 
Damascus University, 3337 of them women.230 That means that more than 15 % of all 
                                                
225 Comp. Böttcher, "Islamic teaching among sunni women in Syria," 154-64. 
226 Ibid., 138. 
227 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009.  
228 Interview with Huda Habash, Damascus, 23.12.2009. 
229 Comp. 2.3, page 85-92. 
230 as quoted in Ibrahim Hamidi, "Alāf al-masājid tuqadim 400 alf dars usbu'ī ... al-aryaf 
al-surīyya tughadhdhi al-mudun b-il-mutashaddidīn ... wa al-ihtilāl al-'irāq yulhim 
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students at the University that year studied sharia.231 This high number is partly due to the 
numerus clausus for sharia studies, which is comparatively low. In addition, especially for 
girls from conservative families, sharia studies are a more acceptable choice than for 
example Arabic literature, because female students of the Arts have a worse moral 
reputation according to my observations. This is supported by Hamidi’s (2006) record that 
there were an additional 6000 students enrolled in the private institutes that offer sharia 
studies on a university level in 2004, such as the ANC and the al-Fatih Institute.232  
 
 
 
4.2.2  The Qubaisiyat: An example of a successful religious women’s  
  network 
 
Recently, some international publicity has focused on the Syrian dā‘iya Munira Qubaisi 
and her network, the Qubaisiyat.233 Munira Qubaisi has been ranked among the 50 most 
                                                                                                                                              
thamaniya alāf,"  Accessed 13.05.2009, http://www.daralhayat.com/archivearticle/127160. 
The female – male ratio of 0.87 to 1 is lower than average. 
231 According to Hamidi there are 48, 000 students enrolled in the University, ibid. 
232 Hamidi, "Fi surīya al-'ilmānīya, Kuftāro yudāfi' 'an "al-wasatiyya li-qat' al-tarīq 'ala al-
tatarruf al-islāmiy"". 
233 Such as: Rhonda Roumani, "Into the open,"  Accessed 13.09.2008, 
http://www.thenational.ae/article/20080912/REVIEW/725899346/-1/SPORT; Ibrahim 
Hamidi, "Yurtadīna al-ḥijâb al- kuḥlī wa yamlikna shabaka tadrīs wa nufūdh wāsi'a ... "al-
anisāt al-qubaisiyāt" yubāshirna fî surīyya inkhirāṭ al-nisā'i fî "al-da'wa al-islāmiyya","  
Accessed 13.05.2009, http://www.daralhayat.com/archivearticle/132991; Mona Sarkis, 
"Religious women's societies in Syria: Angry but tame?,"  Accessed 07.02.2007, 
http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-651/_nr-15/i.html. 
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influential Muslims and described as ‘arguably the most influential Muslim woman in the 
world’ today.234 
 
Qubaisi was born in 1933 as one of 12 children. She was the only girl in her family to 
receive a university education, studying sciences. Her family was connected to the 
Naqshbandiyya-Kuftariyya, and during the 1950s she started to study Islam with 
Kuftaro.235 She started her work as a dā‘iya in the 1960s when she was suspended from her 
employment as a schoolteacher for mathematics because she used the classroom for the 
call to Islam.236 As an alternative, she pursued her religious education at ANC and the 
Sharia College of Damascus University. Later, she left ANC and started to build an 
independent women’s network in the 1970s, encouraging her disciples to reach the highest 
levels of religious scholarship.237 The Qubaisiyat are organised hierarchically like the 
Kuftariyya order and share the Sufi elements such as dhikr and spiritual guidance of each 
member through a teacher. 
 
The success of the network was partly due to the strategy of secret study circles in private 
homes during the 1980s and 1990s.238 In 2006, the government granted a licence to teach 
                                                
234 S. Abdallah Schleifer, ed. The world's 500 most Influential Muslims: 2012 (Amman: 
The Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, 2011), 79. 
235 Islam, "The Qubaysiyyat: The Growth of an international Muslim Women's Revivalist 
movement from Syria (1960 - 2008) " 5.  
236 According to Hassan Kuftaro, son of Sheikh Ahmad Kuftrao, as quoted in Hamidi, 
"Yurtadīna al-ḥijâb al- kuḥlī wa yamlikna shabaka tadrīs wa nufūdh wāsi'a ... "al-anisāt al-
qubaisiyāt" yubāshirna fî surīyya inkhirāṭ al-nisā'i fî "al-da'wa al-islāmiyya""..  
237 Schleifer, The world's 500 most Influential Muslims: 2012, 78-79. 
238 Hamidi, "Yurtadīna al-ḥijâb al- kuḥlī wa yamlikna shabaka tadrīs wa nufūdh wāsi'a ... 
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to the Qubaisiyat on the condition that they would teach publicly in mosques.239 Today, the 
number of her followers is said to be approximately 75, 000 in Damascus and its 
surroundings alone, with activities spreading to Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, a number of 
European countries and the United States.240 According to Muhammad Habash, the Islamic 
Member of Parliament in Damascus, the enormous growth of her movement was due 
partly to her neutrality during the conflict between the government and the Muslim 
Brotherhood. Munira Qubaisi neither alienated the religious political opposition and their 
followers nor the pro-government circles through taking the other side. The network is 
well connected to the most important religious groups in Damascus, such as the ANC, al-
Fatih, the Zayd network, and supported by Ramadan Buti.241 
 
There are a number of Islamic private schools in which dā‘iyāt are using their influence to 
Islamise the young generation. The Qubaisiyat own 80 schools in Damascus alone.242 In all 
private schools, the official syllabus of the government has to be taught, but the Islamic 
schools offer additional religious classes, activities and competitions for children. These 
schools are in high demand among middle class families as an affordable alternative to the 
government schools, with huge classes of often over 60 students per class and underpaid, 
insufficiently trained teachers.243 While other private schools often demand ten times more 
                                                
239 Ibrahim Hamidi, "Shaqīqat Ahmad Jibrīl fi halaqāt "al-ānisa" Munīra al-Qubaisi ... 
Dimashq tasmah l-"il-qubaisiyāt" bi-nashat 'alanī,"  Accessed 13.05.2009, 
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in fees than those of the Qubaisiyat,244 their schools are also known for their well-educated 
teachers and the emphasis on morals and good behaviour.245 Once a student finishes 
school, the network offers on-going religious education and attachment in their study 
circles. 
 
Notwithstanding their success, some women find it difficult to deal with the strict 
hierarchical structure of the Qubaisiyat, which even finds its outward expression in the 
different coloured hijabs, signalling a member’s position within the network. Leila used to 
be a Qubaisiya but she left because she thinks that ‘they are like soldiers.’246 
 
 
 
4.2.3  Women’s da‘wa, employment, and family 
 
A qualification in religious studies offers special opportunities to women with regards to 
their work after graduation. According to the World Bank, the rate of female employment 
is less than 30 % in Syria.247 After they graduate from university, many young women 
work in low-income jobs that have nothing to do with their education or with their personal 
interests until they get married. After that, they are housewives and mothers. However, 
                                                                                                                                              
students per class while she earned the eqivalent of less than $200. She never was trained 
in teaching methods and mainly taught through school book memorization.   
244 According to my Arabic teacher, Bushra, whose nieces were attending a secular private 
school, conversation, 14.12.2009. 
245 Compare as well Al-Sheykh, ""Al-sahariyyat" fi beyrut mu'minat nashitat wa fi 
madarisihunna munhazat dadda al-sibyan". 
246 Interview with Leila, Damascus, 23.06.2007. 
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according to my observation, young women with degrees in sharia studies are much more 
likely to remain engaged with their area of specialisation: religion. Safiya, whom I met 
during my studies at the Sharia Faculty in 2005, is one example. Even before she finished 
her studies, she was involved in teaching girls at her local mosque in a village outside of 
Damascus. She got married within weeks of graduating, but kept on teaching. In 2009, I 
visited her after she had given birth to her first child. She had stopped teaching, but with 
the firm resolve to get involved again as soon as her son or possibly other children would 
be old enough for her to have some time to spare. A number of women from the mosque 
who had joined us for the visit encouraged her to return, saying that they missed her and 
asking her when she would come back.248 Like many female dā‘iyāt, her engagement at 
the mosque did not give her an income. However, it is of high idealistic value to her, 
providing her with a purpose and a position among the women of her village. By 
comparison, young women without such an opportunity who cannot find work may 
continue their studies rather than being unemployed, but that is open to only a small 
minority even among women with a university degree. The majority sit at home and 
struggle with boredom.249 During my field research, graduates eligible for employment in 
the public sector such as teachers had to wait one or two years after graduation to start their 
work with the government. For female graduates, this situation was often aggravated by 
cultural expectations to move back to live with their families, losing their relative 
independence, and by the pressure to get married ‘before it is too late.’ 
 
Like Safiya, the dā‘iyāt that I have met were well educated and highly committed to their 
calling. Some worked in secular employment as teachers, architects or doctors and still 
                                                
248 Conversation with Safiya, Damascus countryside, 04.03.2009. 
249 Interview with the author Shirine Dakouri, Damascus,12.12.2009. 
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made time to spend their evenings and Fridays at the mosques or with visiting women they 
hoped to draw into the movement.  
 
This is especially true of dā‘iyāt that are not married. The subject of the unmarried dā‘iya 
has triggered the imagination of some people, especially the Qubaisiyat have been accused 
of heresy by rejecting marriage and promoting anti-male sexism.250 It is noticeable that 
there seem to be an above average number of unmarried women in their 30s among the 
dā‘iyāt.251 It’s a topic that comes up regularly in my conversations and interviews as I am 
in the same situation. Each one that I talked to wanted to get married but they are not 
desperate enough to marry anybody because there is nothing else to fill their lives. Their 
situation enables them to stand up against social pressures and to reject suitors if they are 
not to their liking. 
 
 
 
4.3  Mosques as spaces for women’s da‘wa religious activism 
 
Another important factor in the development of the women’s da‘wa movement was the 
new accessibility of mosques for women’s activities because religious lessons were the 
main organised activity dā‘iyāt engage in. Mosques provided the space to reach larger 
                                                
250 See e.g. Fayad, "Al-khalfiyya al-jinsiyya lil-qubaisiyyāt"; Al-Sheykh, ""Al-sahariyyat" 
fi beyrut mu'minat nashitat wa fi madarisihunna munhazat dadda al-sibyan". 
251 On the expectation among students for women to get married iin their early twenties see 
Bilal Orabi, "Syria's youth perspectives and orientations: Towards issues of social change,"  
Accessed 
07.02.2012http://www.fafo.no/ais/middeast/syria/syrianuniversityyouth/B%20Orabi_Syria'
s%20Youth%20Perspectives%20and%20Orientations%20Towards%20Issues%20of%20S
ocial%20Change_English.pdf. Less educated women tend to marry earlier. 
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numbers of women than is possible in private lessons and for dā‘iyāt to build up a sizeable 
followership. 
 
One of the conditions for this change from homes to mosques was the development of 
segregated space for women. While the earliest mosque buildings, e.g. in Mecca, Medina 
or Damascus, had no separate space for women and women used to pray behind the men, 
the earliest evidence of segregated space comes from the 9th century when a part of the 
mosque in Mecca was roped off.252 I observed a similar development at the Omayyad 
Mosque in Damascus, which had no separation when I first lived there in 2002. During the 
later years of my field research the back of the prayer hall was roped off for women. 
According to Huda Habash, segregated spaces for women started to be built under the 
reign of the Ottomans.253 However, these were usually balustrades that were open to the 
main hall so that women could hear and see but not be seen. This arrangement also meant 
that women had to be quiet if they did not want to be heard. Some modern mosques in 
Damascus provide a different arrangement. They are built with space for women, not just 
visually separated but also audibly. Women enter through a separate entrance. For 
example, at ANC, the women’s hall is connected to the main mosque via tinted 
windowpanes and loudspeakers. At the Iman Mosque in Mazra‘a, Damascus, the women’s 
hall is in the basement and connected to the main hall via video screens.254 The new kind 
of segregated space provides women with a meeting place for their own programme of 
lessons and even social events as Huda Habash explains: 
                                                
252 J. Pedersen et al., "Masdjid," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. C.E. 
Bosworth, et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1991). 
253 Interview with Huda Habash, Damascus, 23.12.2009. 
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We have more continuing activities, conversations among the women, they can 
laugh and sing together ... it is simply more comfortable. But if [the space] is 
shared with the men, we only listen to a lecture, and go home.255 
 
Nevertheless, mosques are still perceived to be men’s space, first of all. For example, 
during Friday prayers, the women’s part of the Zahra and other mosques is left to 
accommodate the larger numbers of men while women stay at home. The only mosques 
that I know of in Syria where women attend the Friday prayer are the ANC and the 
Umayad mosque. During different activities that I observed, men would call the dā‘iya on 
her mobile phone and complain that they could hear the women. At a mawlid I attended at 
the big Kuwaiti Mosque in Mazra‘a the women used the main prayer hall, which the male 
caretaker at first would not let them enter and then was grumbling and rebuking the women 
unceasingly.256 
 
According to Huda Habash, the change from homes to mosques was pushed by the 
government to make it possible to guarantee the qualifications of the preacher and the 
quality of what was taught.257 As a supervisor, Huda Habash visits mosque lessons to get 
acquainted with the dā‘iya and her education, as well as making sure that the teaching is 
not opposed to the law, e.g. in promoting religious violence.258  
  
Moving lessons to the mosques has made attendance at lessons more socially acceptable 
for women: Public lessons make it much easier to bring others along, or to find out if they 
                                                
255 Interview with Huda Habash, Damascus, 23.12.2009. 
256 Observation at a mawlid celebration at the Kuwaiti Mosque, Damascus, 15.02.2011 
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would like to join a lesson or not, while private lessons are only accessible via invitation 
and are of limited size.259 In addition, for a woman to visit a home of a not-related family 
is seen by some sectors of society as risky, because of possible dangers to her reputation 
and safety. 
 
 
 
4.3.1  The Zahra Mosque as an example of a successful women’s mosque  
  programme 
 
Huda Habash was one of the first women who started to teach regular classes at a mosque 
in Damascus.260 Her programme is one of the most successful today. She developed a 
desire to spread religion very early on in her life and started as a teenager to gather the 
children in her building and her family to teach them stories of the prophets and other 
simple subjects that she had learned at ANC. At the beginning of the 1980s when she was 
seventeen, she began to teach girls in a mosque in Ayn Khadra, at that time an hour and a 
half from Damascus on public transport. She had by then studied sharia for five years and 
was able to teach the girls how to memorise the Qur’an, about Qur’anic interpretation, and 
the biography of Muhammad, prayer and ‘Islamic clothing’: What was to be covered and 
in front of whom. Two years later in 1983, while the country was still in shock about what 
                                                
259 This is not always the case. I tried to join two women’s lessons in two mosques after I 
had heard that they were connected to the Qubaisiyat. My informant said that she had to 
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happened in Hama, she began lessons for women in the Zahra Mosque in the middle-class 
neighbourhood of Mezze where her brother Muhammad Habash was the imam. At that 
time, the Zahra Mosque was the only one after ANC to offer regular lessons for women.261 
Because the women who came to the lessons had very different levels of education, some 
illiterate and some university students, she split them into different groups. Yet she had to 
do all the teaching herself because she was the only teacher. From the second year onwards 
she involved the women who had learned from her in the teaching process. Today, there 
are a number of well-educated female teachers with degrees in sharia studies working at 
the Zahra Mosque. Huda Habash herself completed her education at the Sharia Faculty of 
Damascus University. Over the years, the number of women taking part in different 
lessons each week has grown to about 700.262 
 
The Islamic interpretation that is taught at the Zahra Mosque is moderate. The women’s 
programme includes weekly general lessons for women in different age groups and 
introductory courses for university students who want to gain more in-depth knowledge of 
sharia on top of their secular studies. These girls commit to coming to specially set-up 
classes each Friday for four years. They are taught Qur’an memorisation and recitation, 
Islamic doctrine, Hadith science, Muhammad’s biography and jurisprudence in groups of 
70 to 80 students. Still, according to Huda Habash, the girls have not gained enough 
knowledge to become teachers after they have finished the four-year course. ‘It’s about 
being educated in their own religion (...) If she wants to be multazima  she needs to know 
something about fiqh and doctrine and so on. But it would be too early for her to teach 
                                                
261 Ibid. 
262 Ibid. 
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after only these courses.’263 Hesitation to let students start their own da‘wa too soon sets 
Huda Habash apart from other dā‘iyāt who rely on the spreading of da‘wa on the 
grassroots level. 
 
 
 
4.4  The women’s da‘wa as a grassroots movement 
 
Huda Habash’s stance on the necessary qualifications for a teacher are high by 
comparison. More often, I encountered the opinion that any religious knowledge comes 
with the responsibility to pass it on. As in Huda Habash’s own history, young teenage girls 
are often starting out on their first da‘wa experiences. Even my eight-year-old neighbour’s 
daughter would sometimes walk down the street with me and exhort me on the benefits of 
becoming a Muslim in terms that reflected the preaching in mosques. This approach is 
widely encouraged by many dā‘iyāt. It facilitates the da‘wa movement as a grassroots 
movement because da‘wa is seen not primarily as the duty of a few experts but of every 
believer, so that it will permeate the whole of society.  
However, behind the rhetoric of da‘wa as every Muslim’s duty is the fact that the 
propagation from one woman to another results from the motivational preaching of trained 
dā‘iyāt and the confidence that comes with the perception of having gained valued 
knowledge. 
 
                                                
263 Ibid. 
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According to this approach a person just needs to be one step ahead to be competent in 
da‘wa. Hiyam, one of the dā‘iyāt at ANC, explained to me that da‘wa is not about  
being something and then changing into something else, but it is a matter of 
degrees of being farther away from God or closer. [...] One woman e.g. is at stage 6 
or 5, another one at stage 1. We all want to be or should be at stage 1. So one 
believer who is further on ‘calls’ the other believer to a degree up in closeness, that 
means in piety.264  
 
Thorough knowledge, though it is also viewed as important, plays a secondary role. On 
this level of lay women, da‘wa becomes a simple way of living in a society that is not 
obediently Muslim, an expression of one’s piety in the face of opposition: 
The prophet Nuh is an example of how to live da‘wa. Da‘wa means to call all 
creation to obedience. Nuh shows how one person can bear with [the sin of] a 
whole umma and even bring revival to it and change it. This is the situation in 
which God places every Muslim [...] He did not study, or go to school but he 
studied through life and living in his society, learning how to bear it. [...] [Nuh’s] 
message was very simple. He had no other message than calling people to say 
istaghfir allah,265 subḥāna -llah,266 and al-ḥamdu li-llah.267 After one month he 
added: la ilaha illa -llah.268 His society was so far from God, he started with very 
small steps.269 
 
                                                
264 Interview with Hiyam, Damascus, 09.04.2009.. 
265 ‘May God forgive.’ 
266 ‘Praise be to God.’ 
267 ‘Praise be to God.’ 
268 ‘There is no god but God.’ 
269 Lesson by Rajab Deeb at ANC, Damascus, 05.03.2009. 
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In this quote Nuh (Noah) is used to show that da‘wa is achievable for everyone, because 
there is no necessity for higher studies or training to pass on the simple call to worship the 
one god. In the parts of the da‘wa movement that follow these ideas, motivational 
preaching aims at engaging as many women as possible in basic da‘wa to guarantee that 
the movement spreads quickly. That the message often remains on a simple level is not 
seen as a problem, because it is just the first step to draw the recipients into the movement 
where they will then receive teaching from more qualified dā‘iyāt. 
 
One-to-one da‘wa moves along the channels of social relationships. The family is the first 
place where women are engaged in working towards the Islamisation of  society, not just 
in bringing up their children but also in their relationships with their peers and parents’ 
generation. In lessons, women constantly receive advice on how to ensure that their 
children will grow up as pious Muslims: 
Bring your child a small gift and say: this is from Muhammad. Every time you give 
them something, a hairclip, a pen, say that it’s from Muhammad. Or when he says 
ṣalla –llahu ‘aleyhi wa-sallam270 reward him.271  
 
Accordingly, Huda Habash recalls how as a teenager she spent her pocket money on gifts 
for the children she taught, even though she very much longed to treat herself, because she 
was driven by the need to reward the children ‘for the sake of their prayers’.272  
 
                                                
270 ‘May God bless him and grant him peace.’  
271 Lesson by Sheikh Rajab Deeb, 31.05.2009. 
272 Interview with Huda Habash, Damascus, 23.12.2009. 
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Prayer, religious formulas and short supplications are the first thing to plant in the heart of 
a child. Sometimes mothers are not only called to reward but also to punish their children: 
When a child is seven years old, he is told how to pray. When he is ten, the parents 
command prayer and hit the child if he doesn’t pray. The goal is to have the child 
get used to praying even though it is not yet an obligation (farḍ) for the child to 
pray, but it is farḍ for the parents to teach him. When the child is fourteen, he starts 
puberty. From that time on the son or daughter is responsible to pray.273 
 
In closely-knit extended families, women encourage Islamic practice as sisters, cousins and 
wives, waking up their family members for the prayer of fajr, introducing them to mosque 
lessons and generally trying to convince them to become religiously observant. One 
woman told me how religious women lead lax husbands to a more observant lifestyle:  
The man knows about Islam anyway. It is a question of living according what he 
knows he should do. So if the woman is wise, she will slowly push him towards 
religion, reminding him of his religious duties. And she can always point out to him 
that she wants to follow him and that she needs his leadership for example in prayer 
and in decisions about the children. The man will be happy that she will put him in 
this place and he will mostly start to take his religion more seriously.274 
 
Through attending lessons and gaining religious knowledge, women see themselves 
enabled to promote piety even as a daughter. Um Kulthum, a participant in a private study 
                                                
273 Interview  with  Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009; this was an often repeated subject in 
her lessons. 
274 Conversation Jihan, Damascus, November 2011. 
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circle for young girls and students, told me about how the teaching helped her deal with 
her father: 
The Qur’an tells us not to be angry, and to know about God’s command is the first 
step to acting accordingly. [...] My father is someone who gets angry really easily. 
Now if he does I quote Qur’anic verses to him and he stops.275 
 
Outside the family, friends at school and teachers in particular also play an important role 
in the lives of girls and younger women. Friends invite each other to join them in lessons 
and debate each other about wearing the hijab. Officially, it is not acceptable that teachers 
use their authority to propagate Islam outside the religious education at schools or teach 
anything other than the syllabus,276 but I have heard many stories of girls who were more 
or less pressured by their teachers to wear hijab and conform in other ways to an Islamic 
lifestyle. For example, Miriam told me how she grew up under the influence of her father 
who had rejected religion during the 1990s. However, in elementary school she had a 
teacher who was openly religious and whom she loved very much. One day when Miriam 
went to school proud of some new clothes that had short sleeves, her teacher told her: ‘If 
you wear this again I cannot love you anymore!’ Ashamed she never put on these clothes 
again.277  
 
Beyond the family and school, women with a high level of commitment to da‘wa see their 
responsibility towards the whole of society and try to engage with anyone. Huda Habash 
remembered her zeal during her first years of da‘wa, when she was still a young girl, how 
                                                
275 Group interview during Sawdas private lesson, Damascus, 22.11.2008. 
276 comp. Shirine Dakouri, "dawr al-mar'a fi ta'sis al-wa'i al-dini,"  Accessed 14.12.2009, 
http://www.sommermagazine.com/?page=show_det&select_page=9&id=161. 
277 Conversation with Miriam, Damascus, 17.07.2007. 
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she used to approach total strangers who were sitting with her on the bus, asking them 
about their religious practices, trying to persuade them of the beauty of prayer and inviting 
them to join the lessons at a certain time and day. Hiba, another student, explained to me 
that she likes to walk up to girls her age and ask them why they were not wearing hijab, 
because she believes that they may be seeking and just need someone to encourage 
them.278  
 
While religious education facilitated the women’s da‘wa movement, today female 
religious activism happens in many different ways and in all levels of society. The role of 
relatively untrained women is to raise basic awareness of religious correct practices and to 
recruit other women to come and join the lessons of the religious experts.  
 
 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
The participation of large numbers of women in religious activities at mosques is probably 
the second most visible change in social religiosity in Syria after the reappearance of the 
hijab. Women are involved in spreading religious practices and sentiments, in growing 
numbers of qualified experts on religion as well as lay persons, who are motivated to 
recruit large numbers of Syrian children, women and men. After the uprising in 1981, the 
women’s da‘wa movement gained new importance caused by the break in the public 
religious activities of Muslim men. Through their involvement, the Islamic revival grew 
                                                
278 Group interview during Sawda’s private lesson, Damascus, 29.11.2009. 
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even at a time when male da‘wa was very restricted. In many ways the da‘wa movement 
has opened new doors to Muslim women in Syria: It offers them religious education on 
many different levels as never before. With the argument of segregation, some women 
have become leaders of other women, from teaching small groups of peers to prominent 
positions as government-paid supervisors. As traditional as these women look, they have 
gained a new confidence and purpose in the Islamisation of their society.  
 
Many liberal Syrians had a hard time dealing with the change in their society. Some were 
denying it altogether, others downplayed it. I often heard that Islamism is ‘only a reaction 
to the bad economic situation’, as though rationalising the phenomenon helped to limit it. 
However, others have internalised the government’s argument against democratisation 
based on fear of the Islamists and the possibility that they might gain power: ‘We cannot 
have a real choice in elections because the Islamists would take over the government’, 
explained Joumana about the presidential elections in 2007.279 Others were campaigning 
against the Islamist trend among women, like journalist Nabil Fayad (2005), who writes 
about the Qubaisiyat: 
They are dangerous without comparison for the peace of society and the unity of 
the nation, because [their sectarian influence] sneaks into homes via the wives of 
influential men, demanding preventive action from the government.280  
 
Mernissi (1996) argued that knowledge, and the power that comes with it, would 
strengthen the feminist cause against the Islamists.281 However, knowledge is a ‘neutral’ 
                                                
279 Conversation with Joumana in our home in spring 2007 when Bashar al-Asad was re-
elected president for another seven years without an alternative candidate. 
280 Fayad, "Al-khalfiyya al-jinsiyya lil-qubaisiyyāt". 
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power that opens up different alternatives and can be used to support different worldviews. 
In Syria at the turn of the millennium, religious knowledge was often taught without a real 
engagement with the diversity of Islamic interpretations but with a simple dichotomy of 
‘true Islam’ versus ‘ignorance’, as Afaf, a student at the Sharia College of Damascus 
University, put it: 
When I was younger, I didn’t know anything about Islam. Now I am learning about 
the Qur’an, the prophet and about the pious forefathers. It is only natural that I want 
to live like them because then the religion was still pure. Most Muslims don’t live 
according to the true Islam because they are ignorant.282 
 
In Part Two and Three of this thesis I will argue that for many Syrian women, the study of 
the Qur’an and the hadith does lead to a radicalisation of their faith practice and ideal of 
piety in the Islamist sense. Part Two looks at the experiences of five Syrian women who 
talk about their personal journeys to become devout Muslims. While each case is the 
particular story of one woman’s life, these case studies provide exemplary insights into 
how each participant has made experiences and choices that led her to a particular 
interpretation and expression of Islam. Looking at each case individually first, exploring 
the context of family background and upbringing, events that shaped each woman, and her 
own interpretation of her journey, will give a more complete portrait and lead to a more 
realistic understanding of their developments. A more in-depth analysis of common themes 
will be given in Part Three. 
  
                                                                                                                                              
281 Fatima Mernissi, "Muslim women and Fundamentalism," in Arab women: Between 
defiance and restraint, ed. Suha Sabbagh (New York: Olive Branch Press, 1996), 165.  
282 Conversation with Afaf, Damascus, 01.11.2005 
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PART TWO CASE STUDIES 
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5 MAKING DEVOUT MUSLIM WOMEN’S VOICES HEARD 
 
 
‘Conversion testimonies’ that interpret religious changes as a break with the past are not 
part of the usual discourse among devout Muslim women in Syria. Accordingly, there is 
normally no ritual ceremony involved.  Poidomani (2006) gives the account of a party on 
the occasion of a girl taking the hijab.283 However, those instances seem to be a limited 
upper or upper-middle class phenomenon.284 Rather, continuity is emphasised and the 
change that has happened is seen as the consequent development and realisation of the self 
as a Muslim. Typically, it is a process that may encompass many years, though it could 
also happen suddenly, especially when a traumatic or ‘supernatural’ experience triggers a 
change. None of my participants would describe herself as a woman who had already 
reached the ideal of being ‘pious’ but each one saw herself as progressing toward this goal, 
step by step adjusting their lives to greater religious observance and cultivating pious 
emotions and attitudes. Whereas for some women, the decision to take the hijab was a 
major milestone on their journey, others apparently never questioned wearing it or not. Yet 
their search for the meaning of religious practices that were part of their traditional culture 
led them to go beyond traditional religiosity. However, irrespective of whether I was 
talking to a woman for whom the hijab was a decisive step or not, the way that they would 
inform other women about my research would be: ‘Elisabeth is researching why Muslim 
                                                
283 Poidomani, "Syria: Islamic women's movement gains a foothold". 
284 Only one of my participants recalls that in her circle of friends there were celebrations 
when someone took the hijab in the context of the wealthy Syrian expatriate community in 
Saudi Arabia (Interview with Rabi’a, Damascus, 27.07.2010). These celebrations seem to 
be a new development where they happen and a reaction to the fact that wearing the hijab 
is no longer an unquestioned practice among parts of the population, especially among 
richer Syrians. 
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women take the hijab.’ This seems to me to be first of all an expression of what they think 
is the missing link in the understanding between ‘the West’ and ‘the Muslim community’: 
the rejection of the hijab in ‘the West’. Numerous times, when women saw me in hijab at 
mosques they expressed their satisfaction that, if I had no difficulty wearing hijab, I was 
surely on my way to becoming a Muslim:285 Independent of my participants development 
and of my questions, the starting point for exploring Muslim female devoutness in my field 
research more often than not was the veil. Many participants struggled with it because of 
the visibility of this step. The only Islamic practice that was given comparative space in 
conversations, interviews and lessons was the ritual prayer because of the constant high 
commitment it demands. However, the practice of prayer is much less obvious and I would 
often only hear about the personal struggle with it after many conversations. Islamic 
clothing, on the other hand, is the first thing to notice when meeting a devout Muslim 
woman outside her home. Female clothing – whether it is an Islamic covering or a 
‘Western’ display of the female body - has become a highly emotional symbol of the 
polarisation between Islamic and secular worldviews. 
 
In this chapter, I describe various case studies so that the women’s voices can be heard as 
they interpret their own lives. I also use their narratives to demonstrate some of the factors 
that moved them towards devoutness. In the next chapter, I will build on these factors for 
my overall analysis. In three cases, their stories show not only the process of becoming 
religious as those who have changed themselves but also as those who have become agents 
of change to others. The first two cases portray dā‘iyāt who are connected to the ANC, 
                                                
285 There are indeed examples of women who strated to be attracted to the modesty of the 
hijab first and who entered Islam as a second step, such as Amina Wadud and Na’ima 
Roberts. Comp. Robert, From my sisters' lips; Amina Wadud, Inside the gender jihad  
(Oxford: Oneworld, 2006). 
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although I met them independently of each other.286 The third dā‘iya never talked about 
her association with a specific group although she recommended the lessons at the Zayd 
Ibn Thabit Mosque to me, the centre of the Zayd network. I further describe two cases of 
women on the margins of the da‘wa movement, showing the effects of the Islamic revival 
in wider Syrian society. 
 
The order of these case studies is chronological, according to the age of the participants 
starting with the oldest, because together these cases also give a glimpse of general 
changes that have happened in Syria, especially concerning education and the expectations 
of female roles in society. The cases inevitably vary in length and depth according to, first 
of all, the willingness of each participant to talk about the different factors and experiences 
in her development. In the cases of the dā‘iyāt I used data collected in interviews as well as 
participant observation over a time span of two to six years with varying degrees of 
intensity, while the other cases are based mainly on one or two interviews. The detail of 
the data also depends on whether I was allowed to record the interview or not.  
 
The first case illustrates the role of religious knowledge. It portrays Sawda, who became 
one of the first girls to receive a religious education at the ANC and who later became a 
preacher connected to this institute.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
286 For ANC see 3.2.  
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5.1  Sawda: Finding and teaching religious knowledge 
 
Sawda described the main change that happened in her life as a shift from tradition as the 
ignorant imitation of religious customs to a life shaped by informed religious practice: ‘I 
was a traditional Muslim. Then I became a knowledgeable Muslim.’287 Driven by her own 
experience, she dedicated her life to winning others to the same path. 
 
In the July 2008, when I went to visit a sick neighbour I was introduced to one of her 
relatives, a woman in her fifties, dressed in a floor length black skirt and a dark coloured 
blouse with long sleeves and a black headscarf. My neighbour addressed her as Anisa 
Sawda. ‘Anisa’, literally ‘Miss’, is the usual title for a female dā‘iya. When Sawda heard 
about my research project, she said that there was a group of girls meeting in her home on 
Saturdays and if I wanted, I could come and interview them. As someone used to Christian 
‘home groups’ I was intrigued to learn about what happened during these private religious 
meetings in my neighbourhood. For the next year, until June 2009, I participated regularly 
in this group.  
 
 
 
5.1.1  Sawda’s da‘wa: Change through knowledge and dhikr 
 
When I arrived in Sawda’s flat, fifteen women were crowded in the small living room. 
Most of them were in their early twenties and were sitting in three rows on the floor facing 
                                                
287 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009. 
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Sawda, who sat with three other women in their forties or fifties on two benches, which 
stood against two of the walls. The lights were turned off, leaving the windowless room in 
semidarkness; everyone was quiet and I quickly slipped into the place that I was directed 
to. The room was furnished in a very simple way, with the two wooden, upholstered 
benches as the main furniture, two cross-stitched gold on black Qur’anic verses on the 
walls and a number of pictures of Ahmad Kuftaro next to a calendar, showing the exact 
prayer times for each day. Nearly all of the younger women were dressed in the same way, 
wearing floor length navy blue or black pleated skirts and white shirts. The older women 
wore black skirts and black blouses except for Sawda who was dressed in a simple light 
coloured house dress and prayer headscarf: A wide, cone shaped piece of clothing with an 
opening at the top for the face, covering the whole upper body and is often quickly slipped 
over other clothes for prayer or quickly covering up to open the front door.  
 
I arrived in the middle of the groups’ worship time. After about half an hour of silent dhikr, 
Sawda started to lead the group in spoken dhikr: short phrases from the Qur’an, like la 
ilaha illa –llah,288 and astaghfir allah al-‘aẓim wa atubu ileyh,289 and shorter invocation 
like ya allah290 or ya laṭīf,291 were chanted again and again, each one a specific number of 
times. Sawda intonated each new phrase, the other participants joining her. The only 
movements in the room were the prayer beads that many of the women ran through their 
fingers, and a few of the younger women slightly rocking backwards and forwards in 
rhythm with the meditation. The last phrase addressed Muhammad: al-ṣalātu wa salāmu 
                                                
288 ‘There is no God but God.’ 
289 ‘I ask God for forgiveness and repent.’ 
290 ‘Oh God!’ 
291 ‘Oh gentle One!’ 
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‘aleyka ya sayidi ya rasūl allah,292 then Sawda directed: ‘Al-Fātiḥa’ and the participants 
recited the first surah under their breath. Following that, Sawda recited firstly a long list of 
blessings of the successive sheikhs of the Naqshbandi order starting with Muhammad and 
ending with Ahmad Kuftaro, and a litany of blessings of the whole Muslim community. 
Then one young woman recited a section from the Qur’an, followed by three religious 
songs and a repetition of the fātiḥa, the first Sura of the Qur’an. The atmosphere during the 
spoken dhikr, which took about an hour, was very quiet. Some women kept their eyes 
closed, some started weeping silently. Afterwards the lights were switched on, the women 
took notebooks and pens from their bags, and the lesson started. 
 
Sawda involved two more teachers beside herself in these lessons. Khulud, a widow in her 
fifties, taught fiqh, Islamic jurisprudence, and Hiyam, an unmarried woman at the 
beginning of her thirties, taught Hadith science. Sawda herself taught about Muhammad’s 
biography and tafsīr. Each Saturday, two of the four subjects were taught in turns, each 
one for about one hour. The participants were expected to read textbooks at home and 
familiarise themselves with the subject beforehand. The lessons demanded a commitment 
to attend regularly, to study at home and to sit exams in all areas, which happened twice 
during my attendance. Participants who skipped lessons or were badly prepared were 
publicly admonished whereas those who knew the material were praised. 
 
Considering this commitment, only women with comparatively free management of their 
time attended the lessons, especially unmarried and widowed women. The majority of the 
participants were university students. However, there was also one girl of fourteen still in 
                                                
292 ‘May blessing and peace be upon you, oh my Lord, messenger of God!’ 
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middle school and three girls studying for their secondary school certificates. Two women 
were working as teachers but they were not married yet. Two newly married women 
dropped out when they when they gave birth soon after I joined. Two of the older women 
were widows with grown-up children and one was Sawda’s older sister, who never married 
and therefore lived with Sawda and her husband. 
 
Not all of Sawda’s lessons demanded the same level of commitment as her Saturday study 
group. She taught two public lessons in mosques, one in a suburb and one at ANC.  These 
two lessons were open for anyone to come, and the participants were women of all ages 
and levels of education. The main purpose of the public lessons was to teach women moral 
practices, as Sawda explained: ‘There are quite a few uneducated women attending. So I 
simplify things and talk more about the practical life of a Muslim woman.’293  
 
In contrast Sawda’s explicit expectation for her Saturday lessons was that the attendees 
would not only benefit for their own religious knowledge and practices but follow in her 
footsteps and become dā‘iyāt themselves. They could attend only by personal invitation. 
The relationship between Sawda and these women could be described as mentoring for 
da‘wa. Their training included the theoretical lessons, spiritual exercises like the weekly 
dhikr and spending as much time with their teacher as possible, helping with the chores at 
Sawda’s home or joining her when she went to visit for the sake of her da‘wa. They were 
expected to keep up private dhikr and start small study groups among their acquaintances. 
Not every participant fulfilled the expectations. Yet Sawda often took some time at the end 
of the lessons to ask how their groups were going and encourage each girl individually. 
                                                
293 Interview with Sawda, 19.05.2009 
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The group also went together to visit study circles that one of them had started. On two 
occasions I joined them for such visits. There was some time to socialise as we were fed 
rich breakfasts, followed by a short lesson by Sawda and more extended singing of 
religious songs.  
 
As a dā‘iya Sawda devoted her life to teaching. She saw religious knowledge as the 
vehicle of da‘wa because of the faculty of reason with which God has gifted human beings 
specifically to recognise spiritual truths: ‘Our reason is a gift from God so that we can 
receive guidance from him.’294 According to this view, human reason was created to 
understand religious knowledge, and recognise the truth of the Islamic dogma as well as 
the life supporting qualities of the Islamic norms of behaviour. Sawda often discussed her 
view of the rationality of Islam in her lessons. This view of the rationality of Islam led to a 
one-dimensional, idealised understanding of knowledge and reason as her teaching during 
one of her public lessons, in which Sawda argued at length for the truth of Islam versus 
Christianity, shows: 
From the very beginning of our relationship Sawda was very open about her expectation to 
see me converted to Islam through my studies. Starting from the Qur’anic statement that 
Jesus announced a future prophet called Ahmad, Sawda argued that it was only reasonable 
to follow the newest revelation as much as one would use the newest development in other 
areas. To cling to an abrogated religion made no sense: ‘If you have an old and frumpy 
coat and you buy a new one, which one will you wear? Would anyone with a rational mind 
                                                
294 Lesson taught by Sawda at ANC, 23.03.2009. 
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still wear the old one?’295 However, her main argument was the irrationality of the 
Christological dogma:  
The Christians say, Jesus is the Son of God. If that were true, God logically would 
have a wife: God forbid! […] They say, God is one, then they say: There are three, 
father, son and Holy Spirit. Is that rational? Is that acceptable? They say that Jesus 
crucified himself. So he committed suicide. Why? This absolutely makes no sense. 
For what reason would he do that? Would anyone in his right mind love to 
suffer?296 
 
Despite the fact that Sawda claimed a rejection of Christianity on rational grounds the 
reactions of her listeners were strongly emotional. They became restless, tut-tutting and 
exclaiming ‘God forbid!’ to express their rejection. The experience was also extremely 
emotional for myself feeling personally attacked as the only Christian present, by 
arguments that depicted my beliefs as incoherent and irrational.  
 
Conversations with other participants show that it was a common perception that 
conversion could be expected after contrasting Islam with Christianity, and that my 
adherence to Christianity must be due to ignorance of the facts. For example, at one point 
Sawda sent me to meet her sheikh, Ramadan Deeb. After being introduced as a student of 
Islamic studies he claimed, that I was on my way to becoming a Muslim. Even after I 
confirmed my Christian identity, he reassured me that through my studies I would 
definitely ‘find a better conviction’ in Islam so long as I persisted.297  
                                                
295 Lesson taught by Sawda at ANC, 06.04.2009. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Conversation with Sheikh Ramadan Deeb, ANC, Damascus, 23.03.2009. 
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This example illustrates Sawda’s ‘optimistic’ view of the role that religious knowledge 
plays as the driving factor for religious change. However, knowledge alone without the 
engagement of the emotions was ineffective. Therefore she included dhikr in her da‘wa 
practice.  
 
As described at the beginning of this section, all Sawda’s lessons, like all other lessons in 
mosques and private homes I attended, began with dhikr. She also encouraged her disciples 
to do private dhikr in their homes. Sometimes she would give her disciples ‘homework’ to 
do a certain dhikr for special occasions, e.g. in a lesson after Mothers’ Day298 she 
distributed the different parts of the Qur’an for recitation ‘for the sake of the mothers’ 
among the women, making sure that the group would together recite the whole Qur’an 
twice during the next week, though each woman only recited a certain part on her own. In 
addition she demanded that they should recite 200 times lā ilāha illa -llah299 and lā ilāha 
illa -llah waḥdahu, lā sharīka lahu, lahu -l-mulk wa-lahu -l-ḥamd wa-hu ‘ala kulli shay’in 
qadīr300 200 times. According to Sawda, the recitation would bring blessing to mothers and 
to the whole home.  
 
Sawda encouraged her disciples to practice dhikr because the concentration on God would 
bring them closer to God, purify their hearts, and give them the ability to live according to 
the Islamic ideal that she preached.  
 
                                                
298 Lesson at ANC, 06.04.2009. 
299 See page 116 for the meaning. 
300 ‘There is no God but God alone, without partner, the dominion and praise are his, and 
he is able to do all things.’ 
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The strength or lack of strength needed to live up to their religious ideal was an issue that 
came up again and again among my research participants. Whether it was the question of 
putting on the hijab, especially for unmarried women who feared that they would reduce 
their marriage options through a headscarf, or getting up before dawn for prayer: They 
expressed that it needed special strength to live authentic religious lives. Sawda addressed 
this issue by encouraging the practice of dhikr among her followers. Her lessons were 
interspersed with stories of the enabling power of dhikr: 
When the angels were told to carry the throne of God they said: We cannot do it! 
Then they were told: say: la ḥawla wa-la quwata illa bi-llahi al-‘alī al-‘aẓīm301 and 
up went the throne! 
 
Sawda’s hand flew up in demonstration of the instant ease with which the angels carried 
the throne of God.302 
 
Sawda saw herself as an example of the transformative power of knowledge and dhikr: ‘I 
became a dā‘iya through knowledge and dhikr.’303 However, when she told me the story of 
her own life, her focus was mainly on knowledge. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
301 ‘There is no power and strength except in God, the High and Great.’ 
302 Lesson at ANC, 23.03.2009. 
303 Conversation with Sawda, Damascus, 23.06.2011. 
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5.1.2   Sawda’s story of her own change 
 
I met Sawda for an interview about her personal religious development in her home on 
May 19th 2009. Her older sister sat with us during the whole time though she took no 
active part in our conversation most of the time. As Sawda did not want me to record the 
interview I took notes while we talked and wrote the interview down from memory with 
the help of my notes once I got home. Shortly after the interview Sawda asked me to stop 
coming to her private lessons and did not respond positively to my attempts to meet again 
until June 2011. When we met and I re-translated my interview notes into Arabic and 
Sawda checked the correctness of my data as well as elaborated on a number of topics. 
During this occasion, Sawda also told me that two years ago she had decided that I should 
no longer attend her home lessons because of a tightening of government policies 
concerning private religious lessons. She said that she had to decrease the number of girls 
attending her home. Obviously, in addition to the numerical problem a foreigner like me 
was much more visible in her neighbourhood and would draw more attention to her 
gatherings.304 In the following I describe Sawda’s religious journey according to both 
interviews with her. 
 
Sawda was born in 1958 as one out of five children in the Salihiya neighbourhood of 
Damascus, close to Abu Nur Mosque in Ruqn al-Din. The family lived in a traditional 
Arab house built from mud plaster with an inner yard like most Damascene houses at the 
time. Her mother came from a family of potters and had received no school education. 
                                                
304 In a similar case, the government prohibited foreigners from attending the women’s 
lessons at the Zahra Mosque on Mezze, according to a conversation with Moyra Dale in 
January 2010, which was confirmed when I overheard a conversation between two of the 
dā‘iyāt when I went to the Zahra Mosque in June 2011. 
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However, like many girls in Damascus at the time, she was trained through apprenticeship 
as a tailor. Tailoring was seen as a respectable opportunity for working class girls to work 
either from home or in an all-female work environment and so add to the income of the 
family.305 In my first interview with her, Sawda described her mother as a devout Muslim 
because she kept to practises like gender segregation: kānat min ahl-al-ṣalāḥ wa -l-taqwa: 
Mā kān fi ikhṭilāt.306 In the second interview she commented on this sentence that her 
mother was not really ‘pious’ because her family had no religious knowledge though they 
were traditionally Muslim. Religious knowledge was also practically inaccessible for the 
majority of her mother’s generation, Sawda explained, because there were no lessons for 
women in the mosques in Damascus, and opportunities to study at home were rare. There 
were extremely few dā‘iyāt who could teach women in the homes.307 Sawda’s mother 
knew only very few Qur’anic verses which she had picked up and a little maths, which she 
needed for her trade. 
 
Sawda explained that only in her generation was access to religious knowledge more 
widely available for Syrian women. At the beginning, though, nothing seemed to indicate 
that her life would be much different from her mother’s. When Sawda was ten years old, 
her mother died, and shortly after that she left school with only six years of elementary 
school education. The decision was made by her maternal grandparents with whom she 
lived after her mother’s death. She then also started to be trained as a tailor. Following the 
custom of her milieu she started to wear a headscarf in public when she was 14. Sawda 
                                                
305 Three mothers of participants, who were aged 35 – 50, were tailors: Sawda’s, Bushra’s, 
and Zaynab’s mother. Tailoring was the only employment of women of this generation that 
my participants mentioned at all. 
306 ‘She was one of the righteous and pious people: There was no cross gender mixing.’ 
Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009. 
307 Comp. page 112-113. 
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said that Islam was an unquestioned part of her identity though neither during the 
interviews nor during her lessons did she recall any special memories of what that meant to 
her then or how it was realised in everyday life except in the question of segregation and 
hijab. From her perspective today, her identity was Muslim but her life was not: 
I always was a Muslim; [the change] was only a question of knowledge and 
of what happened inside and outside [the home]: Inside I didn’t wear hijab 
but outside I did. 
 
From her current perspective her behaviour as a young girl was not Islamic because the 
‘true hijab’ was not a matter of public or private space, but to whom she was permitted to 
show her hair to. According to her understanding, to uncover her head in front of any 
marriageable person like a male cousin made her hijab incomplete. Hence her early youth 
was shaped by social norms of religious behaviour rather than the religious norms she 
adhered to later on.  
Sawda’s father was absent from her narrative until I asked her about the role he had played 
in her life. She said that he accepted any decision that was made by her grandparents and 
later herself. Probably he married again which would explain why Sawda grew up with her 
maternal grandparents. According to my observations, widowed men often re-marry 
quickly, sometimes leaving their children with the mother’s family.308 
 
The influence that would change Sawda’s life and cause her to go back to school was 
Ramadan Deeb, a disciple of Ahmad Kuftaro and one of the religious guides at ANC. 
                                                
308 Accordingly, this Damascene saying expresses the child’s loss of both parents in the 
case of the mother’s death and the assumes remarriage of the father: māt ‘abūk ‘ala -l-
marātib hattūk. mātat ummak ‘ala al-marābil kabbūk. ‘If your father dies, you are put on 
the shelf [as the place of attention], if your mother dies, you’ll be thrown in the trash.’ 
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According to Böttcher (1998), Sheikh Ramadan, who belonged to the inner circle of the 
leadership of the Naqshbandiya-Kaftariya order, received special responsibility for da‘wa 
among women from Ahmad Kuftaro in the early 1950s.309 Sawda’s brother worked in the 
garage where Deeb had his car repaired and became one of his disciples in 1973 or 1974. 
Ahmad Kuftaro opened the girl’s middle school at ANC in 1975.310 The area around the 
ANC is one of the most conservative areas of Damascus even today, and during the 1970s 
there was still resistance among the conservative parts of the population against school 
education of girls, many of whom married soon after they left elementary school.311 
According to Sawda’s memories, Sheikh Ramadan actively pursued the recruiting of his 
disciple’s female family members, asking her brother whether he had any sisters, who 
might be interested. Sawda said that at first she rejected the idea of returning to school. By 
this time she had just turned 17, she had been out of school for five years, so she had no 
desire for more theoretical knowledge. She also did not like the idea of going back to class 
with girls much younger than she was. At her age she would not have been able to return to 
middle school under normal circumstances, but for the sake of having enough students to 
open the school, ANC accepted older students in their opening class. Apparently the 
question of the implications that an education at ANC could have concerning her religious 
life was not part of her decision-making process. Meanwhile, Sheikh Ramadan persevered 
and invited her via her brother to visit him on his farm outside of Damascus. Sawda 
refused to go until her brother told her of the fruit trees that would just be in full bloom at 
                                                
309 Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad: 183. 
310 Comp. 4.2.1, page 102-105. 
311 A girl would have been about 12 years old when she finished her elementary education. 
I have met many women of Sawda’s generation and class in Damascus who were married 
when they were fourteen or fifteen. Today it is more usual for girls to finish at least middle 
school. Of course this observation is only true for some very conservative communities of 
the working class and lower middle class. 
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the time because he knew that she loved all kinds of flowers. So finally she gave in and 
went to see Sheikh Ramadan together with her older sister. During this visit she agreed to 
register for middle school at ANC. 
 
Sawda describes that at that time ANC was a small building with primarily containing  the 
mosque and a one-storey building housing the boys’ school. Ahmad Kuftaro built a second 
storey specifically so that he could start a school for girls. Co-education was not only 
unacceptable for the conservative families around ANC, it was generally not practised in 
Damascus after elementary school.312 Notwithstanding the efforts made to recruit students, 
the first girls’ class was small with only 23 students.  
 
Sawda remembered that it was difficult for her to go back to school. Her motivation was 
low. She barely read at all and struggled a lot to study at the beginning. It was mainly 
Ahmad Kuftaro who encouraged her to go on.  
It was very, very hard for me to return to study. But Sheikh Ahmad encouraged me. 
He said: You must learn! You have to have knowledge for the sake of your children 
and the whole of society, your neighbours, your friends, so you can help them and 
teach them, for everybody’s benefit.313 
 
Apparently Sheikh Ahmad Kuftaro played an important role not only in pushing 
institutional religious education for girls and, later, women, in Syria, but also in motivating 
the girls to study. He demonstrated the great importance that he gave to the religious 
education of these girls through taking part in teaching them himself, even though he was 
                                                
312 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009. 
313 Ibid. 
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the Grand Mufti of Syria. Thus he envisioned an important role for them as the future 
women of Syria, and the shaping of their society enthused Sawda and her classmates.314 
Sawda also remembered how Kuftaro always had a book in his hands, sometimes on 
religious issues, sometimes on secular issues, and how she started to model herself 
accordingly and began to read. Despite her struggles, she finished her middle school and 
went on to study at the ANC secondary school when she was 20. By the time she finished 
her baccalaureate exam, she had overcome her reluctance and had developed a desire for 
knowledge. Therefore, in 1981, she entered Damascus University and studied for four 
years for a certificate in sharia studies.315 
 
Through the education she received at ANC Sawda experienced a change in her outlook on 
life that affected her in different ways: The girl who had not even wanted to pick up her 
education again became excited about learning and knowledge in general, as Sawda 
explains: ‘First of all, my attitude to learning that changed. Then I started to understand. I 
felt I wanted to change. Actions only change if the soul changes first.’316 Thus on top of 
her religious studies she also registered for a degree in nursing and education. Two 
accidents and a prolonged period of recuperation forced her to drop out of this degree. 
Nevertheless Sawda kept a high appreciation for all rationally acquired knowledge, which 
would eventually point to and confirm Islamic doctrine and thus support her da‘wa. After 
her university certificate in sharia studies she returned to the ANC and studied another four 
years for a certificate in Arabic literature and sharia at the da‘wa college. She successfully 
finished this degree in 1989, at the age of 31. 
                                                
314 Comp. Huda Habash’s memories in 4.2.1 page 104. 
315 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009 
316 Ibid. 
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5.1.3   Becoming a dā‘iya 
 
Ahmad Kuftaro had told the female students that their future role would be to spread 
religious knowledge in their society.317 Early on, Sawda followed his direction. When she 
was 18 years old she started to gather a small number of friends and relatives to meet in 
her home and taught them what she had learned. At that time she had just studied for about 
one year at ANC middle school. Nevertheless, this initial year proved successful to 
convince and motivate her to pass on what she had learned. It did not matter to her that her 
knowledge was still very limited because she was aware that by comparison with most 
girls and women around her, she knew something, and that had to be passed on. 
Apparently, the girls who came, felt that they benefited and the group developed into a 
regular study circle. Over the years and with Sawda’s growing knowledge and experience 
in teaching, her disciples brought their friends and relatives along. Once the group became 
too big, Sawda started another. During the second half of her twenties, she regularly taught 
six lessons every week, parallel to her studies. She was also working in the administration 
of ANC to earn her living, having finished her sharia certificate. When she got married at 
31, she combined her lessons to have more time for her new obligations as a wife and since 
then taught three weekly lessons. She also started to organise the lessons according to 
commitment and her intention to mentor younger students for da‘wa.  
 
Although Sawda was not one of the ‘star’ dā‘iyāt and except for her circle of disciples she 
was not mentioned to me by other women as other, better-known dā‘iyāt were, Sawda had 
been able to build a committed circle of about a hundred women who attended her lessons 
                                                
317 Comp. 4.2.1 page 104. 
 142 
and were her disciples. Today, many of her disciples are the daughters and even 
granddaughters of the girls that she first taught.  
 
The education she received at ANC totally changed Sawda’s course in life from a tailor 
and probably an early marriage to a preacher with a higher education and a comparatively 
late marriage. Her commitment to da‘wa seemed as strong when I met her as when she 
first started to teach. ‘I do da‘wa because it is good to obey God. He said: ida‘u ila -l-sabīli 
rabbika. So we do it.’318 Looking back at her personal history she felt a sense of being 
chosen by God through the opportunities that had opened up without her seeking them, 
giving her a purpose for her life.319 This conviction strengthened her sense of her 
responsibility to pass her knowledge on to others, or she would be held accountable before 
God for holding it back. During her lessons, Sawda used to quote a number of recurring 
aḥadīth on this subject to motivate her disciples to do the same: 
A ḥadīth says: Said the messenger of God: Whoever gains knowledge and keeps it 
secret from the people, will be reined in with a bridle of fire on the day of the 
resurrection.320 
 
Sawda’s journey to devoutness also affected her choices concerning everyday life. In the 
interviews she especially mentioned the changes she made concerning her dress, and the 
way she managed her time as well as how it affected her marriage. 
 
                                                
318 ‘[Prophet], call [people] to the way of your Lord.’ (Sura 16:125) Interview with Sawda, 
Damascus, 19.05.2009.  
319 Conversation with Sawda, Damascus, 23.06.2011. 
320 Ibn Maha, vol 1,265. This and similar aḥadīth recurred during lessons; Sawda dictated 
this one to me during our interview, 08.06.2011. 
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5.1.4   Practical changes in her life: hijab, time management and marriage 
 
From Sawda’s perspective, her change towards religiosity was primarily about ordinary 
life as a Muslim rather than about religious activism or her career as a dā‘iya, which she 
sees as only one consequence among others: 
All the information that I learned and that changed my life were about what is 
ḥarām and what is ḥalāl because it was all about how to live as a Muslim, what to 
do. Islam is a way of life.321 
 
The changes she implemented brought some conflict with her traditional community. She 
remembered that people used to call her an ‘extremist’ because of her uncompromising 
practice. She started wearing a certain Damascene variation of the niqāb: Even in her home 
when she wore a casual housedress and I have never seen her without hijab, a white cotton 
headscarf that completely covered her hair. Yet whenever she went out, she would wear a 
second, black piece of cloth, the mandīl, that covered her head and was then pinned from 
both sides of the face under the nose, covering chin, mouth and cheeks. In addition she 
wore dark sunglasses to cover her eyes, so that basically most of her face was covered. Her 
body was dressed in a loose, floor-length black coat. Nevertheless, in her lessons Sawda 
taught that only the hijab was obligatory as were long, loose, non-see-through clothes. At 
the same time she would argue that in many cases it was better – aḥsan – to wear the 
niqāb:  
 
  
                                                
321 Ibid. 
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Fi ḥasan wa fi aḥsan.322 In Islam a woman will cover her face if she is very 
beautiful. For example, if the men on the street turn around to look at her it is better 
if she covers her face.323 
 
This is the interpretation that was taught generally at ANC and supported by a many of my 
participants.324 Interestingly, a large number of women who attend the lessons there wear 
niqāb: The argument that it is better and related to female beauty seems to be attractive to 
them. 
 
One of the changes in Sawda’s life was that she focussed her activities on her religious 
goals. For this reason she stopped watching television, aimless chatting and other activities 
that the women around her filled their free time with. She explained that the reason was not 
that these activities as such were forbidden but that she had learned from Ahmad Kuftaro 
the importance of making good use of her time. With her studies and da‘wa she simply had 
no time to spare for useless amusements. ‘Some people called me mutashaddida, but I was 
only setting priorities.’325 Sawda explained that the responsible use of time was one of the 
practical issues that they were teaching women about at ANC generally. Rather than 
wasting time with gossip and other unimportant occupations, women should use whatever 
spare time they had to study and practise dhikr. Sawda especially expressed her 
satisfaction that she had even learned to use the time spent on necessary worldly 
occupations to do dhikr, for example while she was busy with her housework.  
 
                                                
322 ‘There is good and there is better.’ 
323 Interview with Sawda, 19.05.2009. 
324 For example by Ruba, 5.4.2, and Zaynab, 5.2.1.  
325 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009. 
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Another major area which was influenced by Sawda’s turn towards devoutness was the 
question of her marriage. The suitability of potential husbands had become a religious 
question for her. Many women of her generation married when they were still teenagers. 
Sawda not only finished her school education instead during these years, but she also 
changed her ideas concerning the criteria of a potential husband. While questions of 
economic suitability and the similarity of family background are the usual major factors 
when marriages are arranged in Syria even today, Sawda decided that she was only going 
to marry a religious Muslim who practiced Islam. She rejected a number of suitors on 
religious grounds, arguing that they were drinking alcohol and did not pray. Her rejection 
weighed especially heavily, as some of them were her relatives. In the traditional sectors of 
Syrian society, marriage with a relative, often a first cousin, is seen as preferable to 
marrying a relatively unknown person. For Sawda, her religious criteria meant that she had 
to go against her family’s wishes. She remained unmarried throughout her twenties 
notwithstanding the social pressure on women to marry. However, rather than yielding to 
the pressure, she said that during these years she prayed that God would give her a husband 
that suited her and understood her goals. 
 
In addition to finding a husband who shared moral and religious ground with her, Sawda 
had also gained a new sense of self-worth through her studies. ‘I wanted a husband who 
[…] valued my achievements, my studies and my desire for da‘wa.’326 She was aware that 
her future as a dā‘iya depended on her husband’s support. Many of her first disciples had 
to stop even attending lessons because their husbands did not have any sympathy for their 
religious activities. According to her assessment, this situation has not changed much for 
                                                
326 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 08.06.2011. 
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the new generation of young women that she was teaching, telling them: ‘Use your time 
now to study as much as you can! Soon you will be married and they will lock you up.’327 
Sawda wanted a different kind of marriage. When finally a preacher from ANC asked for 
her hand in marriage, she came to an agreement with him before her marriage that he 
would support her religious activism as long as she did not neglect her duties as a wife. As 
it turned out, the couple were not able to have children.328 
 
In practical terms this meant to coordinate her activism with her husband’s: During the 
morning until three in the afternoon she was free for da‘wa. Her husband left their home 
during these hours for his own preaching. This shows another aspect of the practical 
solutions they had to find for Sawda to continue her activism because Sawda’s sister was 
living with her: On account of the strict gender segregation they followed, the husband 
would not enter the flat as long as Sawda was not at home, in case Sawda’s sister was there 
on her own. Sawda was committed to being home at three from her lessons and visits. The 
second part of the day she spent on her housework and duties as a wife.  
 
People called Sawda an extremist because of her choices of lifestyle: Her clothing, the way 
she spent her time, and her uncompromising engagement in da‘wa. It is interesting that the 
questions of conflict seem to have been areas that would be seen as lifestyle choices. On 
the other hand, there were areas in Sawda’s teaching that would be called ‘extremist’ or 
‘radical’ in a European context that apparently did not generate such a reaction from the 
people around her, e.g., during one of the Saturday lessons she taught that any Muslim who 
                                                
327 Sawda during a private lesson, Damascus, 28.02.2009. 
328 Similarly, Zaynab al-Ghazali legitimised her active role in da‘wa by her lack of 
children. Mahmood, Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject: 182. 
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decided to leave Islam had to be killed, according to the hadith: ‘man baddala dīnahu fa-
qtul-hu.’329 She argued for a literalist interpretation with no room for compromise in this 
matter because the hadith was sound and its content a clear command from Muhammad. 
Nobody among her disciples asked any questions as they did in other instances when they 
were aware of different opinions. While this may be seen as a sure indication of religious 
‘extremism’ from a perspective that holds that the choice of religion is a universal human 
right,330 the death penalty for apostasy has been demanded in the four major law schools331 
even though there are also voices among Islamic scholars like the Sudanese scholar Hassan 
al-Turabi who reject this. Egyptian scholar Salim al-Awa, e.g., argues that while apostasy 
is a crime according to sharia law, capital punishment is only permitted according to this 
hadith, not commanded, because both the Qur’an and the example of Muhammad’s 
reactions to apostates do not back up the obligation to kill apostates.332 Nevertheless, 
according to my observations, the traditional view that apostasy demands capital 
punishment is dominant in Syrian society, at least in theory, even among those who are not 
very religious in their practice, and not seen as an extreme point of view. This example 
shows that, in some ways, the categories of extremism and radicalism are quite 
unsatisfactory because they depend so much on each person’s standpoint. 
 
                                                
329 ‘Whoever changes his religion: Kill him!’ al-Bukhari, 149, 2 
330 Comp. art. 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
331 Comp. for a discussion of the development of the concept of apostasy and its 
punishments as well as the distinctions between the law schools: Frank Griffel, 
"Apostasy," Encyclopaedia of Islam, Third Edition. Brill, Accessed 18.03.2012, 
http://www.brillonline.nl/subscriber/uid=1358/entry?entry=ei3_SIM-0044. 
332 Muhammad Salim Al-Awa, "Discretionary or prescribed punishment,"  Accessed 
18.03.2012http://www.onislam.net/english/shariah/contemporary-issues/islamic-
themes/417705-discretionary-or-prescribed-punishment.html. 
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Sawda’s initial turn towards Islamism was less of an intentional search than the result of 
recruitment to join studies at ANC. However, she accepted the teaching she received and 
made her own decisions to accomplish the goal of da‘wa. Her religious development had 
the result of providing her with new options of how to live her life: She changed her 
criteria as to who was a good husband, her education and purpose enabling her to go 
against her family’s wishes. When she got married, she successfully negotiated her double 
role as wife and dā‘iya. Sawda’s focus on dhikr and her expressed desire for closeness to 
God shows her as a woman whose activism was integrated in her quest for devoutness. The 
new accessibility of religious knowledge became her driving force towards it.  
 
 
 
5.2    Zaynab: Finding divine love 
 
The importance of religious knowledge holds true in all the following cases to varying 
degrees. It played a major role in Zaynab’s life. Born in a small town in the countryside of 
Damascus in 1975, she had much better access to secular education than Sawda’s 
generation, but religious knowledge was something she only discovered in the late 1980s 
as the society started to move towards greater religiosity.333 Like Sawda, Zaynab was 
influenced by the ANC, where she was still a student during the time of my field research, 
in addition to her work as dā‘iya. Yet at the centre of change in Zaynab’s interpretation of 
her life story lies not knowledge, but the experience of divine love.  
 
                                                
333 Comp. 3.2, page, 75. 
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Zaynab could pinpoint the moment of the spiritual and emotional experience that changed 
her life. She had gone to listen to Rajab Deeb, the successor of Ahmad Kuftaro as the 
leader of the Naqshbandiyya-Kuftariyya, at the ANC: 
The mosque was so full there was no space to sit anywhere, so I spent the time 
standing at the door until I saw the sheikh. [Then I felt] like a child who sees his 
mother or father after a long absence! Maybe I feel closer to him than to my father 
or my mother, I even feel that he is more important to me than the whole of 
creation, anyone I know. […] When he talks about the prophets I feel as if I am 
turned upside down. He starts planting a new meaning in your spirit, in your heart. 
Your love for the prophet becomes different. When he talks to you about a 
prophet, you feel as if he has become physically present before you. This happens 
in the spirit. Just like that I started to have different emotions …334  
 
In March 2009 my friend Safiya introduced me to her relative Zaynab to ‘talk about 
religion’. Both were involved in teaching women at the mosque of their small town, 30 
minutes outside of Damascus. Zaynab seemed to be a very active woman, who talked 
about her work as an Arabic teacher in a boys’ secondary school, her volunteering at the 
local mosque, working on her master’s dissertation in Hadith science at ANC and 
attending public lessons of Rajab Deeb and other religious scholars. Her clothes, a dark 
navy blue coat and similarly coloured hijab, that covered not only her hair and throat but 
also her forehead and her chin up to her mouth, distinguished her from the usual attire of 
Muslim women. Our conversation soon turned to the subject of modesty, and she told the 
story of a married man who fell in love with another woman for two years just because he 
                                                
334 Interview with Zaynab, Damascus countryside, 27.07.2009. 
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saw her smile once. This story with its strong legitimisation of the niqāb struck me as odd 
because Zaynab herself did not wear it. She concluded:  
What power is in the beauty of a woman! Of course, the niqāb is not farḍ, but I 
would love to cover my face. Only, as a teacher I can’t. And if I have to show my 
face in the classroom it would make no sense to cover it on the street.335  
 
Obviously, in Zaynab’s opinion, the discussion about modesty should not aim at the 
question of how to minimise the limitations for women but at maximising the protection in 
cross gender settings, even if she acknowledged that other practical issues had to be taken 
into account, too. 
 
Over the next two and a half years, we visited each other privately four more times both in 
her town and in my home, and I joined her regularly for the Thursday lessons of Rajab 
Deeb at ANC for one year. We also talked on the phone, which was easier than making an 
appointment due to her very busy schedule. Sometimes she would call me and invite me to 
join her for a special lesson or occasion she wanted to attend, for example the monthly 
lesson for women only by Sheikh Rajab. Zaynab attended the Thursday lessons surrounded 
by 20 to 30 women of all ages from her small town. They always sat in the same spot in 
the women’s gallery. She usually spent a couple of hours in the women’s hall before the 
Thursday lesson. Though meeting there with a group of other master students to study 
together, she was regularly called away by one of her disciples to discuss personal 
questions. Others just came to greet her with special respect, some trying to kiss her hand, 
                                                
335 Conversation with Zaynab, Damascus countryside,  04.03.2009 
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which she would prevent by getting up and greeting them with the common embrace and 
kisses on the cheek. 
 
Like Sawda, Zaynab openly pursued my conversion to Islam. She engaged me in 
conversations about the lessons and would sometimes call me afterwards to hear what I 
thought about it and review the lesson for me again. Even during the lessons she would 
stop her own painstaking taking of notes and copy Arabic aḥadīth and verses into my 
notebook that she thought were important for me and that I could not write down quickly 
enough. She also made sure that I sat at the window of the women’s galleries for the 
lessons so that, as she told me, I would after a while come to experience the spiritual 
connection with Sheikh Rajab as she had. This space was a constant issue of contention 
between the women because only the first row was able to see Sheikh Rajab downstairs in 
the main prayer hall.  
 
As early as our first meeting, Zaynab told me that she had not always been devout, but that 
her life had been ‘turned upside down’ through listening to Rajab Deeb. In July 2009 we 
met for an in-depth, recorded interview and in June 2011 for a follow-up interview, which 
was not recorded, to talk about her journey towards devoutness, on which the following 
portray is based. 
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5.2.1   ‘Traditional Islam’: Zaynab interprets her religious background 
 
Zaynab described her family during her childhood as ‘normal’ and ‘traditional’:  
As a society, we are following Islam; that was simply the context in which I lived. 
Naturally (fiṭrīyan) we were Muslims, just fasting during Ramadan and performing 
religious rites.336  
 
We lived as Muslims through imitation only.337 
 
Born in the 1970s, Zaynab grew up as the second of eight children. She described her 
father as a progress-oriented, open-minded man who, in her memory, was absent from 
home most of the time. The economic situation of the growing family demanded that he 
worked in two different employments. Her mother was also busy, not only with her 
children, but also working as a seamstress from home. The only religious presence in 
Zaynab’s family during her childhood was her maternal grandmother. Zaynab remembered 
that she used prayer beads and was known in her town to have the special gift of helping 
women with breastfeeding problems through reading the Qur’an for them. Yet her practice 
did not challenge Zaynab or her family to follow her example. Religion apparently did not 
play any specific role at home other than as part of the traditional way of life in her town 
and was in Zaynab’s memory characterised by absence of communication, which went 
back to a lack of communication between her grandparent and her parents’ generation: 
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337 Interview with Zaynab, Damascus,  18.06.2011. 
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‘The generation of my parents usually were cut off from religious knowledge, except for 
the practice of the obligatory [farḍ], maybe.’338 
 
Zaynab characterised the way in which her family spent their time through the lack of 
religious interest. It was determined by what was seen as ‘normal’ and ‘customary’ in her 
community:  
When we were socialising we would switch on the television and watch movies 
that were kind of frivolous. Still, we would watch them: It was normal. Maybe 
there was even a negative influence on our lives. But, it was normal. That’s the way 
it was, the way we grew up, that was the atmosphere at home: Normal movies, 
normal music, everything was normal. There was nothing religious that we really 
adhered to (mutamassikīn fi). 339 
 
The social life of her family was centred on visits among the extended family and 
neighbours, still the normal social practice in Syria. Looking back, Zaynab noticed 
disapprovingly that even when there started to be some irregular meetings at the local 
mosque in the 1990s when religious teachers came from Damascus, her family were not 
involved, preferring to spend their leisure time visiting or watching TV. Even though 
Zaynab did not see these activities as sinful, her verdict of ‘normal’ had become for her a 
category that was opposed to devoutness, mainly because it was lacking religious 
purposefulness. Yet, Islam was not absent from her upbringing. Rather, as the next section 
will explore, the problem with the religious elements was that they were meaningless for 
her. 
                                                
338 Ibid. 
339 Interview with Zaynab, Damascus countryside,  27.07.2009. 
 154 
The traditional conservative milieu in which Zaynab grew up, constituted the framework 
for the religious practices and sentiment of her family and her own life. She remembers 
religious practices as an unquestioned but also unimportant part of life. The obligatory acts 
of worship especially were accepted in theory but not necessarily practiced: Her parents 
seem to have been uncommitted and neither brought their children up to observe the five 
prayers nor to value them: 
[…] We were a little lax with prayer and my family didn’t care a lot to make sure 
that we prayed. They prayed but I never felt that there was any necessity or 
obligation to pray. […] To be honest, my parents sometimes prayed and then 
stopped for longer periods of time. […] At that point [prayer] had very little 
meaning in our lives.340  
 
Similarly, her family fasted during Ramadan because everybody around them did. They 
had an old copy of the Qur’an in their home but she only remembers her father reading it 
sometimes during Ramadan. Other practices were more present in everyday life, but they 
had little importance to Zaynab as she did not understand their meaning:  
I did not understand why my grandmother was holding prayer beads in her hands, 
or what prayer beads were. Or, we knew the saying ‘peace be upon the prophet’, 
but what did it mean?341 
 
Her grandmother was also the only one in her family who sometimes attended mawālīd in 
the mosque. There were no regular activities for women or children and Zaynab says that it 
never even crossed her mind that she could have anything to do with the mosque.  
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While the Qur’an was not used much in Zaynab’s family, the person of Muhammad seems 
to have played a more important role in her upbringing. She recalls that her family used to 
tell stories from his life to the children, which was the general custom. These stories played 
an important part to strengthen her religious identity making her feel proud and glad to be 
a Muslim:  
They told me he brought us from darkness to light, or that without Muhammad we 
would still be worshipping stones. Without him we would not enter paradise on the 
day of resurrection, we would not know the Qur’an but worship fire or a stone or a 
human being like us, as in other religions.342  
 
The feeling to belong to Muhammad consolidated Zaynab’s consciousness of being a 
Muslim, yet interestingly, the purpose of emulating Muhammad seems to have been absent 
from these stories. Her religious upbringing taught her basic Islamic monotheism without 
concrete practical implications. 
 
Another illustration of Zaynab’s understanding that religion consisted in mere imitation 
was an instance when, as a child in the third grade, she put on the hijab for the first time, 
together with her friend. They put it on and off for a few days, ‘trying it out […] just for 
fun’343. The main memory that she connected with this event today, was how they both 
went out in their hijabs and when they saw one of the religious leaders in town they tried to 
get his attention, calling out greetings to him and enjoying the thought that he would see 
them as ‘religious’ (ṣāhib al-dīn). Her family told her she was too young to wear the hijab 
yet. After a few days they both took the hijab off for another number of years.  
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For Zaynab, to put on the hijab was not a religious decision but a customary part of life. It 
was part of being a grown up woman. Her experiment had the character of a child’s role-
play, even though, in line with her surroundings, the role she played was that of a respected 
Muslim woman. Even in her attempt to catch the attention of a religious leader she was 
looking for status – the questions of segregation and obedience to God were not yet a 
subject to think about.  
 
Although Zaynab described her upbringing in contrast to meaningful religiosity, she had 
nevertheless memories of religious experiences that read like a parallel story. To Zaynab 
they were ‘a different story’ because she attributed the origin of these experiences to 
neither her family nor her community, but to God’s influence on her life leading her to 
become who she is today. 
 
 
 
5.2.2   Zaynab’s growing religious interest 
 
Zaynab remembered that when she was upset or sad, she used to look for solitude and turn 
to supplication to find consolation. 
I had these moments when I was alone with myself, and I would say to [God]: my 
Lord, you are my support, and I knew you before I knew my father and my mother, 
before I knew any other human being. When I was small I had this [experience]. 
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When I was frustrated with someone or someone made me sad, I would sense God 
(ahsās bi-llah). I don't know where that came from.344 
 
In her narrative, Zaynab focused on the lack of meaning and intentionality in the religion 
that she saw modelled as a child. Yet on the other hand, it is exactly this lack of 
intentionality that she understands as evidence of divine agency in her story: One theme 
that appears repeatedly when she talks about these early experiences and her later 
‘conversion experience’ is that she could not identify its origin. Nothing in her memory 
pointed to her family as the source for her behaviour or emotions. Her only possible 
explanation was therefore that she did so because of her fiṭra: 
These emotions of faith are founded in fiṭra Every human being feels them at birth 
and even before birth because the spirit was in the world of atoms (‘ālam al-dhirr). 
There is a reference in Surat al-A‘raf.345 
 
In Zaynab’s memories, these experiences were associated with feeling isolated from her 
family, and her prayers offered her a possibility to overcome her isolation and feel that 
God existed and was with her.346 Zaynab interpreted these experiences on the one hand as 
significant, as the first beginnings of her devoutness. On the other hand, they were not 
significant enough to give meaning to the religious activities and formula that she saw 
during her childhood. Rather, these experiences were interpreted as unconnected with the 
traditional religiosity that she otherwise described, because she did not remember a model 
for her behaviour. In her narrative, they are invested with a special immediateness.  
                                                
344 Interview with Zaynab, Damascus countryside,  27.07.2009. 
345 Interview with Zaynab, Damascus, 18.06.2011; the quotation she is alluding to is Surah 
7:172; for a more detailed discussion of fiṭra comp. Chapter 5.4.1, page 290. 
346 Interview with Zaynab, Damascus countryside,  27.07.2009. 
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Interestingly, they were experienced in ignorance and disconnection from normative 
religious behaviour, in contrast to her later appreciation of knowledge and religious 
observation. This interpretation is facilitated by the idea that children are innocent and not 
yet religiously responsible.  
 
In her community, Zaynab experienced the religious atmosphere during the early 1980s as 
dominated by fear in being associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. She remembered that 
it was significant enough to stop people from taking part in mosque activities or showing 
religious symbols publicly. Families stopped young men, in particular, from going to the 
mosque so that they would not be denunciated as Muslim Brothers. One of her 
neighbouring families had a big picture of the Ka’aba on their wall. Zaynab noticed this as 
something strange at the time.  
 
The first weak influence of religious knowledge came with religion classes at middle 
school. Zaynab said that her female religious studies teachers were her favourite teachers 
because of their friendliness. Sometimes she played ‘religion teacher’ with her younger 
siblings and cousins, making them sit down in front of her and teaching them to memorise 
the fātiḥa and other Qur’anic verses she had learned. Zaynab recalled that she only learned 
how to pray correctly at school. The religion teachers used the methods of tarḥīb (inducing 
fear) and targhīb (inducing desire), but with little success, as the knowledge did not change 
Zaynab’s life, because it did not ‘touch [her] heart’ and her love for Muhammad stayed 
‘abstract’347. With hindsight Zaynab saw her religious school education as of limited 
importance because it did not make her love, pray, or observe any other religious 
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obligation. Her interest in religious activities was limited throughout her early teenage 
years. When a cousin invited her to join her for private lessons to memorise the Qur’an 
when she was 13, she went once out of curiosity but dropped out afterwards.  
 
Zaynab started to wear the hijab during these years, a development that left no special 
mark on her memory. It was simply part of growing up as a girl in her town. She did not 
know the religious norms concerning the hijab and only wore a headscarf when she went 
into public space. As a ‘traditional’ hijab wearer, she did not mind showing some stray hair 
or even quickly exiting her home without hijab to go to a close neighbour’s house.348 In 
contrast, at the time of our acquaintance, she made sure that she covered herself correctly 
according to her understanding of the sharia whenever a possibly marriageable man might 
see her, this included male family members such as cousins or brothers-in-law.  
 
Zaynab’s teenage years were still primarily under the secular influences that were part of 
the new opportunities of secular education of her generation. Schooling, as well as the 
open-minded atmosphere at home, gave her a general desire for more education and 
knowledge. She read everything that she could lay her hands on. Looking back, she regrets 
that she read books indiscriminately, some of which painted a picture of religious tenets 
that she rejects today. A version of the qisas al-anbiā’, portraying the prophets as sinful in 
contradiction to the common Islamic teaching, especially stuck out in her mind. Zaynab 
explained to me at length that this lack of discrimination showed that no matter what 
teaching she received in school, she still had no real understanding of the prophets during 
her teenage years. When I interviewed her, Zaynab seemingly felt a strong need to 
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apologise for her former enjoyment of books that were distasteful to her today. The 
prophets have become a very emotional subject for her since:  
Any prophet is exempt from sin and never ever thinks sinful thoughts. As you 
would never ever think about eating a piece of cotton, so a prophet never ever even 
turns his eyes or his heart towards what is sinful. God forbid!349 
 
The general atmosphere in her community changed towards the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s.  
When I got to be about 18 years old, there started to be many more opportunities. 
My generation had more opportunities to learn generally. […] My friends and I 
moved slowly [towards religion], and so did my family. Not a lot, we didn't 
become [religious] 100 %, or at once. But during Ramadan we started to read the 
Qur'an, or to attend prayers, my sisters and me. Prayer started to become 
important.350 
 
This general trend coincided with the growing influence that her school friend Mai started 
to have on Zaynab’s religious life. Mai’s father was a religion teacher and Zaynab noticed 
that her whole family lived Islam in a different way than what she was used to at home. 
They prayed regularly, and they were reading the Qur’an. Zaynab started to question the 
way her family was living. During her last two years at school she orientated herself more 
and more towards the religious practice of her friend’s family and tried to change her life 
accordingly. Mai’s influence seems to have grown stronger when her family became 
                                                
349 Interview with Zaynab, Damascus, 27.07.2009; Rajab Deeb also used this illustration in 
his lessons, showing how ridiculous the idea is that the prophets sinned. Zaynab has made 
his argument her own. 
350 Ibid. 
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connected to ANC. First Mai’s brother started to go there for lessons through his friends 
and became a disciple of Rajab Deeb. He brought cassettes back with him and hung a 
picture of Sheikh Rajab on wall of the family home. 
 
Zaynab experienced a growing desire to improve religiously. Under the leadership of her 
friend, who was herself inspired by the media her brother brought home from ANC, they 
started to set themselves goals for religious activities and set up a system of accountability 
between themselves. These activities included memorisation of Qur’anic passages, prayer, 
extra days of fasting and dhikr: 
We agreed to worship together, for example saying subḥān allah,351 al-ḥamdu l-
illah352 and lā ilāha illa-llah353, and we would agree to say this 1000 times, or 100 
times. […] Or we would agree to fast on Mondays and Thursdays, during the 
summer, when it was hot: 52 degrees maybe, - but no matter what, we wanted to 
fast. […] There are aḥadīth that, if someone says al-ḥamdu l-illah subhānahu 100 
times his sins are forgiven, even if they were like the foam of the sea. [...] Why did 
we do this? Because of the feelings of the heart, this is the way you have to satisfy 
the Lord of the universe. Why? If we sin we want to ask for forgiveness, we are sad 
because of our sins. That is why we did these things.354 
 
This quotation shows Zaynab’s new dissatisfaction with the discrepancy between her lax 
religious practice and the religious ideal she had started to admire. She said that she 
struggled to keep these commitments and that she often underwent little punishments, 
                                                
351 ‘Glory be to God.’ 
352 ‘Praise be to God.’ 
353 ‘There is no God but God.’ 
354 Interview with Zaynab, Damascus countryside,  27.07.2009. 
 162 
which would be even more fasting, more dhikr or paying 25 Lira, which would have been 
the cost of five bus rides at the time. Nevertheless she dedicated herself to be a better 
Muslim. Now, some of the more fear-inducing material she had learned during religion 
classes in school became personal, and she felt distressed whenever she had not fulfilled 
her religious obligations. A new sense that she needed forgiveness and a transformation of 
her life became prominent in her mind: ‘For me personally I thought of the fasting and so 
on as a way of punishment (‘aqūba) and an exercise (mujāhada) to repent from my 
sins.’355 
 
As the above illustrates, there were a number of factors that coincided with Zaynab’s 
experience: The general trend in society and her family’s move towards religiosity; her 
own psychological development during puberty to be more critical of her up-bringing and 
the growing importance of peer influence through her friend Mai. 
 
 
 
5.2.3   Finding divine love 
 
It was during this time of new religious endeavours that Zaynab had her experience of 
Rajab Deeb, described at the beginning of the case study. Mai and her siblings became 
Zaynab’s initial connection with him, bringing her religious cassettes, books and news 
from lessons they attended. According to Zaynab, her growing desire for devoutness and 
her frustration with her failures culminated in her encounter with Rajab Deeb in a way that 
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can be called a ‘conversion experience’. She said that she was already deeply affected by 
him first the time she saw the picture of Sheikh Rajab in her friend’s home, and even more 
so when listening to cassettes with his teaching. When at last she was able to go and attend 
one of his lessons, Zaynab formed a strong emotional attachment albeit never personally 
meeting Sheikh Rajab until 2009.   
 
Pictures of the better known sheikhs are a common sight in Syria. Pictures of Rajab Deeb 
usually show an old man with a thick white beard, a white cap, a white robe or the brown 
coat of the ‘ulamā’, thick-rimmed glasses and a friendly smile. Some show the ANC in the 
background or show him together with Ahmad Kuftaro. According to Böttcher (1998), 
these pictures are used as visual aids to keep the special spiritual connection (rābiṭa) 
between the sheikh and his disciples.356 
Zaynab described that she experienced an immediate emotional reaction when she saw 
Sheikh Rajab’s picture:  
If someone talks to you about someone else, first you are not sure whether you are 
convinced [of what they say] or not. But in my case, love for him entered my heart 
immediately. It’s possible my friend and those who talked to me about him didn't 
love him like I did. […] The first time I saw the picture I was astonished. I felt as if 
I knew him. And again when I listened to his cassette.357 
 
Zaynab described the final event of her ‘conversion’ as her experience of listening to 
Sheikh Rajab in person during a Thursday lesson, although this happened some time after 
her media encounter. At that time, it was difficult for her to get to Damascus for his lessons 
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in the evening. Then she discovered a notebook from her brother and realised that he had 
started to attend Sheikh Rajab’s lessons without telling his family. Only because she could 
persuade her brother to take her along was she able to go herself. Zaynab describes the 
experience to be able to attend this lesson as a deep sense of coming home and meeting her 
soul mate: 
When I heard him talking, again I felt that he was not a stranger. I felt he was not 
new to me, as if I had known him for a long time.358 
I knew that there was something more than [the natural meeting of two people]. 
There is a spiritual affinity between Sheikh Rajab and me. This is something that 
happens if God permits it and guides the spirit to it. The basis for this affinity is 
that our spirits knew each other from the time of creation, before the creation of the 
bodies. 359  
 
The sudden attachment that Zaynab felt was so strong and unexpected that she could only 
explain it as a divine re-union of her spirit with Sheikh Rajab’s spirit because of a ‘pre-
existent’ connection between them. 
As in her childhood experiences of God’s closeness, her un-intentionality was one of the 
major themes of Zaynab’s interpretation concerning her connection with Sheikh Rajab. 
This sense of wonder was emphasised when she pondered how she had become much 
more attached to him than Mai and her family, finally resulting in a change of roles as 
years later she became their religious teacher. 
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To explain what happened to her, Zaynab drew a parallel between her ‘conversion’ and her 
experiences of romantic love. The first time she fell in love she was 16, and this episode 
lasted only for a couple of days because the strength of her emotions dismayed her. She 
decided to ask God to free her from this love, and her feelings passed. A year or two later 
she had a more lasting experience. Looking back she thought that there had been an 
emotional vacuum in her life before her encounter with Rajab Deeb and therefore she 
made the conscious decision to fall in love with a neighbour. He was well educated and 
worked as an engineer, which she associated with progress and rationality. Zaynab 
recognised this incident as a key experience in her life that helped her to understand her 
emotionality and what it means to love: To remember one’s beloved always and to be 
shaped by thoughts and emotions that are directed towards him and thus to fill an existing 
emotional vacuum. In Zaynab’s view, love establishes a spiritual connection between the 
lover and the beloved, even if there is no acknowledgement between them. However, while 
these two experiences taught Zaynab about love, she said that she only found ‘true love’ 
when she encountered Rajab Deeb shortly afterwards. For Zaynab, love became the 
motivation to change her life and engage in a more satisfying religious practice. Her instant 
‘conversion experience’ was followed by a process of gradual change as her thoughts were 
filled with him and his teaching. Eventually the encounter led to her regular attendance of 
his lessons and formal studies at ANC.  
 
However, Zaynab emphasised that the love for her sheikh was only important because it 
mediated love for God through opening her heart to the greatness of God through his 
teaching, sharing his own spiritual connection with the prophets with her, and practically 
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through teaching her dhikr. Reflecting on those 14 years of his influence, she explained 
how her love for God had been influenced.  
Love is so important because without love there is no faith. In a ḥadīth Muhammad 
said three times: without love there is no faith. To love the sheikh is a way to love 
God, because if you love, you also love what your beloved loves.360 
 
Zaynab illustrated through the example of dhikr how much her inner attitude had changed. 
The unsatisfactory attempts at dhikr with Mai made her aware of her weakness and 
sinfulness. At ANC she was taught the Qur’anic basis of dhikr and received structured 
training on how to practice it, with an emphasis on step-by-step daily practice and personal 
discipline. Again, her initial motivation to learn dhikr ‘correctly’ came from her love for 
Sheikh Rajab. Over the years, through the daily practice of dhikr her love for God and her 
desire for emotional connectedness became part of her everyday life as she reached a new 
stage of ‘God-mindedness’: 
I told you I am not living up to the highest standards of dhikr, but praise God, now, 
after nearly 14 years with the sheikh, if I walk on my own, sometimes I feel my 
heart saying on its own account, allah, allah, and I feel such delight. Today, when I 
was going to the mosque and was standing at the bus stop, and I wasn't aware of 
my heart, I noticed that my heart on its own accord was saying: Allah, allah, allah. 
I was overcome with joy in my heart! Praise God!361 
 
Encountering Rajab Deeb, and the emotional connection that she felt, enabled Zaynab to 
change her religious life. Over the next two years, however, she was not able to 
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accompany her brother to his lessons except once or twice. Zaynab was never initiated as a 
disciple of Sheikh Rajab or any other sheikh at ANC. She never used the word Sufi with 
me, yet her narrative shows the strong influence of Sufi religiosity. The emotional 
connection she felt became the thrust of a number of practical decisions she made 
afterwards, leading her into religious activism. 
  
5.2.4   Higher religious education and da‘wa 
 
A major influence on Zaynab’s life was the decision to study sharia at the ANC. Initially, 
she enrolled on a two-year course at an institute for Arabic teachers rather than a four-year 
course at university. This decision was made on the economic basis that her family needed 
her income as soon as possible. Yet after she started teaching Arabic at school, she 
registered to study in parallel with her work for a university degree in biology. This course 
would have taken four additional years but as a teacher with a university degree her 
income would have doubled. However, when she heard about a course for female students 
in sharia studies at the College of Islamic Da‘wa at the ANC she cancelled her registration 
to start sharia studies instead. This choice had a number of down sides: It was a five-year 
programme, the subject was much less prestigious, and her income would not improve if 
she worked as a religion teacher with a degree from ANC.362 For Zaynab, all these aspects 
could not deter her from pursuing an education at ANC because this brought her into Rajab 
Deeb’s sphere of influence. This was her main motivation for the change. Apparently, she 
had not considered studying sharia at Damascus University for four years and the prospect 
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of a doubled income. Nor was she planning to become a dā‘iya at this point, which also 
shows that her decision was centred on Rajab Deeb and her personal desire for religious 
fulfilment rather than a motivation for religious activism. 
The course at ANC was taught in the afternoon363 so that Zaynab continued teaching in the 
mornings. After she graduated from this course she started to study for a master’s degree in 
hadith studies at ANC. 
 
With her growing religious knowledge, Zaynab started to make more changes to live 
according to the sharia interpretation taught at ANC. The areas she mentioned specifically 
were her dress and her commitment to prayer, which now included the sunna prayers, but 
over time her whole worldview was more and more permeated by the religious standards 
that held up the ideal of living in total imitation of the sunna of Muhammad. Zaynab 
rejected the unenlightened imitation of religious behaviour as mere taqālīd,  replacing it 
with an imitation based on the knowledge and literalistic interpretation of the aḥadīth. One 
affected area was the question of adherence to cultural norms. 
 
Retrospectively, Zaynab contrasted the traditional values that she was taught as a child 
with the religious norms she learned as a grown-up at ANC.  
Our family […] made sure we knew what was shameful (‘ayb) rather than what 
was forbidden (ḥarām). The moral values were that if you do this it is acceptable – 
if you do that it is shameful.364 
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The Arabic word for shameful, ‘ayb, was one of the first words that I learned when I 
moved to the Middle East. It is ubiquitous in child rearing and this concept of shame is 
used in front of people as a motivation for proper behaviour. Ḥarām is actually often used 
together with ‘ayb in these situations. However, for religious Muslims ḥarām has the 
precise religious connotation of being sinful and forbidden by God. Therefore they assert 
that an act perceived as socially ‘ayb but is not unlawful should not be called ḥarām.  
 
The example Zaynab used to illustrate this are the cultural limitations of women’s mobility 
that she grew up with, specifically the expectation that women should be at home by the 
time it gets dark. This traditional norm would clash with her desire to attend the lessons of 
Rajab Deeb which started after the maghrib prayer and ended with the ‘ishā’ prayer. 
Travelling back to her town afterwards made her come home hours after the respectable 
time.  
I suffered a lot just for the sake of going to the lessons, and my family opposed me 
a lot, especially my mother. […] The society in a small town like mine doesn’t 
tolerate a woman or a girl spending evenings away from home a lot. It just isn’t 
done! At the latest you have to be home at sunset, but I had started going out and 
coming back late.365 
 
While the example of coming home late may seem of comparatively little consequence, 
Zaynab illustrated with it a far-reaching difference between two opposing systems in 
evaluating behaviour: Traditional moral behaviour is motivated by a society’s expectations 
with the resulting evaluation of shame or respect. By contrast, religious practice avoids 
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what is wrong because of God’s eternal judgment and motivates one to do what is good 
through thankfulness. In some instances ‘ayb and ḥarām may be congruent, in other 
instances they are opposed. Zaynab’s growing religious interest and knowledge of sharia 
law led to a diverging shift in her values: On the one hand it gave her freedom from the 
moral judgments of her neighbours, on the other it meant submission to the sharia. This 
distinction is, of course, partly idealistic. As a member of her community Zaynab needed 
to weigh the consequences of going against traditional norms.  
 
Even if the recent changes in Syrian society made it possible for Zaynab to break some of 
the traditional moral rules of her community, this came at a cost for her. From a cultural 
perspective, a girl who does not come back home until midnight is suspicious of sexual 
looseness, and as such is putting shame on her family. Zaynab knew that her neighbours 
were gossiping about her staying out late. They complained to her mother and demanded 
that she curb Zaynab’s commitment to the lessons. 
 
It is important to see that de facto both values, sharia and social judgement, are taken into 
account when making choices, because it explains why religious Muslim women often 
have such an appearance of being simply traditional and conservative when actually the 
newly gained knowledge of the distinction between traditional and religious norms has 
given them a different tool for making their choices. Sometimes women adhere to 
conservative customs out of practical reasons rather than the complex distinctions between 
the different rulings in Islamic jurisprudence, al-aḥkam al-khamsa, which offer the 
possibility to assess situations in a differentiating way. As the example of Zaynab’s choice 
not to wear niqāb shows, cultural pressures can also work for compliance with less 
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restrictive norms as choices are often handled in a flexible manner according to 
practicality.  
 
The general shift in society towards religiosity has made religious life style choices more 
acceptable in other instances. Consequently leading a life of greater sharia conformity also 
earned Zaynab respect. 
 
Zaynab’s motivation for da‘wa came from her love for Rajab Deeb and Muhammad, the 
prophet. Therefore it came easily and naturally to her once she had found this love. She 
recalls how her friends started teasing her about her constant talking about religion. Her 
father, annoyed by her attempts to correct her family, complained that she talked about 
nothing else but ‘the prophet said this, the prophet said that.’366 However, from her own 
point of view at this early stage she had not consciously chosen to propagate Islam, her 
da‘wa simply flowed out of her love: ‘Whatever the sheikh said was printed on my heart 
and I passed it on straight away, without objective.’367 
 
If Zaynab’s first steps in da‘wa were informal and relatively unintentional, in the second 
stage of her da‘wa she started to become formally involved in the women’s activities at the 
local mosque through her sister, younger by six years, who had followed her example and 
studied at ANC straight after school. Zaynab’s sister was approached with the question of 
whether she was willing to be responsible for a women’s institute for the memorisation of 
the Qur’an in her town, which the ANC was planning to open in the local mosque. The 
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institute proved a success and with growing numbers of women and girls coming for 
classes, Zaynab started to teach there, too, one day each week. 
 
Zaynab felt that her da‘wa had recently reached a third stage, leaving behind the formal 
framework of the mosque. She had begun to widen her circle of influence, reaching out to 
students and teachers at the school where she worked and other strangers. She did not stop 
teaching at the mosque but changed her perspective, stating she was also called to reach 
those not coming to the mosque and who seemed less interested in religious matters.  
Recently, wherever I am I feel that I have to talk and spread my love, I spread it at 
school with the teachers and my students, with my neighbours, my relatives, any 
place I can talk. […] There are bigger numbers in the mosque, but that is not 
everything. Not everybody I know comes to the mosque, there are different 
communities, some I meet at the school, some are my students, others teachers, all 
of these you have to talk with.368 
 
Zaynab’s case illustrates the personal change towards devoutness in the context of the 
general shift in Syrian society: While she experienced her development through her 
particular story and very personal events, the number of circumstances that time and again 
pushed her towards religiosity, connect her life story to that of many other Syrian women: 
From the strong cultural value, yet lack of meaning and practical importance of Islam 
during her childhood, to the awakened religious interest among her friends and family, to 
the growing influence of ANC and its interpretation of Islam, firstly in her life, then 
through programmes in the public life of her community. Yet Zaynab’s case also showed a 
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very specific personality, formed by her emotional character and longings, which worked 
together with the Sufi currents at ANC. For her, the most important aspect of her journey 
was the divine agency that she recognises in her involuntary emotional reactions to the 
experiences that shaped her religious development and gave meaning to religious practices.  
 
Zaynab’s story also illustrates that female empowerment is not the key to understanding 
her choices, because even though she eventually emerged as a religious leader in her 
community, her growing devoutness initially caused her to turn away from opportunites 
that would have given her more economic gain and social status. 
 
The first two case studies have provided examples of women who became devout under 
the direct and indirect influences of the ANC. The third case study will show that the trend 
towards devoutness has also reached the Syrian villages.  
 
 
 
5.3   Aisha: Becoming devout in a Syrian village 
 
Even though the women’s da‘wa movement in Syria is centered on the cities and in 
many ways dependent on the accessibility of the urban religious infrastructure, with its 
mosque lessons and wide acceptance female da‘wa, the Syrian countryside is also 
affected by it - notwithstanding to a lesser degree. Aisha’s turn towards growing 
devoutness illustrates this phenomenon. 
 
 174 
I met Aisha three times in 2005 and 2006 when I was visiting her cousin Hanan in one 
of the Kurdish villages in Northern Syria. The rural Kurdish communities in Northern 
Syria have kept a more distinct identity from the Arab majority than the Kurdish 
population in the cities that have been urbanised for a longer period. Kurdish language, 
music and holidays show the vitality of their ethnic culture. There are also differences 
concerning religious practice, as many Syrian Kurds adhere less to Islamic practice. 
According to my observations369 there is more openness towards communist thought, 
and the feeling that they have been discriminated against on ethnic grounds seems to 
have led many to cynicism concerning Sunni Islam.  
 
 
 
5.3.1   Religious change between a village community and urban influences 
 
When I met Aisha, nothing seemed to distinguish her from other village women in her 
area at first sight. A woman in her late twenties, with only an elementary school 
education, she spent her life looking after her four young daughters, her home, and 
working on the family land. When I saw her for the third time, she had come to visit 
her cousin Hanan in an attempt to heal a breach in the extended family because the 
latter had broken off an unofficial engagement with Aisha’s younger brother. During 
this visit we chatted about my research and she told me that she, too, had changed to 
                                                
369 I have visited Hanan as well as different families in a number of Kurdish villages 
continually over the period spring 2005 to spring 2011. 
 175 
become more religious.370 My first reaction was surprise, as Aisha, unlike the religious 
Muslim women I had encountered in Damascus, had not talked about Islam or devotion 
to me, yet. She also lacked the common visible signs of religiosity: Her dress was not 
different from other women in her area. She wore a colourful headscarf in black printed 
with bright red roses and green leaves. Her dress was made from a thin and flowing 
patterned material with long loose sleeves and a long, loose skirt with lots of little 
pleats, showing off the tailored waist. This kind of dress is traditionally worn by rural 
women. It revealed her figure much more than the manteau or abāya usually worn by 
the more religious women I had met so far.  
 
Despite her outward conformity with the rural community she lived in, Aisha said that 
she started to wear al-ḥijab al-ḥaqiqi, the 'true hijab', only four years ago. Before that 
time she would wear the headscarf merely for practical reasons, which is common in 
the Syrian countryside, as a protection against the sun during her work in the fields for 
example, but she was not bothered with religious norms or ideas of modesty. ‘Taking 
the hijab’ meant she had started to adhere strictly to regulations of the religious hijab. 
Since then, she also started praying more regularly, reading the Qur’an and being more 
exact in observing Ramadan, even though she was aware that she was still falling short 
of full religious observance. Yet she understood herself to be in the middle of a process 
of change and expressed her desire to stop compromising her religious practice and to 
live up to her ideal of religious observance: ‘I am not done with changing my life yet, 
but am trying to make it little by little more conformed to religion.’371  
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While Aisha described the changes in her life mainly in terms of practice, she 
repeatedly emphasised that a personal conviction had to be at the centre of religious 
life: ‘It is important that the change does not come from others, but from personal 
conviction (qinā‘a).’372 Her desire to change was mainly founded on the growing 
conviction that she was falling short of God’s commands. This was not an entirely new 
thought but it gained a new urgency in her mind. Consequently she started to fear for 
her fate in the hereafter: ‘I was thinking about how I would be judged by God.’  
 
These thoughts were triggered through the example of her brother, who turned towards 
religiosity two years before Aisha started wearing the hijab. According to Aisha’s 
account, her parent’s family had moved to Aleppo, leaving only her with her husband 
in the village. Originally, her brother had led a secular lifestyle unconcerned with 
religious norms. Aisha mentioned that he had been promiscuous and drank alcohol. 
However, in 2000 while he was studying medicine at university in his third year he 
became friends with two students who propagated Salafi Islam on campus. Through 
their influence he changed his life and became a Salafi himself. Usually Syrians use the 
term Salafi with a negative connotation for Muslims who are seen as overly strict and 
extreme to the degree of militancy. In Aisha’s understanding, though Salafi stood for a 
person who truly followed Muhammad: 
To be a Salafi means to live like the prophet Muhammad and his companions 
and to lead a pure life. Many students are becoming Salafis but they face 
problems so they remain secret.373 
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 Aisha said that both friends of her brother, one a law student, the other a student of 
English literature, had disappeared, and though nobody knew where they were, she was 
sure that the government had imprisoned them. In her opinion, Syrian society was 
becoming more religious because of the influence that the Islamic da‘wa had on 
people’s lives. As in her own life, people needed to hear religious teaching to move 
from indifference to commitment. 
 
 
 
5.3.2   Becoming religious: an aspect of conservatism or progress?  
 
The case of Aisha’s development is another illustration that the relationship between 
the categories of ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ are not as clear cut as the appearance 
of veiling and other claims of adherence to ancient Islamic practices may suggest. A 
comparison between Aisha and her sister shows this: When Aisha’s brother became 
religious he started talking to both sisters about the Islamic obligations, especially 
pressuring them to wear the headscarf. While Aisha apparently was open to his 
influence and started to think about God’s claim on her life, his younger sister, who 
was still unmarried and living at home, resisted his influence for a number of years. 
She had lived her teenage years in Aleppo and had experienced a more modern lifestyle 
than Aisha in the first place, being a fashionable young woman used to wearing 
trousers, make up and perfectly coiffed hair.374 She fought with her brother saying that 
she was free to wear whatever she wanted rather than giving in. At the time I talked 
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with Aisha, her sister was 24 years old, and suddenly stated that she was going to don 
not only a headscarf, but a floor length dark manteau, a dark headscarf and a niqāb. 
Aisha was surprised by her sister’s decision, but she was also pleased. Her sister said 
that as she had decided to cover herself, she was not going to make any compromises. 
However, she had not yet put her announcement into practice because she was 
‘gathering strength’375 to go through with it.  
 
Aisha seemed also jealous that her younger, unmarried sister had the freedom to make 
her own decision and was going to overtake her in her religious practice while she was 
struggling with the opposition of her husband: ‘My husband is against my growing 
more religious but I want to do it anyway.’ When I asked her why her husband was 
against her development, she only said that he did not want her to change any of her 
practices. They had been married for eight years and Aisha complained that in other 
areas as well her husband tried to pressure her to do what he wanted. One area of 
conflict was her husband’s desire for a son. Aisha said that she had not wanted another 
child after giving birth to three daughters, but had given in. The fourth child had also 
been a girl and her husband kept pressuring her for another pregnancy even though she 
said that his demand was unreasonable, considering that all four births had been 
caesarians. In addition to the health issue Aisha argued that her husband’s insistence 
showed a lack of trust in God: ‘It is God who creates a human being male or female. 
Both are gifts from him.’376  
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After my conversation with Aisha in 2006, the rift between her family and her cousin 
Hanan widened and I was not able to get into contact with her again. However, Hanan 
told me two years later in October 2008 that Aisha had left her husband and had gone 
to live with her family in Aleppo. Aisha’s sister had started to wear the dark manteau, 
hijab and niqāb some time before that. Once Aisha was free from the pressures of her 
husband she had done the same.377 
 
The case of Aisha shows a woman for whom her turn towards religiosity was connected 
with her desire for progress and self-determination while struggling to find a liveable 
compromise between her rural community and her new ideal of a religious woman. In the 
end she decided to let go of the community she lived in and find opportunity for her own 
development in the city. It is interesting that her new religious practice, which was in many 
ways more restrictive, nevertheless meant for Aisha to get rid of the traditional 
conservatism of her rural community even to the degree of leaving her husband. 
 
At the beginning of her development, Aisha had to find a way to adhere to what she 
thought of as obligatory Islamic dress without going against the village consensus. While 
on the one hand it seems that she accepted her brother’s demands of the hijab more easily 
than her younger sister because it was less of a change from local village custom than from 
Syrian secular fashion, the modern Islamic clothing that is worn by many religious women 
in Syrian cities was more difficult for her to wear because she would have stuck out. A 
manteau, for example,  would also have proven very impractical in everyday village life 
with the demands of manual labour. Only later, through the example of her sister and her 
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claim of ‘no compromise’ did the manteau and modern hijab become part of the progress 
she desired in her religious life as well as part of urban lifestyle choices. 
 
Yet at the time of my interview, Aisha also remained critical of some of the developments 
in the religious milieu in the cities. Specifically, she opposed women engaging in the 
da‘wa movement: ‘In the cities even women are doing [da‘wa] nowadays, but I don’t like 
that.’378 In her opinion, women should be able to make their private religious choices but 
not take up public roles. Interestingly, in rural Syria women played a more public role 
anyway because they have traditionally been part of the agricultural labour force.  
 
Aisha’s turn to religion seems to have helped her to assert herself against her husband and 
his demands in areas that went beyond the argument that she had to obey God. In fact, 
most dā‘iyāt in my experience would judge that her duties as a wife took priority over a 
more overt religious life style as long as she fulfilled her obligations. Yet Aisha decided to 
make her decisions about her religious practices a higher priority than her husband’s 
wishes and rather re-attached herself to her family of origin.  
 
In Aisha’s case growing devoutness and female empowerment developed in parallel ways. 
Her brother obviously played an important role and influenced her way of thinking. Yet as 
a married woman, geographically separated from her brother, she may just as well not have 
followed him if he had not managed to convince her. Her growing independence enabled 
her to follow her desires for a more observant religious practice. With all the outer factors 
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that played a role in her development, Aisha’s own assessment remains, that her major 
motivation for her choices was the thought of God’s judgement. 
 
Thoughts of God’s judgement also played an important role in the next study, the story of 
Ruba’s journey towards devoutness. However, the circumstances of her life, growing up in 
Damascus, receiving higher education and looking forward to comparatively good 
employment opportunities, were very different from Aisha’s. This demonstrates that the 
notion of divine judgement as a motivator for change is not limited to lesser educated, 
‘backward’ women but, as I will explore further in 6.4.3, a integral part of my participants’ 
identity as devout Muslims. 
 
 
 
5.4  Ruba: A journey towards chastity 
 
About a month after the outbreak of the uprising in 2011, I went to interview Ruba at a 
friend’s house. I arrived in one of the poor, illegally constructed neighbourhoods, with 
large families living in shoebox-like concrete structures, one on top of the other, in 
unpaved streets full of rubbish, close to the conservative middle-class area of Midan. Ruba 
had walked over from her family home in Midan. The three of us sat down on a couple of 
mattresses on the floor, which were the main seating, for a cup of coffee, and  the 
conversation turned to the demonstrations of the day before. In the evening, the announcer 
on the state TV channel had said that the rumours about demonstrations in Midan after the 
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Friday prayers were false. Rather, according to the broadcaster, the men who exited the al-
Hassan Mosque had chanted al-ḥamdu li-llah because it was raining. Ruba was outraged: 
They have no respect for their own people! Do they think we are stupid? The 
window from our flat shows the street in front of the mosque, and I saw the men 
and heard what they were shouting.379 
 
Ruba’s case is the story of a young woman on the margins of the da‘wa movement. She 
did not strike me as being very interested in devoutness when I first met her. She talked 
about going to a mosque lesson once and not returning because of the harshness of the 
teacher, and chatted with my Druze friend and I about her desire to work as an engineer, 
complaining about the opposition to women’s education in the ‘backward community in 
Midan.’ The usual religious propaganda was missing from her conversation. She was 
dressed in a light brown manteau and beige hijab, and my friend had suggested her to me 
as a ‘guinea pig’ to try out a questionnaire on Muslim women because she saw Ruba as 
very ‘open-minded.’ Only during the interview did I realise that she had a strong desire for 
stricter religious practices and seemed to be a woman on her way to a more radical 
devoutness, so I asked her if she was willing to talk about her own experiences. We met 
again a week later for a second interview. Both interviews were recorded. 
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5.4.1  ‘Religion’ as compulsion and compliance to cultural norms 
 
Ruba was born in 1985. Growing up in the context of an extended paternal and maternal 
family in Midan, Ruba’s childhood associations with religion were mixed. While she 
remembers her mother teaching her how to pray as a child, she interpreted the behavioural 
norms in her family as driven by social acceptance rather than obedience to God’s 
commands, which Ruba, like Zaynab,380 describes with the term ‘normal’. However, that 
did not mean that their lives were void of religion, but rather that religious and cultural 
demands were intertwined and often not differentiated. Ruba’s criticism demonstrated that 
this led to some correct practices but without correct intentions while correct intentions 
could be paired with incorrect practices: 
[The girls in my family] wouldn't talk with a guy because it is Islamically unlawful, 
but because that was the way society was, and that is how they would act. That's 
what I mean by 'normal'. […] Even my mother and father were not knowledgeable 
about religion. Their daily life was ordinary, so that they didn't pray much. Yes, 
and their praying was not always correct.381 
 
Summing up the religious sentiment in her family at the time, she said it was ‘without 
spiritual feelings.’382 
 
Similarly, to wear the hijab was the normal cultural expectation of women in her 
community. Nevertheless, when her parents asked her to put it on she did not want to. She 
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remembers her childhood as a time of freedom from norms of clothing and other ‘female, 
modest’ behaviour, of running around and playing outside in the streets. When she was in 
seventh grade, her mother bought her a hijab and asked her to wear it, but she refused. 
Every morning her mother would take the hijab to the front door as she said good-bye, 
nagging her: ‘When will you start wearing it?’ Ruba was not alone in her rejection. She 
was part of a group of ten school friends who all struggled with the same demands and 
comforted each other when they got upset about their parents’ pressure. Many tears 
flowed. Looking back, Ruba thinks that they blew their dislike of the hijab out of 
proportion and that it became an issue of teenage rebellion to her and her friends not to 
wear it while they knew that sooner or later they had to comply because women without 
hijab were not accepted in her community. After about a year, the group of friends decided 
that they would give in and together come to school in hijab. As Ruba put it: ‘[Our] 
families shamed [us], and so we agreed in the end that we would wear the hijab.’ 
 
Later, donning the manteau was a step to find a compromise between Ruba’s desire to 
wear what she liked and her on-going family pressure concerning religiously acceptable 
clothes: 
Then the families began with the next stage: ‘Tight trousers are ḥarām, short tops 
are ḥarām, ḥarām, ḥarām.’  So we were wearing baggy trousers, and skirts - we 
had no choice, though we didn't like the skirts.  […] In ninth grade I began to wear 
a manteau and wear tight trousers and short-sleeved tops and so on underneath it 
until I didn't have any baggy clothes. I said that I could buy whatever clothes I 
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wanted and wear them and the manteau would cover it all. And that is how I 
continued.383 
 
Ruba was not the only one in her family that had difficulties with pressure related to 
religious practices. Her father’s generation had turned from Islamic convictions and 
practices other than what were culturally necessary, because of the inability of her 
grandparents’ generation to fill them with meaning. Her paternal grandfather especially 
was harsh, and tried to force his sons to pray and attend the mosque, yet could not explain 
why they should do so. He even beat them into compliance when they were young. As a 
result, all his sons rejected religious practices when they grew up. Ruba calls them ‘sinful 
Muslims’ who had ‘broken their religion,’ mentioning particularly that they never prayed, 
nor had any desire to know more about the Qur’an or Muhammad because they did not 
love them.  
 
Ruba did not remember any attractive models of religiosity during her childhood or early 
teenage years. On the one hand she saw the lack of religious learning which resulted in 
mere imitation and cultural pressure. On the other hand she was repelled by the few people 
around her who became part of the Islamic revival because their behaviour seemed too 
extreme:  Her father’s oldest brother returned to the kind of harsh religiosity that he had 
seen in his father. He started to go to mosque lessons at the Daqaq Mosque in Midan and to 
read religious books. Soon after that, he began to propagate ‘true Islam’ in his family. Yet 
from Ruba’s point of view he was too strict, as demonstrated particularly in his views on 
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women: He started to demand that the women in his family not leave the home and 
opposed higher education for his daughters. 
Another example was the family of one of Ruba’s classmates in elementary school. The 
mother had recently become religious through attending lessons at a mosque and equally 
engaged in da‘wa, and her daughter received some religious education, learning how to 
recite and memorise the Qur’an. In retrospection Ruba envied these opportunities. Yet her 
reaction at the time was repulsion because the girl had started to wear the hijab when she 
was still in elementary school, which seemed terrible to Ruba when she was a child. 
 
On looking back, Ruba identified social pressures and cultural norms as the main 
motivations behind adherence to or rejection of religious practices during her childhood 
and teenage years; however, religious questions remained in her mind. In particular, 
religion classes during middle school showed her the connection between unloved 
practices and Islam, legitimising the local morals as divine commands and paving the way 
for Ruba to change her attitude. Today, her view of the hijab, for example, has changed to 
the degree that she even prefers the niqāb. She sees her former rejection only as rebellion 
against the way that the hijab was pushed on her: 
If they bring you some chocolate and force you to eat it, you hate it. You feel it is 
not good because they want you to eat it. It was the same thing with  
the hijab for us girls.   
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5.4.2  Discovering chastity as the goal of religious observance 
 
At the beginning of our interview, Ruba estimated that a large percentage of women turned 
towards religion due to the experience of a shock which made them realise that their 
secular lifestyle had let them down: ‘They feel that there is no-one in the world who can 
help them except God. So they hold on a lot more to religion and take refuge in it.’384  
When I asked her about her own experiences, Ruba obviously found it difficult to talk 
about it. She mentioned a traumatic incident but couldn’t remember what it was. Only later 
she explained that it had to do with a romantic relationship. The subject seemed shame-
related for her as she did not share much detail of what happened: When she was about 15 
or 16 years old she started to meet secretly with a boy from her school. The relationship 
lasted for five years. After the initial years her boyfriend asked her family for her hand in 
marriage and they got officially engaged, but the relationship became more difficult when 
Ruba went to university and her boyfriend did not pursue further education. According to 
her, it was she who started to have reservations about the connection as she developed her 
thinking through her studies, feeling dissatisfied with her fiancé’s lack of common interests 
while he seemed totally infatuated with her. However, when her fiancé unexpectedly broke 
the engagement, it unsettled her and triggered her search for God: 
It was a huge shock to me. He left me. I was devastated and [felt] this great 
emotional emptiness …, and I had lots of free time that needed filling. […]  
So I began to fill my time. After the shock, I felt that I should return to God, read 
the Qur'an and pray, so that God would help me. I started to go to the mosque and 
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memorise the Qur'an and I began to love going deeper in religion.385 
 
Ruba repeatedly described how her experience had shattered her. Broken engagements are 
comparatively common in Syria. In a culture where arranged marriages are still the norm, 
couples often do not know each other very well before they get engaged. While these break 
ups are also painful as the hope of married life and happiness is disappointed, in most cases 
I have observed that the experience is not devastating or life-changing, and the search for a 
marriage partner may be continued relatively quickly afterwards. In Ruba’s case, 
understandably, the five-year-old relationship left a huge vacuum in her life. Yet this is not 
the only reason why she turned towards religion to fill the gap. The unexplained and 
sudden end seems to have affected her feeling of helplessness; hence, she emphasised 
helplessness as the main reason to seek God when she talked about this phenomenon in the 
general context.  
 
However, as Ruba had already started to feel dissatisfied with the relationship beforehand, 
the question is why she did not feel some relief to ease the pain even if she did not go so 
far as to initiate the break-up herself. The following quote sheds some light on this: 
In the beginning I was talking to Ali without my family's knowledge. So after I fell 
and tasted the loss I began to say that I wished I had not spoken to him.  It left a 
black spot in my heart, it was a bad experience, and as always, after we have made 
a mistake remember that God told us not to do that, that it is wrong.386 
 
Apparently Ruba felt that the way they had conducted the relationship during the earlier 
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stages was sinful and that it had somehow left her morally marred. Regretting ‘speaking to 
Ali’ may represent more explicit sexual behaviour or merely the sexual attraction involved 
in their secret relationship. In the context of the cultural construct of female chastity and 
male objectification of women, it is possible to understand her emotional reaction and 
feelings of guilt as a credible response to either. Clearly the experience made her accept 
one of the prevalent the cultural notions that men relate to women mainly as sexual 
objects:  
Maybe [Ali] gave me this picture, that for a man, a woman is just a body.  She is 
just a female, not an intellect. Compared to others he had a really good character 
but now I have this impression that troubles me. There are things that you cannot 
describe but when they happen in front of you, you feel something ugly.387 
 
The acceptance of this idea made Ruba ready to accept the restricting religious 
prescriptions that she had rejected earlier as the solution to cross gender issues. Now the 
view of the different natures of men and women and their different obligations for the 
protection of the community from sin as it is propagated within the da‘wa movement 
offered an explanation of her turmoil and orientation for the future. The cultural norms on 
gender and some of the teaching on gender roles she had learned in school were her 
starting point to search for orientation. She started to visit mosque lessons and to listen to 
TV preachers whose teaching strengthened her emotional reaction that her devastation was 
based in her disobedience to divine commands. Ruba’s attitude towards Islamic clothing 
suddenly changed from rebellion to acceptance because of the idea that it offered 
protection from sexual immorality:  
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So that is the story of how I started to like the niqāb, because I found religion to be 
right. Also, the notion that speaking to Ali was unlawful - to speak to a guy and 
love him if there is no lawful connection between us or my family doesn’t know -
[was proved to be right]. 388 
 
 
 
5.4.3  Religious observance and the longing for independence  
 
The feeling of sexual guilt and regret was the motivation for Ruba to start on her journey 
towards religious observance. At the time of my research, she had moved on beyond 
gender issues. She had started to pray regularly, engage in personal dhikr and memorise 
the Qur’an. In contrast to other case studies, Ruba was not recruited into the da‘wa 
movement by another person, which explains why she has remained on the margins of the 
movement rather than committing to a religious teacher or institution. Her earlier dislike 
for pressure and the thoughtless following of rules turned her away from the mosque 
lessons that she visited, although she said that she would prefer to attend lessons if she 
found a dā‘iya whose personality she liked. Instead, she regularly listened to TV preachers 
as a way to learn as much as possible about Islam, trying to avoid what she saw as the 
uneducated, minimalist approach to Islam that she had grown up with.  
 
Ruba was convinced that her experience had proven Islam as trustworthy and her own 
subjective tendencies as false. Yet her approach to devoutness also showed the tension 
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between this conviction and her own desire for independence. This became clear when we 
talked about women’s equality and the possibility of modernist Qur’anic interpretations.  
 
On the one hand, Ruba held on to a literalist Qur’anic and sharia interpretation that was 
very similar to the views taught by dā‘iyāt like Sawda or Zaynab, defending discriminatory 
laws concerning polygamy and female inheritance and witness. She argued that the 
distinctions made between men and women were based on the different natures of both 
genders and that they protected women, for example from having to seek employment 
because the inheritance laws put the obligation of material provision on the men. 
According to her view, any society in which women have to work to provide for their 
families, failed women. Ruba admitted that in reality, many women do so. Yet rather than 
adjusting the sharia to this reality, the circumstances should be adjusted to the ideal society 
according to the provisions of the sharia. She argued that the sharia could not be changed 
for two different reasons: Firstly because of the divine revelation, which was universally 
valid, rejecting the idea that the historical context could limit its mandatory validity and 
influence the development of authentic interpretation. Secondly, she reasoned that the 
created nature of men and women did not change: Women were emotional and needed the 
protection that laws, which might look discriminatory from a Western perspective, offered. 
For example, they needed to be married and therefore polygamy was providing for the 
surplus of women. 
 
On the other hand, Ruba voiced her personal dislike for many situations that she accepted 
from a religious point of view. Asked whether it was better for her to be married, too, she 
answered:  
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Not better for me. I like to develop my knowledge. […] I don't have this notion that 
I would just sit by myself and close the door. […] But when they say that in Islam 
women sit at home etc., this is not from the perspective that she has no rights, but 
that it is more comfortable for her - so that you can raise your children properly, 
serve your husband, serve your household and obey your Lord.389  
 
Similarly, she accepted and rejected polygamy, saying that, notwithstanding the important 
reasons that might lead to it, in her opinion ‘it is makrūh.  Not just makrūh, but very much 
so, and that is because it has effects that are not good at all.’390  
 
This kind of critical voice is usually not present within the da‘wa movement.  
 
Yet again, concerning gender segregation, Ruba voiced some of the most radical thoughts I 
have come across. She wished to wear niqāb but abstained from it only for practical 
reasons: She had tried it out a couple of times but realised that with the niqāb her 
interaction with men was much more limited if she was to practice it coherently and avoid 
all except the absolutely necessary contact with men; this she felt she could not do as a 
student and later in employment as an engineer. Nonetheless, in Ruba’s ideal world, 
segregation went even much further. She explained to me that women should have their 
own ‘women-only’ facilities and institutions, like public transport, workplaces and 
universities, a concept that is called ta’anīth. 
 
Interestingly, in this area Ruba accepted the thought of evolving religious judgements 
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according to the state of society: Far from the argument that the niqāb is demanded 
because the whole body of a woman is ‘awra, Ruba explained that it had been commanded 
in the Qur’an only after the social situation had become so bad that the women had to wear 
it as a protection against the harassment from the unbelievers.391 She saw the situation in 
her own society as complicated because social interaction in the modern world made the 
niqāb inappropriate in mixed gender work places and educational institutions. On the other 
hand, Ruba saw the niqāb as the divine solution against the harassment of women. 
Likewise, her support for ta’anīth was not an expression of religious extremism but a 
radical answer to her desire to participate and benefit society without having to deal with 
sexual issues.  
 
For Ruba, the distinction between fanaticism and devoutness lay in the question of 
personal choice. The religiosity that she was aiming at was by far not only a question of 
correct practices, but also of ‘spiritual feeling’ and love of God, which compulsion could 
not achieve. The comparison between her description of her own journey and her uncle’s, 
who started to force religious practices on his family, illustrates this: 
The problem was that [my uncle] became religious in a somewhat fanatical way. I 
don't know, maybe to God his religion was correct, but in my view, no, it wasn’t. 
He would come home [from the mosque] and would see that his sister wasn’t 
praying and he would tell her to pray and that it is ḥarām not to. […]  But in my 
view his religiosity was fanatical. He was very fierce in the way he dealt with 
people.392 
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We did not sense the spirituality of anything. That is, you feel in your heart 
something good. […] When you fall into sin then you will say that you now really 
understand why God said not to do that. You start to want it, and you start to 
behave correctly and you see the results of that are really good, and so you want 
more and you say ‘Praise God’ that he taught me how to live.393 
 
Ruba’s wavering, compromising and contradicting herself are expressions of the on-going 
process that she found herself in at the time of our interviews: On the one hand, she was 
moving towards greater religious practice in her quest to gain a good conscience, moral 
purity, respect and spiritual satisfaction. On the other, there were obviously areas in which 
she struggled to practically accept certain restrictions that the Islamic interpretation she 
agreed with theoretically, put on her. This seems to me to point to a lack of conviction. 
Other participants shared with me similar struggles, though looking back from a stage of 
stricter observance they judge their reticence as a lack of strength not conviction. Being 
influenced though not really part of the da‘wa movement, Ruba may remain at the critical 
distance she expressed. Alternatively, her desire for more may move her closer to the 
centre of the movement and to greater acceptance of its teaching. 
 
The perception of being on a journey and moving continually towards greater devoutness 
was felt strongly by all of the five women of this chapter. Yet this perception also 
illustrates how unique each one of them is, as the last case shows. It portrays the youngest 
of the five, yet the one who went furthest in her religious zeal. Nevertheless, she also 
desired to reach higher levels of devoutness. 
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5.5   Farida: Choosing what is ‘best’ 
 
While I was studying at the Sharia Department of Damascus University, one day in 
2005 a figure covered from head-to-toe in black, including gloves and niqāb, 
approached me with the story that God had given her the special obligation to convert 
me to Islam in a dream. At first I felt overwhelmed by her zeal. Nevertheless we 
developed a friendship over the years, trying to understand each other’s religious 
commitment. The concept behind her fervour was the distinction between ‘good’ and 
‘better’ – ḥasan wa aḥsan. It motivated and justified her to go far beyond the obligatory 
in her religious practice. Her choice of extreme veiling was a result of this concept as 
she explained: 
Hijab is obligatory, niqāb is better, and khimār is the best. I always want the 
best and I just can’t be satisfied with anything less. As a teenager I was wearing 
hijab, now I am wearing niqāb, but I am waiting to get my eyes laser operated, 
so that I won’t need glasses anymore and can wear khimār.394 
 
Born in 1986, Farida finished her undergraduate sharia studies in 2008 at the age of 22 
as one of the top students of her year. She got married and started her postgraduate 
studies in the autumn of the same year. After her ‘diploma’ she went on to study for her 
master’s degree in 2009, while at the same time teaching undergraduate students at the 
newly opened Sharia Faculty of Aleppo University and taking care of her child, who 
was born in 2009.  
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Even though we had discussed my research project many times and Farida had helped 
me to find research participants, it was only in June 2011 that she offered to tell me her 
own story when I visited her for a last time before leaving Syria. She did not want me 
to record her, so the following is based on my notes of an informal interview with her 
and the written up account from memory when I got home as well as former 
conversations. 
  
 
 
5.5.1   Choosing religious practice for her father’s sake 
 
Originally from a small village close to the Lebanese border, Farida had spent her 
childhood in Saudi Arabia, where her father had found employment. Only during the 
hot summer months, her family returned to Syria each year, spending the school 
vacations between her village and a second family home in a new middle class suburb 
of Damascus. Similar to Sawda and Zaynab, she described her early upbringing as 
‘traditionally Muslim’: Religious practices like prayer and the hijab were followed in 
imitation of customs but not strictly.395 This changed during her late childhood. 
 
According to Farida, her father played the most important role in the development of 
her religious consciousness. When she was small, he rarely prayed. It seems that her 
father and her uncle who were living together with their families in Saudi Arabia 
became more religious through the influence of Saudi society during the 1990s. The 
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family was living in a Syrian expatriate community; therefore, the men, primarily,  
interacted with Saudis and were influenced by Saudi religious teaching. Farida’s uncle, 
although in Saudi for secular employment, later became the imam of the mosque of the 
Syrian community, and started to be referred to as a ‘sheikh’ back in Farida’s home 
village in Syria.  
 
Her father’s turn towards religion did not seem to have had a huge impact on the 
everyday life of his family at first. For example, even though Farida and her siblings 
were aware that her father disliked the modern media with their sexual contents, they 
watched TV and listened to secular pop music without thinking whether this clashed 
with Islamic morals or not: ‘We were just a normal family with normal media choices.’ 
396 Her parents taught their children traditional moral values and basic religious 
practices like prayer, but they also accepted the influence of the media with different 
values in their home, which meant for Farida that she grew up with these two diverging 
influences without questioning any of them. Instead, she and her sister Khadija, who 
was two years older and very close to her, learned to change their behavior from one 
set of values to the other, depending on the context they found themselves in. To 
illustrate this, Farida described how, as a teenager, she would wear the hijab in Saudi 
Arabia simply because every girl did so in that context, but during the summers when 
she was in Syria, she would wear no hijab and run around the streets in shorts and short 
sleeved t-shirts like most of the girls in her Damascene neighbourhood. ‘That shows 
you that I was not at all convinced of the hijab, it was only something I wore because 
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every girl had to in Saudi Arabia.’397 The tension between the two sets of values did not 
matter to her so long as her social context accepted her behavior.  
In another memory of this time, Farida reflected on her and her sister’s love for belly 
dancing:  
My sister Khadija is a really good dancer, and I remember one day that she 
played music and danced in front of the mirror. You know how sexy Eastern 
dancing is. My father came in and watched without her noticing. When she saw 
him after a while, she stopped embarrassed, but he said: ‘Don’t stop, go on and 
finish your dancing.’ So she went on dancing the whole length of the song, but 
he watched her all the time. She felt so ashamed!398 
  
Similarly to Zaynab’s reflections that her ‘traditional’ upbringing used the criteria of 
‘shameful’ rather than religious norms to guide her behaviour, 399 Farida’s memory also 
illustrates the difference between religiously motivated behaviour and the traditional 
motivation to avoid what is ‘ayb. Farida’s father did not argue with his daughters about 
whether belly dancing was ḥarām or not  - he did not even speak of the question as to 
whether secular music was ḥarām, a conviction that Farida held later – but he tried to 
take the pleasure out of the dancing by making Khadija feel ashamed. 
 
Nonetheless, religion was also part of Farida’s upbringing. In her memory, her parents 
were split when it came to using the approaches of tarḥīb and targhīb. She recalls how 
her mother used fear to make her pray even though she herself did not pray faithfully:  
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My mother always used to tell me this story about a little boy who saw that his 
mother each day started to kindle the fire with small sticks first before she used 
bigger pieces of wood. This boy started to cry and cry, so much so he became 
sick. When the people asked him what was wrong, he said: ‘God will also start 
the fire [of hell] with little ones!’ My mother told us this story and said: ‘Start to 
pray even though it is not yet farḍ for you!’400 
  
It seems that this story had little effect on Farida’s practice, though, as she did not 
really start praying as a child. Possibly the example of her mother, who was lax with 
her own prayer practice, undermined the message. Interestingly, this early memory of 
her religious upbringing already conveyed the message that the obligatory was not 
enough, like the concept of ḥasan wa aḥsan. 
  
Her father, on the other hand, tried to encourage his children to pray without pressure. 
He gave them little presents when they prayed, like a hair clip or a little tract to read. 
Consequently, Farida said that the rare times when she prayed she only did so because 
of her love for her father, not to obey God.  
 
Her father also started to read the Qur’an with his children on Fridays, making this 
reading into a special occasion of time spent with him. Farida told me how much she 
loved her father and longed to spend time with him, so that when he asked on a Friday 
who wanted to read the Qur’an with him, she would always do that, even though the 
Qur’an itself did not mean much to her. 
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Often me and my siblings would all sit around in a circle on the floor with my 
father, one of the little ones in his lap, and he would let each one of us read a 
page. But we only did it because we loved to spend time with him.401   
  
 
 
5.5.2   Religious influences at school 
 
According to Farida, it was the religious teaching at her school in Saudi Arabia that 
triggered a change in her religious attitudes during her teenage years. She remembered 
that it was particularly her year in eighth grade when she started to reflect about what 
she was doing and why. At that time she was 13 to 14 years old.  
 
There were two teachers specifically, who played an important role for her during this 
time. Apparently, her teacher in religious studies in middle school was a gifted 
preacher. She used to teach only half of the class time on the subject according to the 
syllabus. The other half she used to preach. The question of judgement in the hereafter 
was a common theme and she used the approaches of tarḥīb and targhīb with greater 
effect than Farida’s parents had: ‘Often she would talk about heaven and hell until the 
whole class would start weeping. She really made us desire heaven and fear hell.’402 
 
The second teacher was Khadija’s teacher in religious studies, who later also taught 
Farida. However, she had influenced Farida prior to her religious studies lessons.  
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Their school organised special lectures on religious subjects once a week for all the 
students. Farida remembered one lecture in particular during eighth grade, that affected 
her greatly. The teacher was talking about the subject that God was always and 
everywhere with each human being. Her question concerning the students’ lack of 
commitment to religious practice struck home with Farida. The teacher asked them: 
‘How can you do one thing in one place and a totally different thing in another? God is 
in both places and he knows everything!’403 Farida said that both she and her sister felt 
personally addressed as they realised that that was exactly what they were doing with 
the hijab: They were wearing it in Saudi Arabia but in Syria they were not. ‘I realised 
that I was acting as if God was only in Saudi Arabia, not in Syria.’404 This thought 
challenged her to think about her motivation for wearing the hijab. She decided to wear 
it in Syria, too. 
 
By the time Farida started her studies at Damascus University, she had moved a step 
further and had become committed to wearing the niqāb. During my interview with her 
in 2011 she claimed that the teaching she had received in Saudi Arabia had convinced 
her that the niqāb was indeed obligatory, contrary to what she had told me in 2007.405 
This contradiction has its origin in the different interpretations between the four major 
law schools concerning this matter.406 That her personal conviction had become 
stronger in 2011 may have been a response to the niqāb ban in Syria in 2010, or she 
may have tried to soften the question for my sake during the earlier conversation. 
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Another decision she made when she was in eighth grade was to become committed in 
prayer. Proud of herself and happy she told her father about it, knowing that it would 
make him happy, too. However, she soon realised that she found it quite difficult to 
stick with this decision. ‘I got bored with prayer, and I started to do it more and more 
irregularly.’407 With hindsight, Farida saw this as an important experience because it 
confronted her anew with the question of her motivation. There were two problems that 
made prayer difficult for her, one was that she still mainly prayed for her father’s sake, 
and the other, that to do so she tried to get by with the minimum of the obligatory 
prayers. The prayer as such she did not enjoy. Her school teacher had taught them that 
it was enough to pray the farḍ and that, particularly if they were new to prayer, it would 
be easier to only pray the short farḍ and that they should not worry about praying the 
sunna or nawāfil, the added supererogatory prayers. Farida discussed her difficulties 
with her father. He advised her to pray the sunna to solve her problems with her lack of 
motivation, saying: ‘Sunna is like the fence around the farḍ and if you take the fence 
away, the devil will break in and steal the farḍ, too.’408 Farida decided to follow his 
advice. The result proved her father right because when she started to pray sunna in 
addition to the farḍ, prayer became easier. With the years she added other nawāfil 
prayers and learned that prayer gave her happiness.  
 
For Farida, this experience was a turning point in her religious sentiments: She learned 
that going beyond the obligatory was the way to committed religious observance. 
Whereas she had struggled with her commitment so long as she was mainly motivated 
to pray to impress her father, praying nawāfil changed her desire to pray for the sake of 
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loving God. For her, loving God could not be achieved through the minimal fulfillment 
of obligations but through this change in her attitude towards prayer and a practice that 
put emphasis on the desire to be close to God. As Farida explained: ‘I learned to love 
God. Now I talk to him any time, not just during prayer.’409  
 
Looking back, Farida felt grateful towards God that these developments happened 
when she had not yet started to menstruate because her struggles and laxness with 
prayer all predated the time when she became legally bound to pray and skipping 
prayer would have become a sin that she would have to be accountable for before God 
on the Day of Judgment. These thoughts and fears did not trouble her at the time, 
though. Rather, Farida remembers that she was keen to start her period because the 
women in her family used to celebrate a party for the girl, and she felt left out from 
sharing a common experience with her mother and her older sister. Nevertheless, from 
her later perspective, Farida saw these events as a special grace that God had granted 
her because her period started comparatively late when she was fifteen years old. 
 
To illustrate her gratefulness, Farida referred to another student from her university 
course that had not been religiously observant before she started to study sharia. As a 
result of the teaching at college, she started to pray during her first year. Yet she was 
troubled about the question of making up for all the prayers she had missed since she 
started to menstruate and discussed with Farida how many times she should pray in 
addition to the regular prayers. ‘The problem is, that no one knows the answer,’ 
explained Farida. ‘I said to her, pray as many times as you need to find peace about it, 
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because we don't know. So for now, it is all about finding peace in your heart.’410 
Interestingly, Farida dealt with the dilemma of not knowing how many make-up 
prayers would be ‘enough’ by advising her friend to pray until she would find peace. 
She introduced a very subjective criterion to a question that gained its importance from 
the fear of divine judgment for an ‘objective’ shortcoming, implied in the concept of 
records taken concerning obligations fulfilled or not. Yet Farida maintained that the 
subjective feeling of peace was not the ultimate solution, it was only an attempt to find 
a way to live for ‘now’, implying that the ultimate answer would be known only on the 
Day of Judgment.  
 
It is part of the common da‘wa discourse that religious obligations that were not 
observed are seen as dayn, a debt that has to be paid through make-up exercises. For 
example, Sawda taught her disciples during lessons after Ramadan how and when 
exactly to make up for any day they had broken the fast, depending on whether that 
was due to the commanded abstinence from fasting during their menstruation or 
laxness. She argued with them to take their debt seriously, and that they had to pay 
additional kufāra, a compensation, if they had not done so until next Ramadan.411 The 
difference with the debt of years of missed prayer was that its exact amount was 
unknown. Discussions among religious women and repeated teaching during religious 
lessons show that it was an important subject for many women, how to deal with the 
uncertainty.412 The presence or absence of peace or fear of judgment potentially opened 
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the door for ongoing religious efforts. This explains the relief Farida felt that God had 
spared her this uncertainty through her unusually late menarche. 
 
Besides her father and her religion teachers, Farida remembers that religious media 
started to play an important role in her awakened interest in religiosity such as religious 
TV programmes (both preaching and historical movies like ‘The Message’), and 
cassettes she listened to, while simultaneously, the religious teaching at school was 
having a growing influence. She especially remembered one cassette, with a version of 
the popular genre of the qisas al-anbiā’, the stories of the prophets. During eighth 
grade, she went through a phase of listening to this cassette every day when she came 
home from school, over and over again. This coincided with the school syllabus. Farida 
was happy that she already knew the material and was the only student in class who 
knew all the answers. She loved the lessons. When they had exams she excelled 
without having studied for it specifically. This experience made her happy and proud of 
herself and reinforced her religious interest.  
During her later teenage years, Farida recalls, media preachers also had a great 
influence on her, in particular, she listened a lot to the Egyptian preacher Amr Khalid, 
whose TV programmes target young Muslims, and to Tariq al-Sweydani.  
 
The different teaching that Farida was exposed to, the role model of her religion 
teachers at school, and the experience that observance was easier if she went beyond it, 
instilled in her the desire to live up to the highest religious ideals. The following two 
sections will illustrate this through a number of practical choices that she made. 
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5.5.3   Choosing da‘wa over prestige   
 
Farida described herself as a strong personality with the ambition to excel in her 
religious commitment. Her personality also influenced non-religious areas of her life.  
She studied hard during her secondary school years and earned very high results in her 
high school certificate with 96 out of 100 as her lowest mark. With these results she 
could have studied medicine, which demands the highest marks in the Syrian 
educational system.413  
 
Yet Farida decided to study sharia for the sake of da‘wa. This was a surprising choice 
taking into account that the step down from studying medicine to sharia meant a huge 
loss of prestige and economic opportunities.414 I never encountered another student 
who made such a choice, while I met a number of sharia students who had aimed for 
other subjects and ended up studying sharia because of the numerus clausus.  
 
Farida recalled the pressure that her family put on her to change her choice and that 
everybody around her said that she was ‘crazy’ to study sharia. Her aunts and uncles 
tried to convince her: ‘Who on earth would be so stupid and register for sharia when 
she can study medicine?’415 Even strangers tried to make her see reason: For her 
application at Damascus university she had to give multiple choices, and she wrote as 
her first choice sharia and medicine as her last. When the administrator saw her form, 
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he gave it back to her telling she had made a mistake. Farida had to argue with him to 
accept her application forms even after she explained that she had intentionally put 
sharia first and medicine last because she knew that with her grades she would only get 
an offer for medicine if she put it first or second, but that she really wanted to study 
sharia.  
 
Farida had developed a strong desire to work in da‘wa through the influence of her 
sister who had started university two years earlier. Khadija’s exam results allowed her 
to study economics. Like other Syrian students, she registered for this subject 
notwithstanding her lack of interest in it, thinking that maybe after a while she would 
like it. However, she was unhappy and changed her studies to sharia after her first year. 
As the difference between economics and sharia was not perceived as such a huge step 
down, her family accepted her choice without further pressure. Yet one day Khadija 
went with her aunt to see a doctor. While he was examining the aunt, he asked Khadija 
about her studies and rebuked her, telling her that she had made a stupid choice to 
change subjects. Khadija defended herself, saying that even by comparison with 
medicine, sharia would have been a better choice because a doctor only healed the 
body, which necessarily would become sick again, and at the end die. So nothing 
would remain of all his effort. However, she had decided to study sharia to heal the 
spirit because the spirit remained. The doctor apologised to Khadija and acknowledged 
that he had spoken out of place.416 Farida recounted this dialogue with pride. She 
decided to follow Khadija’s example: 
I was very impressed! I started to think a lot about the value of the different 
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aspects of life, and wanted to fill my life with work that remains. So I decided 
studying sharia had more value than studying medicine.417 
 
Farida threw herself into her studies. She read a lot and loved it. She studied hard and 
got very good marks so that she finished her undergraduate certificate in four years, 
which only a few students are able to do, according to my observations. Already during 
her second year, when I was studying with her at the department, other students 
referred to her when they had a question. 
 
Farida said that she became very strict (mutashaddida) through her studies though in 
her understanding her ‘strictness’ was not so much a question of her practice as of her 
religious thinking. She described that during her undergraduate years, she became so 
entrenched in her studies that the lecturers became her highest authority. Everything 
they taught, she accepted without questioning whether there could be a different way of 
looking at things. This development was supported by the Syrian educational system, 
which demands rote-learning and memorisation rather than critical thinking of its 
students.418 During her post-graduate studies, wider reading and in-depth learning 
broadened her way of thinking again: ‘My studies helped me to become less strict. The 
more I studied the more I realised that there are different opinions and that helped me 
to moderate my views.’419 Yet this development remained limited to her scholarly 
thinking, helping her to understand the differences in interpretations and practices. In 
her own practice she still chose to adhere to the stricter interpretations of Islam.  
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5.5.4  Family choices   
 
Beside her choice of studies, the area of family choices illustrates Farida’s priority in 
her work in da‘wa. Farida is one of the few women I have met who are not only 
married but also mothers and still very active in da‘wa. When I asked her how she 
managed to fill the triple role as student, dā‘iya and university lecturer, and mother, she 
laughed: ‘By not having more than two children, and not more than one at a time!’420 
Family planning was one of the important subjects for her when she discussed marriage 
with her future husband. They had met in the traditional way. Her husband was a 
neighbour, who first went to talk to her father after he had observed Farida on the 
streets and gathered information about her and her family. He was attracted by her 
extreme covering and her reputation as a devout student of sharia. Farida also wanted 
to only marry a man who would share her desire for uncompromising religious practice. 
During her years as an undergraduate student, she had expected that if both husband 
and wife agreed that they would live ‘according to Islam’ there would be no conflict 
but perfect union of sentiment and practice on all levels of family life. Yet when she 
met her future husband she discovered that this idea could not stand up to reality. 
Farida said that her husband had a much more traditional ideal of a Muslim family. He 
specifically wanted to have a large number of children and subscribed to the traditional 
role model that expects women to stay at home rather than seek employment. However, 
in the end, he accepted her position that she had an important role as a dā‘iya and that 
more than two children were not feasible if Farida was to persevere in her calling. 
Farida said that she would not have married him if he had not supported her in her 
                                                
420 Ibid. 
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da‘wa. ‘The good thing is that now my husband really wants me to be active in this. He 
encourages me and helps me. Otherwise it would be impossible.’421 
 
For the sake of her religious activism, Farida has been able to make a number of 
compromises with the conservative view of a woman’s role and found a way to follow 
her goal of an independent role through depending on her husband and her extended 
family for support. When her family spent time in her village in Syria, she would often 
leave her husband in Damascus and join them so that the women of her family could 
look after her son when she needed to study. Her husband accepted this arrangement. 
During term time she travelled for two days every week to Aleppo to teach at the 
Sharia College there. However all her arrangements were filtered through her 
understanding of Islamic standards. For example, she would not travel and stay in a 
hotel on her own, but her husband, father or one of her brothers had to travel with her 
to Aleppo. 
 
 
 
5.5.5   Farida’s choices: tashaddud or aḥsan? 
 
Farida’s case is another illustration of the limits of the usefulness of the categories, 
which are often used to describe very devout Muslim women as simply ‘conservative’ 
and ‘traditional’ or ‘strict’ and ‘extremist’. She surely does not fit the category of a 
suppressed woman, even though her many choices were shaped by her submission to a 
                                                
421 Ibid. 
 211 
strict Islamic interpretation. When Farida moved on from the tashaddud of her 
undergraduate years she did not promote a subjectivist way of evaluating religious 
practice and sentiment but understood tashaddud as a narrow-mindedness that is 
ignorant of the diversity in interpretations within the ‘orthodox’ framework. Yet, while 
she rejected ‘strictness’ in the sense of an ignorant judgment of possible orthodox 
answers, she still believed in the possibility of finding and following ‘the best’ practice. 
 
For example, there was no doubt in Farida’s mind that the Islamic sharia would provide 
the best solution to all issues in society if correctly deducted from the Qur’an and the 
sunna and subsequently followed. This included the commitment to the sharia rulings 
about personal conduct, morality and worship on the individual level as much as the 
implementation of sharia on the governmental level, as she claimed: ‘The problem with 
Syria today is that sharia is only implemented in personal law, and even there, not in all 
aspects.’422 Farida deplored it that when it came to other areas like economic law, 
sharia was not taken into account, but only secular law. She saw this as a relict of the 
French colonialism that still needed to be dealt with. For this reason, she had decided to 
do doctoral research in an area of economic law from a sharia point of view once she 
had finished her masters.  
Farida was convinced that a truly Islamic concept of economic law would not only 
obey God’s will but would prove the best practice empirically:  
I know that any system based on sharia will be the best. Not only in a spiritual 
sense, but it will also function best. I hope that even non-Muslim countries will 
                                                
422 Ibid. 
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see the benefits of this system and will introduce it into their economy.423  
 
Another example that shows Farida’s uncompromising attitude once she had certainty 
about the goodness of her choice, is her conviction to wear niqāb. This stance brought 
her into conflict with the Syrian authorities when the government banned the niqāb and 
khimār from schools and university campuses in July 2010.424  
Farida saw the ban as an act to marginalise educated religious Syrians during a period 
when the government felt strong enough to do so. In any case, she argued that no 
teacher would stand in front of her class wearing a niqāb because the niqāb would 
negatively affect the communication between the teacher and student and deprive the 
students of the right to see the teacher’s face. Most of Farida’s colleagues who were 
munaqqabāt were teaching in girl’s schools or in elementary school and were only 
teaching children, so they came to school in niqāb and took it off when they taught. 
When it came to university staff, according to the proponents of the niqāb a woman 
would not teach men anyway, because her voice is seen as attractive as her body and 
therefore part of a woman’s ‘awra in extremely religious circles. Farida herself taught 
only female students, she wore the niqāb on campus and took it off only when she was 
in the classroom. 
 
Farida remembered that when the ban was issued she didn’t know what to do. In her 
opinion, people who were saying that the niqāb was not an important question because 
it was not obligatory were wrong because at least in shafi’i law the niqāb is farḍ.  
                                                
423 Ibid. 
424 Acc. to Al Arabiya News, 22. July 2010, [22.07.2011] 
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2010/07/22/114525.html 
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It is my conviction that to take off my niqāb would be against God’s will. I 
would never do that! No man has ever seen my face on the street. It was very 
hard on us munaqqabāt, but I have a strong personality. Nearly all of my friends 
decided to take off their niqāb because they did not want to lose their work. I 
called my husband who was travelling in Saudi Arabia to ask his opinion. He 
said: ‘If they demanded of you to stop praying, would you do it?’ I answered: 
‘Of course not’.425  
 
Farida was glad that her husband was supporting her and decided to continue wearing 
her face veil. She recalled how the next time she entered the Sharia Department, the 
dean called her into his office. Yet he did not dare to confront her directly or ask her to 
take off her niqāb but just looked at her hidden face angrily. So she remained teaching 
there even though she did not follow the government’s orders. When the ban was lifted 
Farida felt vindicated that she had defied the government and followed her own 
conscience. Her friends and colleagues who had stopped wearing the niqāb returned to 
wearing it, but she felt that once they had shown their faces to everybody the niqāb had 
lost its meaning for them: ‘They lost their special reward.’426 
 
Farida held on to a contested piece of clothing under very difficult circumstances, 
jeopardising her employment. Though many Syrian Muslims would judge her action as 
‘extreme’ and ‘strict’ these categories were not adequate evaluations from Farida’s point of 
view. ‘Strictness’ and ‘extremism’ were ways of thinking that did not take all opinions into 
account. Religious practice, on the other hand, was to be judged according to the question 
                                                
425 Interview with Farida, Damascus, 16.06.2011. 
426 Ibid. 
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as to what length people would go to for the sake of God,  and so long as it was for him 
and not for someone else’s sake, the farther, the better. In Farida’s mind, difficulties that 
needed to be conquered only added to the appeal to give one’s best and hope that God 
would reward the pain suffered for him. In another context, Farida illustrated how hardship 
stimulated her desire for the best because of her hope of divine reward: ‘I am so happy that 
Ramadan is moving into summer, because the more difficult the fasting, the better! Praise 
God who will give us more reward!’427 
 
 
 
5.6   Conclusion 
 
The five cases of Sawda, Zaynab, Aisha, Ruba and Farida do not show any sensational 
breaks with the past or spectacular ruptures with their original communities. Rather, their 
journeys to devoutness took place within the framework of known religious expressions, 
albeit moving towards the extreme end of it, and within the general trend in Syrian society 
that provided growing acceptance of religious display and activities. Interpreting their own 
past, these women take an ambiguous stance towards their original communities: On the 
one hand, they claimed continuity as part of the Muslim umma and a society and culture 
that had been shaped by Islam. Starting their journeys with the self-perception of being 
Muslim, it seems that none of them ever asked whether a different choice could have been 
made that could have led her outside of this framework. Therefore, their desire for 
meaning and fulfillment was connected with the religious elements that surrounded them 
                                                
427 Conversation with Farida, Damascus, 03.10.2007 
 215 
and were part of their identity. On the other hand, they also claimed discrepancies between 
their communities and Islam, diagnosing the absence of religious knowledge, meaning and 
practical commitment that ‘true Islam’ demanded and which they re-discovered for 
themselves and, as preachers, for their communities. This ambiguity finds its expression in 
the discursive opposite of ‘normal/traditional’ versus ‘religious/knowledgeable’.428 In these 
narratives, the opposite of the religious woman is not the atheist, nor the dramatically 
sinful person, but the woman who lives a life that is characterised by gradual indifference 
towards Islam even if she believes in the basic tenets of Islam and follows religious 
performance as far as they are cultural customs.  
 
To what extent their journeys are part of the developments in society is most obvious in the 
first three cases: Sawda is the only one whose childhood and teenage years fall into the 
main period of government-supported secularisation in Syria. It is her generation that 
experienced the most far-reaching shift toward mass education. The new access to higher 
education through ANC as a response to the secular trends in society changed her 
biography from an uneducated seamstress to a religious activist with a university degree. 
For the next generation, education had become the norm for wide parts of Syrian society, 
especially in the urban areas. With increasing education, growing mobility and technical 
progress, the influence of religious teaching at school, at the religious centers and through 
the media was growing, too. Zaynab’s story demonstrates how the availability of religious 
information, symbols and values at school and in her circle of friends prepared her to 
attach herself emotionally to a religious figure when she went through the crisis of 
                                                
428 Comp. the similar findings among Egyptian students by Werner, Between 
Westernization and the Veil: Contemporary Lifestyles of Women in Cairo: 109-17. 
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adolescent love. This attachment then became the motor of her choices that led her to 
religious studies and da‘wa.  
 
Aisha’s case has in common with Sawda’s that even though she belongs to Zaynab’s 
generation, her original educational and biographical choices were much more limited as 
the development of her rural community was lagging behind the urban centres. Her access 
to religious knowledge was only indirect through her brother. In her case, devoutness went 
hand in hand with her desire for self-determination in her marriage and her struggles with 
the patriarchal village norms. Ruba’s narrative differs from the rest, as her experience of 
sin led her to the acceptance of a life-style that she had originally rejected as too restricting. 
Farida chose the most extreme form of devoutness among these women. This is not only 
due to the influence that Saudi teaching had on her but also symptomatic for the ongoing 
process towards more extreme forms of religiosity in parts of Syrian society. However, it 
also concurred with her own experiences that going beyond the obligatory enabled her to 
be committed in religious practice and gave her personal satisfaction.  
 
Each participant was additionally shaped by her own personality and individual 
circumstances. However, they all have in common that they see God’s call or even 
intervention as the major reason behind their journeys. This raises the question of how they 
understand their choices and the question of power. The next chapter will look at this, 
based on the recurring themes of their narratives. 
  
 217 
 
 
 
PART THREE: ANALYSIS 
 
 
  
 218 
6 SOCIAL EMPOWERMENT ON THE JOURNEY TOWARDS DEVOUTNESS 
 
 
In Part Three I will analyse what makes Islamist devoutness attractive to my research 
participants based on my case studies and additional data. Looking at the issue of female 
empowerment and the question of why Islamist women claim some yet deny themselves 
other areas of power and participation of public space, I will argue in this chapter that 
solidifying the confines of women’s lives to privacy and segregation facilitates the 
women’s da‘wa movement as much as the new female religious activism. As a secular 
lifestyle and public participation are seen partly as contradicting piety because of gender 
issues, religious women are choosing not to take part in this sphere, but to be active in their 
parallel community of ‘sisters’. I will look at how the concepts of empowerment, choice 
and compliance shape the relationship of religious women to their culture, their families 
and communities, and the government, as well as the relationships within the da‘wa 
movement. 
 
However, this is not the only way in which female empowerment can be understood in the 
context of the women’s da‘wa movement. Therefore chapter 6 will explore how my 
participants understand their individual change towards the devoutness for which they are 
striving as ‘empowerment’, not on the social but on the individual religious level. I call this 
‘religious empowerment’ in distinction to ‘social empowerment’, which I will look at in 
the following sections. With this distinction I aim at giving a complementary account of 
my participants’ journeys and thus come to a more valid understanding.  
 
 219 
6.1  Empowerment and hiddenness 
 
While women of all different milieus are increasingly visible in the streets of Damascus, 
and many women with a more moderate or liberal lifestyle are present and vocal in the 
political, media and other public arenas, the lives and activities of culturally conservative 
Sunni women remain largely hidden because of their choice to avoid public scrutiny. This 
is particularly true of women’s religious lives even though the behaviour of my research 
participants is both hidden and on display.429 This cultural tendency to secrecy plays a role 
in facilitating the women’s da‘wa movement because it correlates with religious values of 
modesty and gender segregation within the movement and thus helps to avoid conflicts 
with conservative parts of society. Yet at the same time the lengths to which very religious 
women go is often met with opposition and prejudice from other Syrians and therefore 
seems counter productive in avoiding attention. Silence about women’s religious activities 
therefore also helps  avoid contentious public debates about the da‘wa movement while at 
the same time the lack of openness breeds fear in many more secular or moderate Syrians. 
 
In the following, I want to show how the lives of my research participants are shaped by 
the desire to remain hidden in the context of the wider Syrian society in relation to the 
question of female empowerment.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
429 See 3.3. for my discussion of the cultural concepts of seclusion and segregation. 
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6.1.1   Veiling as display and concealment 
 
In 3.3, I have discussed how changes in Syrian society from seclusion to female 
participation resulted in a redefinition of gender boundaries. Even while seclusion was 
widely practiced, women did not always act in accordance with it, as the mother of my 
language tutor recalled, describing her childhood and teenage years in a middle class 
quarter during the 1940s and 1950s:  
All Damascene women wore a black face veil; it was simply the fashion. This veil 
consisted of two parts: a very transparent, see-through black cloth and a thicker, 
less see-through black cloth. The first actually awakened more desire in the hearts 
of men, because the thin material hid any blemish or wrinkle and made the face 
look perfect, accentuating the lines of the face. Before a woman left her house she 
would put on a lot of make up, very red lipstick and kohl to emphasise the eyes. 
Underneath the black transparent cloth they looked extremely attractive. When she 
left her house she would put the thicker veil over her face because of her male 
family members, but once she left her immediate neighbourhood she would throw 
it back over her head.430  
 
It is interesting that these recollections, whether they are representative for the majority of 
her contemporaries or not, give an example of women using compliance to cultural norms 
to gain limited freedom to cross gender boundaries, using the face veil to display their 
beauty, similar to the fashion hijab of some Syrian women. The picture painted differs 
hugely from the behaviour of women in the da‘wa movement today whose extreme forms 
                                                
430 Interview with Bushra and her mother, Damascus, 07.07.2009. 
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of veiling place them outside the general cultural norm, and who, rather than flaunting 
their attractiveness secretly, often leave their veil on when neither religion nor culture 
demand it, e.g. the participants of Sawda’s private lessons always wore their headscarves 
throughout the three to four hours of their stay even though the roof apartment was very 
hot during the summer months and most visitors in my experience would normally remove 
their hijab in a secure private setting because of the heat. This raises the question of why 
they veil and what they communicate through their veiling. 
 
The moderate Islamic scholar Muhammad Habash and the Syrian author Shirin Dakouri 
both argue that the increased visibility of women in headscarves wrongly led to the 
conclusion of an increase of mutaḥajjabāt in Western perception. Rather, both agree that 
the change in attitude towards mutaḥajjabāt  and the end of the ideal of seclusion allowed 
women in headscarves to leave their homes and participate in public space and thus 
become more visible.431 It is impossible to validate either opinion as there is no 
representative data on how many women have started wearing the hijab again during the 
last three decades. Habash told me that, according to his observation, for each woman who 
started to wear the hijab another stopped wearing it.432 My personal observation and the 
perceptions of other interview partners433 differ as I met numerous women who talked 
about their decision making process that led them to wearing the hijab, yet only a few had 
moved the other way. However, there is no doubt that there are also many women who 
come from a background in which the hijab is worn traditionally and whose mothers lived 
                                                
431 Interview with Muhammad Habash, Damascus, 19.06.2011; interview with Shirine 
Dakouri, Damascus, 12.12.2009. 
432 Ibid. 
433 E.g. Zuhair Salim, spokesman of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood said that when he was 
a student, 1969-1971 ca. 20% of the girls wore the hijab, while today about 80% of 
educated women veil in some form. Interview, London, 16.03.2010. 
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comparatively secluded lives, while their daughters today are students or employed, as 
illustrated by the cases of Sawda, Zaynab, Ruba and Farida.434 In any case the re-
emergence of veiling became a visible statement of choice because in addition to the 
public icon of the modern unveiled woman, still present in Syrian society, there is the wide 
spectrum of shapes that the veil has taken on today: from women in very tight clothes and 
striking makeup who add a colourful headscarf as a fashion statement, to women in black 
with face veils and gloves. The veil as clothing as a means to hide has become ambiguous 
in that it provides visibility and hiddenness in a society where it is optional. The majority 
of veiled women in Damascus opt for the manteau and a white, blue or black headscarf. 
However, the clothing choices of my focus research group border on extreme veiling; 
consequently, the more extreme their veiling is, the greater the attention they draw. 
According to surveys I undertook in three main shopping areas in Damascus, gathering the 
data on 1882 women in total, there are about 8 % of women in the busy city centres who 
wear some kind of face veil.435 Yet their visibility is the visibility of the phenomenon not a 
personal visibility because their face veil grants them anonymity. 
 
The hijab is often understood as a visible statement of religious identity in protest against 
the post-colonial rejection of the hijab in the West as well as a tool to publicly claim 
modesty and respectability in the context of a patriarchal culture.436 The diversity of the 
hijab undermines such general explanations. According to my survey, other than the 
                                                
434 Comp. particularly 5.1.2, page 135-139, on Sawda, and 5.5.3, page 206-209, on Farida. 
435 Surveys were conducted in Jisr al-Abyad, 21.12.2009, Sharia al-Hamra, 22.12.2009, 
and the Suq al-Hamidiya, 22.12.2009, on workdays during the late afternoon hours, with 
the highest percentage of women in niqāb or khimār in Jisr al-Abyad (9,5%) and the 
lowest in Sharia al-Hamra (5%).  
436 Comp. e.g. Kamla, "Syrian women accountants' attitudes and experiences of the hijab in 
the context of globalisation"; Tabassum F. Ruby, "Listening to the voices of hijab," 
Women's Studies International Forum 29, no. 1 (2006). 
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munaqqabāt about 44 % wore the unadorned dark manteau and dark or white headscarf 
that dominates the religious scene, 27 % wore loose, ‘modest’ clothes like dressy trousers 
or long skirts and hijab, and 4 % wore a colourful hijab combined with very fashionable, 
tight clothing. 17 % wore no headcovering at all. 
 
According to my research data, the prejudice against outwardly conservative women has 
shifted from those wearing the headscarf to those wearing face veils.437 The former have 
become a broadly respected group in Syria, yet the latter are still judged as the ban of the 
niqāb in 2010 and the subsequent discussions show.438 Thus the meaning that extreme 
forms of veiling convey is more ambiguous, as Syrians who are more moderate often 
expressed to me that women in extreme veiling do so without choice because of family 
pressures and the backwardness of their communities.439 
  
For women who have chosen to wear niqāb or khimār for religious reasons, their choice, 
though more visible than the average headscarf due to its rarity, seems to be ignored by 
many Syrians and therefore any possible statement is not understood in wide parts of their 
society. Accordingly, women within the da‘wa movement, like Zaynab, told me numerous 
times that even though they would prefer to wear the niqāb they did not because of the 
pressure against the niqāb from their families and communities. Therefore extreme veiling 
is not a means to increase respectability. 
 
                                                
437 For example Syrian author Shirine Dakouri voiced these prejudices in my interview 
with her, Damascus, 12.12.2009. 
438 Comp. Sami Moubayed, "The strong brand of Syrian secularism,"  Accessed 
08.04.2013, http://www.mideastviews.com/articleview.php?art=487. 
439 Muhammad Habash supported this observation: Interview with Muhammad Habbash, 
19.06.2011.  
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Kamla (n.d.) argues that the choice for the hijab is not so much religiously motivated as 
socially because of the focus on sexuality that is associated with it. The apparent tension 
between devoutness and the struggle of women against sexual objectification while 
seemingly only being trapped in a different kind of objectification as women, who are 
sexually inaccessible, is for her a reason to dismiss religious motivations. 440  Extreme 
forms of veiling aim at hiding women in a much more general sense than a headscarf, 
which aims at covering only those areas of the body that are understood as specifically 
enticing. However, my participants understood the main meaning of any kind of veil as 
hiding female beauty for the protection of society from sexual immorality in obedience to 
God’s command. While anti-Western sentiment was not absent from my interviews and 
conversations with my research participants, devout Syrian women claim that obedience to 
God was the primary reason for the veiling of their choice. Benefits for the whole of 
society were understood as consequences to be expected of the divine order of the world 
and used to rationalise the intrinsic goodness of the divine command. This is true 
especially for the debate about male and female sexuality. In my participants’ worldview, 
rather than a tension, the way male and female sexuality are perceived integrates into the 
understanding of the religious question and is seen as yet another example that proves the 
correctness of their religious convictions. For this reason the aspect of modesty and the 
need to protect society from sexual immorality, which would inevitably follow the display 
of female beauty, was discussed often among my research participants in a cultural-
religious circular argument. They used cultural notions of what is sexually attractive as 
proof for the rationality of religious norms, and religious norms to ascribe sexual meaning 
to certain behaviours, such as wearing red clothes or shaking hands, or the beautiful smile 
                                                
440 Kamla, "Syrian women accountants' attitudes and experiences of the hijab in the context 
of globalisation" 14. 
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of a woman as in Zaynab’s story.441 In the same way, they argued for other, less visible 
religious practices, which were adhered to in obedience to God and explained as the 
rationally best way to live, because the creator designed the world accordingly. For 
example, Sawda explained to me that prayer was not only good from the spiritual 
perspective but also ordained by God as physically healthy exercise.442 
 
The question of veiling is only part of the whole concept of gender segregation and the 
rejection of cross-gender contact other than within the families or according to necessities. 
The term for cross-gender contact ikhṭilāt, literally ‘mixing’, is usually used within the 
da‘wa movement with a negative connotation even though differentiations in how much 
‘mixing’ is necessary and appropriate are made. Avoidance of ikhṭilāt is seen as one of the 
signs of a pious life. Sawda, e.g., described her mother as ‘one of the pious people, there 
was no ikhṭilāt.’443 The example of Ruba and her ideal of ta’anīth, the concept of a parallel 
women’s sector  shows, that the religious demands were seen as going far beyond cultural 
values, practices, and necessities, both traditional and new.  
 
This example, like the unattained desires for niqāb, show the confusion that seems to be 
inherent to the subject of ikhṭilāt among my research participants: On one hand, the 
necessity for cross-gender contact is accepted and women are supported and proud of their 
participation in education and employment in a gender-mixed society. Accordingly among 
the devout women who participated in my research were an architect, a university lecturer, 
a medical doctor, an engineering student, and other professional women. At the same time, 
                                                
441 Comp. 5.2., page 144. 
442 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009. 
443 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009. 
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in lessons and conversations there was a strong undercurrent that upheld extreme gender 
segregation even within the extended family as the pious ideal. The same tension shows in 
the difference between ‘word’ and ‘deed’ at the ANC: while female participation in 
education and employment is lauded and demanded during lessons because ‘women should 
benefit the whole of society’, activities among the attendees at ANC are organised to keep 
the highest standards of gender segregation - female students have separate lectures, 
entrances, halls, corridors and lifts. Yet during my research, participants repeatedly 
expressed a desire for more gender segregation. The tension between participation and 
segregation is seen as a result of the discrepancy between the cultural and social reality of 
ikhṭilāt in Syria, to which they agree to comply, and the religious ideal. Hence their ideal 
of gender segregation, whether observed or compromised, cannot be understood as a result 
of compliance to their culture. This is even more obvious in their expressions of 
dissatisfaction at the necessity to compromise for women like Ruba dream about 
organising Syrian society in a way that would allow women to study and work in parallel 
‘women only’ settings comparable to Saudi Arabia. Similarly Ibtisam, another dā‘iya at 
ANC, recommended Saudi segregation as an example of protection for women.444 
According to Barout ta’anīth, this is not a traditional idea but a recent development, which 
he sees as a result of the participation of very religious women in the Syrian work force.445  
 
These examples show that some of my participants see strict gender segregation as 
empowering because it frees them from the limitations of gender mixed contexts. The 
creation of ‘women only’ spaces would provide them with the choice to define the distance 
or proximity to strange men. Similarly, through the choice of veiling, women can partly 
                                                
444 Conversation with Ibtisam, Damascus, 23.11.2010. 
445 Interview with Mohamed Jamal Barout, Aleppo, 04.12.2009. 
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determine the kind of relationships or contacts they want with the society around them. 
The face veil especially can be used to create distance. Dunya told me about her 
experience of starting to wear the niqāb for the sake of belonging to a Sufi community in 
Jordan whose leader demanded it from all the women living in the community: She said 
that she enjoyed visibly isolating herself as a person, being able to smile or to cry 
unbeknownst to anyone around her and without having to think about other peoples’ 
reactions. She felt that this gave her a sense of privacy no matter where she was, which she 
experienced as liberating.  
 
While a parallel women’s sector is out of reach for Syria’s religious women, in most areas 
of life extreme forms of veiling provide relative distance and hiddenness. From their 
perspective, this is only one aspect of their religious practice. They see it as coherent with 
other forms of religious behaviour that are far less public and noticeable and therefore 
cannot be sufficiently explained through post-colonial theory or as gaining mobility. 
Veiling has been researched too much in isolation from the other aspects of female Muslim 
religiosity.  
 
In a similar way to the display and concealment of women’s forms through veiling, female 
religious activism in Syria is both visible and hidden as I will discuss in the next section. 
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6.1.2   Hiding women’s involvement in the da‘wa movement 
 
On the social level the religious activities of women are both hidden and visible: Large 
numbers of women entering or leaving mosques for lessons are of course visible. The 
recruitment of women for the various religious activities in mosques and to a smaller 
extent in homes is also a visible phenomenon. Yet some activities are organised so as to 
minimise visibility; especially activities in private homes. There are cultural as well as 
political and religious reasons for this tendency.  
 
During the year I took part in Sawda’s lessons in her home, the girls were told not to come 
or leave all together but to do so in twos or threes in order to avoid drawing attention. The 
desire for privacy was also respected by her neighbours: the first time I went to join her 
private lesson, she had told me to ask her local grocer to point out her house to me,yet the 
man in the shop declined to tell me. Most of the recruitment I have witnessed was done by 
mouth propaganda within religious circles. Concerning public activities, preachers may 
announce the start of new lessons for women so that the men in the mosque tell the women 
in their families. Yet, at the same time, in my experience it can be quite difficult for an 
outsider to gain any knowledge of women’s activities. In attempts to attend local mosque 
lessons for women I experienced problems gaining any information from mosque 
caretakers who refused to tell me when women had lessons. The Muhammadi Mosque in 
Muhajirin area, which is connected to the Qubaisiyat,446 for example, was a very active 
mosque. The men of the neighbourhood and shopkeepers thronged in big numbers to 
prayers on all days and frequent special events like mawālīd for the men were audible from 
                                                
446 Acc. to Bushra, who grew up in the neighbourhood, conversation, Damascus, 
15.02.2010. 
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my flat, three streets away. I had observed that large numbers of women entered the 
mosque at different times, and went there to ask for information about women’s lessons so 
I could attend. Not only shopkeepers in the vicinity, but also the caretaker of the mosque 
denied any knowledge of activities for women in the mosque. 
 
This was not a singular experience. Of course the reason for this may have been that they 
did not want a foreigner involved even though I had dressed in hijab to be able to enter the 
mosque. Yet I heard of Syrian friends who had similar experiences, e.g. the husband of one 
of my friends asked a female colleague attending lessons for information for his wife, but 
was not given any.  
 
If this is true of public lessons in mosques, it is even more so concerning religious 
activities for women in homes such as lessons, mawālīd and other devotional meetings. All 
activities in homes are much more hidden from scrutiny and only accessible via personal 
invitation. While activities in the mosques are to a degree under government observation 
and control, activities in the homes are much less so. All such meetings were actually 
prohibited under emergency law, which restricted the freedom of assembly and stated that 
no more than five unrelated people were allowed to gather together.447 Though these 
private lessons are happening all over Damascus and at least the neighbours will know 
when women come regularly in larger numbers and will hear if audible worship like sung 
dhikr takes place, government control is comparatively reduced as the dā‘iya invites 
women she considers trustworthy. 
 
                                                
447 Acc. to a secret service officer who questioned me, Damascus, autumn 2005. 
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Culturally, to remain in the private sphere and not publicise their activities is part of the 
image of modest female behaviour and attitude. To comply to this makes women’s 
activities more respectable and will make families more accepting if their female members 
want to join. The cultural demand of segregation also makes it less acceptable for the 
government to interfere with these activities.  
 
On the other hand, da‘wa is necessarily a public activity if women try to propagate Islam 
widely. Therefore, their activities are not confined to lessons or other specifically 
‘religious’ occasions: ‘Everything can be da‘wa!’448  Whereas public preaching is one of 
the main activities for da‘wa, my participants can interpret every personal interaction in the 
light of da‘wa. As women who bear the signs of their religious affiliation visibly with them 
every time they leave their homes, they try to attract others to Islam through moral 
uprightness and simple acts like returning the money if a shopkeeper has given them too 
much change. Hiba, one of the teenagers who attended Sawda’s private lessons, told how 
she likes to approach other girls of her age group on the street: 
I ask them: ‘Why are you not wearing hijab?’ Many girls want to do what is right 
but they feel they don’t have the strength to go through with it. I always hope if I 
talk to them that there is one like that among them and my speaking to them will 
encourage her to start wearing the hijab.449 
 
Female religious activists are trying to walk a fine line between publicity for the sake of 
winning more women and concealment for the sake of modesty and segregation. The 
parallel structures of women’s activities facilitate a new platform for social activities 
                                                
448 Dr. Halima, one of the dā‘iyāt at ANC, interview at ANC, 14.06.2011. 
449 Groupinterview during Sawda’a private lesson, Damascus, 29.11.2009. 
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among women beyond the private sphere of family and neighbourhood, and for female 
leadership.  
 
In addition, my participants voiced the need to remain under the radar of the government. 
In the next section I will look at how the hiddenness of female religious activism shapes 
the relationships in the political arena. 
 
 
 
6.1.3   Veiling the relationship between the government and religious activists 
 
To remain partly ‘hidden’ facilitates the women’s da‘wa movement because it prevents 
appearing threatening to the government. Since the uprising of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, the government dealt with religious movements in Syria according to whether they 
were seen as a threat or not. The Muslim Brotherhood, for instance, was persecuted 
because it was reaching for political influence. Scholars and groups who supported the 
legitimacy of the government were tolerated, such as Ramadan Buti,  those close to al-
Fatih Institute and Ahmad Kuftaro.450 However, as Pierret (2009) has argued, the pro-
government religious milieu was not simply a number of pawns in the government’s 
hands.451 They shared the interest of the Islamisation of Syrian society on the level of 
individual piety and morality with the political Islamist movements, yet they co-operated 
with those in power. For the government, the support of the religious Sunni groups played 
                                                
450 Islam, "The Qubaysiyyat: The Growth of an international Muslim Women's Revivalist 
movement from Syria (1960 - 2008) " 175-76.  
451 Pierret, "Sunny clergy politics in the cities of Ba'thi Syria." 
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such an important role because given the oppression of any kind of political opposition or 
civil movement, the only non-governmental infrastructure in the country belonged to the 
religious groups, which the government could not extinguish but needed to control to keep 
in power. 
 
This relationship has not been without tensions as the government tried to interfere with 
the non-political Islamist milieu. While on one hand it has tried to be seen as a supporter of 
Islam, building mosques and institutes of Qur’an memorisation, on the other hand it has 
tried to curb the rise of Islamic influences in Syrian society even considering moderate 
Islamic groups. For example in 2004, the government interfered with the private institutes 
of higher religious education like the ANC and al-Fatih, prohibiting the registration of 
foreign students to study sharia.452 On a smaller scale, foreigners have been prohibited 
from attending the lessons at Zahra Mosque in Mezze even though this was a very 
moderate mosque under the leadership of Muhammad Habash.453  
 
The same tension between co-operation and struggle for control characterises the 
government’s relationship with the women’s da‘wa movement. The ministry of awqāf, for 
example, employs women specifically to control the female preachers. Huda Habash for 
instance was employed to visit the dā‘iyāt teaching lessons at mosques to make sure that 
they were not preaching an extremist Islam interpretation that fuelled violence or anti-
sectarian sentiments. Dā‘iyāt who did not comply to government regulations lost their 
                                                
452 Hamidi, "Fi surīya al-'ilmānīya, Kuftāro yudāfi' 'an "al-wasatiyya li-qat' al-tarīq 'ala al-
tatarruf al-islāmiy"". 
453 Interview with Huda Habash at her home, Damascus, 18.06.2011. 
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licence to teach.454 However, even though Huda Habash herself co-operated with the 
government and took a moderate stance in many religious questions, she also had to 
comply with the government regulations that restricted her lessons to Syrians only. 
 
Individual female preachers were banned from teaching in mosques, like Zaynab, who had 
to stop teaching in her local mosque after the ministry of awqāf withdrew her licence in 
2010. Nevertheless, the government had to balance the gains against the losses when it 
came to controlling women’s lives so that it would not estrange large parts of the 
conservative population.455 This strengthened the women’s da‘wa movement specifically 
concerning religious activities that took part in the private sphere because of the 
resentment at probing into women’s private lives. Thus Zaynab, though no longer able to 
teach publicly, could still teach in home groups and had lost no influence in the private 
relationships with the women of her home town. However, these relationships and her 
influence were not necessarily visible to someone who was not part of their group. This 
example shows that because women’s religious activism had never taken place exclusively 
in mosques and was majorly a grassroots movement, the private networks along which it 
grew helped to limit the government’s control over it. Avoiding publicity helped to 
maintain this. 
 
The government also seemed to want to keep the degree to which the Islamic revival had 
permeated society off the public agenda. The official line until the uprising in 2011 was 
that no religious movement in Syria existed. Extremism was denied to play a factor, even 
though there have been singular incidents of the government fighting so-called ‘terrorist 
                                                
454 Interview with Huda Habash at her home, Damascus. 23.12.2009. 
455 Böttcher, "Portraits of Kurdish women in contemporary Sufism," 196. 
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cells.’ For example, the government stopped an attack against the UN in Mezze, 
Damascus, in April 2004, and a cell belonging to the terrorist organisation Jund al-Sham 
was broken up by the security services in Daf al-Shawq, Damascus, in summer 2005.456 In 
September 2008, a car bomb killed 17 in Sayyida Zaynab, which was seen as a spillover 
from the sectarian killings in Iraq.457 These incidents reinforced the main argument against 
political opening and real reforms to be the threat of radical Islam. With this argument, the 
government played into the fears of the secular, moderate and religious minorities. On the 
other hand this prevented a discussion about the wider piety focussed movement towards 
more religiosity in Syrian society. In my opinion, the reason behind this is that a public 
discussion could possibly have opened up doors generally for political and social 
discussions about the future of Syrian society, which were discouraged because it would 
potentially have led to a polarisation of society with some pushing towards a stronger 
Islamisation, others for secularisation. Many more secular, well-educated Syrians held on 
to the idea that progress would be the end of the old backward religiosity. An open 
discussion about the moderate Islamist movement would have proven this idea wrong and 
questioned the secular basis of the Baath government which mustered the support of the 
secular milieu and religious minorities.  
 
The women in the da’wa movement responded in kind and as described in 6.1.2., I have 
observed many incidences in which women have tried to hide their religious activities. 
While hiding facilitated them because they remained less government controlled, the 
aspect of hiddenness at the same time bred fear and suspicion among parts of the 
                                                
456 Comp. Hamidi, "Al-tayarāt al-islāmiyya tataqaddam fi surīya wa al-sultāt tashunna 
"'amaliyāt istibāqiyya" didd bu'r takfīriyya". 
457 Comp. "Syrian car bomb attack kills 17,"  Accessed 27.09.2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7639137.stm. 
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population. For some women it is more acceptable to go to a mosque than a private lesson, 
e.g., because it is public and more controlled. Yet in a way, the da‘wa movement in Syria 
caters to women who are coming to it from different angles: those who prefer a more open 
approach can go to mosques while those who are attracted to activities that are hidden or a 
personal relationship with a dā‘iya that a private lesson offers may e.g. join the Qubaisiyat 
or commit to other private groups.  
 
A forceful open movement would probably also have resulted in social repercussions, as 
many Syrians held onto the ideal of moderation and religious extremism was looked down 
upon. Even during the recent uprising with its increasing sectarian divide it took months of 
violence for the government, which labelled it as religious extremism from the very 
beginning, to succeed in pushing the revolts into stronger sectarian waters. At the 
beginning, the slogans of many protests were anti-sectarian to prove the government 
wrong, such as the logo on the Sham News Network website on April 22nd, which showed 
the Muslim crescent and the Christian cross. Protestors used slogans such as: ‘We are 
Syrians, not Salafists.’458 
 
A stronger rejection of female religious activism by the wider Syrian public would have 
been detrimental to the movement because women depended on their families’ acceptance 
for their activities. As long as going to mosque lessons and starting to veil are perceived by 
the general public as non-threatening and respectable, families will be more tolerant to 
their female members who want to do so. However, if these activities and practices are 
                                                
458 Al-Jazeera, "Syria live blog April 22,"  Accessed 22.04.2011, 
http://blogs.aljazeera.net/live/middle-east/syria-live-blog-april-22.Comp. as well Samar 
Yazbek, Schrei nach Freiheit  (München: Nagel & Kimche, 2012). 37.  
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seen as extremist or dangerous because religious women are perceived as part of a 
movement to Islamise the society, many families would probably try to stop their female 
member from taking part in it.  ‘Moderation’ in religious matters is seen as a high value, as 
illustrated by the fact that even those research participants practising a more extreme form 
of Islam claim moderation to legitimise their choices. 
 
Very devout women in Syria make choices regarding their religious practices that cannot 
be explained as simple advantages to increase their mobility or participation in public 
space. Their choices go far beyond cultural respectability, even if general conservatism as 
well as new religious trends make the gap between the average Sunni Syrian woman and 
one of my research participants appear smaller from the outsider’s perspective than from 
within Syrian society. Rather they seem to navigate their relationships with Syrian society 
and the government in ways that allow them to follow their ideal with a minimum of 
conflict. In the next section I will look at how their relationship with their community 
affects their choices. 
 
 
 
6.2   Women’s religiosity and their community 
 
While I have discussed the changes in Syrian society in general in chapter 3, I now want to 
look at the way that the change towards religiosity happened in the particular context of 
my research participants’ ‘communities of origin’, that is their families, neighbourhoods 
and colleagues, and whether their turn to devoutness has empowered them in these 
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relationships. Community plays an important role in the development of becoming 
religious, both in the community of origin and the new community of believers, centred on 
a mosque programme or on a religious leader. Religious women address each other as 
‘sisters’ and build an emotional bond within their religious ‘sisterhood’. Notwithstanding 
the egalitarian ring of this terminology, these two are often connected as there are families 
who used to be relatively indifferent to religion and unknowledgeable about it, but have 
rediscovered religious practice and its meaning from the1980s and 90s onwards.  
 
 
 
6.2.1   Changes in the community of origin 
 
As the case studies in Chapter 5 have shown, family members, friends and schoolteachers 
play an important role in the development and decision making of devout Syrian women. 
Interestingly, in three cases, brothers had a special impact on their sisters: Sawda was 
recruited to attend ANC’s middle school through her brother, Zaynab, though more 
directly influenced by her friend and indirectly her brother, was supported by her brother 
when she was looking for a way to attend lessons at ANC, and Aisha’s brother actively 
tried to persuade his sisters to change. In all these cases the brothers were themselves new 
recruits to religious circles. This observation concurs with a wider number of other women 
who mentioned to me that their brothers specifically influenced their development. I think 
the reason for this is that young men are more easily reached by male preachers. Unlike the 
fathers who are busy providing for their families and are often relatively absent from their 
families because of work commitments, young men who are not yet married have more 
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time on their hands. As in Sawda’s, Zaynab’s and Aisha’s cases, the young men were often 
the first ones in their families to get connected to a dā‘i while male preachers had no direct 
access to women.  
 
The five case studies show different examples of how the communities of these five 
women have changed and at least partially moved together towards greater religiosity. Yet, 
while the influence of a community on the individual is an important aspect in each 
woman’s life, her choices are not merely a reaction to the communal development. In the 
first place, the community and family built the emotional connection with Islam that each 
of my research participants mentioned surrounding them with religious symbols, speech 
and ideals. The discrepancy between these ideals and the personal lack of practice and 
meaning could only be bridged in the later development of each participant because it was 
there in the first place. However, in three cases, my participants later became driving 
forces in shaping the general trend towards religiosity in their communities. Aisha and 
Ruba did not show any zeal for converting other women to their convictions. While this 
may also be due to differences in character and family situation, Aisha was the least 
educated and remained unattached to any form of private instruction or to an institution of 
religious learning which was out of her reach during the time of my research. Her 
unmarried, newly ‘converted’ brother seems to have remained the strongest influence on 
her family’s religious practice. In Ruba’s case, her family history had made her suspicious 
of religious pressure and appreciative of religious independence. 
 
The example of Sawda shows a woman who started on her journey towards religiosity at a 
time when the general trend in society was still moving away from it. Though her brother 
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was instrumental in connecting her with Rajab Deeb, her family was not religiously active 
or educated and even her brother did not try to win her by religious arguments according to 
her memories. Neither was her initial reluctance to return to school connected to religious 
questions in her mind. It is not possible to say from her interviews whether her brother was 
deeply or more peripherally involved in following Rajab Deeb. The rest of her family 
seems to have been indifferent at first and later Sawda recalled the critical voices of those 
who saw her as an extremist as well as conflicts with her sister when her da‘wa made her 
break the traditional female role limits. Nevertheless, she also was able to start teaching, 
beginning with her close family and neighbourhood circles. Three decades later female 
family members were attending her lessons and apparently had accepted her as their 
teacher; I encountered at least six of them.  
 
Zaynab described how her whole family moved towards being more religiously observant 
at the same time with her. For example her mother started praying more regularly, and her 
cousin began going to private tajwīd lessons. So when her friend initiated that they would 
practise dhikr together, Zaynab was open to the idea. Yet eventually she moved beyond her 
family practice in her desire for a personal connection with Rajab Deeb and consequently 
her sharia studies. Zaynab’s example and zeal then triggered a ‘da‘wa chain reaction’ in 
her community as through her personal influence her younger sister and her younger 
relative Safiya studied sharia and then initiated women’s activities at her local mosque. 
Other women from her small town have followed their example. Today her sisters, her 
mother and a number of her cousins join Zaynab to listen to Rajab Deeb’s lessons, some of 
them studying sharia at ANC.  
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Farida and her family differ from the other cases as she grew up outside Syria. Still, her 
story is similar to that of many other families who moved to Saudi Arabia or the Gulf 
countries because of economic hardship in Syria and were influenced by Wahhabi Islam, 
even though they lived in Syrian expatriate communities. Her father affected her emotional 
link with religious practice, but it was her schoolteachers who impelled her to move 
towards an individual, personal religious commitment and sentiment. However, Farida, 
together with her sister, also became a religious initiator in her family as she moved from 
common religious practice to follow an Islamic interpretation that is close to Wahhabism, 
rejecting compromise. For example, she admonished her mother about covering her face 
when I was visiting her.  
 
Farida’s correction of her mother’s behaviour was not a singular case according to my 
observations. For instance, Um Kulthum, one of Sawda’s followers and an English 
literature student in her early twenties, said about her father:  
The Qur’an tells us not to be angry. My father is someone who gets angry really 
easily. This is natural, but to remember the Qur’an helps to stop being angry and to 
forgive. Now if he gets angry I quote Qur’anic verses to him and he stops.459 
 
In this example, Um Kulthum expresses that ‘now’, after having received the knowledge of 
the Qur’anic verses against anger in Sawda’s lessons, she has gained the competence to 
rebuke her father even at the highly emotional moment of his anger. The involvement of 
women in the da‘wa movement as a new phenomenon has brought with it a shift in the 
way that the generations relate to each other. Traditionally younger women learn from 
                                                
459 Group interview during Sawda’s private lesson, Damascus, 22.11.2009. 
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older women and listen to their advice. In groups, rather than seeking out the attention and 
approval of their peers, according to my observations, young women often address the 
conversation to the oldest woman present, asking her advice. For instance, during a 
religious meeting Dunya turned to an old, white-haired woman she had never met before 
and asked her whether she could help her with the interpretation of a dream that had 
unsettled her. To openly contradict and criticise an older person is traditionally seen as 
rude. During one of her public lessons Sawda grew extremely annoyed with an old woman 
who audibly finished her sentences for her. When Sawda tackled this, in contrast to 
confronting younger women directly she did not address the older woman but looked in the 
opposite direction, and the other attendees were noticeably embarrassed by this conflict. 
  
The new opportunities to gain religious knowledge and the recruitment of younger women 
into the da‘wa movement means that now they tell their mothers and fathers how to 
practise Islam correctly. The fact that young women correct their fathers means that, de 
facto, they are challenging the patriarchal cultural norms. These challenges are not 
understood as generational or personal conflicts; rather, my participants agreed with the 
cultural norms of honouring older people, especially their parents. Yet because of the 
primary importance that correct Islamic practices and sentiment had for them, they 
counteracted the traditional hierarchy if necessary. Religious leaders especially, 
independent of their age, were treated with the respect due to an older generation, for 
example, when older women tried to greet their teacher by kissing her hand. This inversion 
of positions was intensified through the fact that, according to my research participants, 
while many young women were reached through their brothers, their parents are often 
reached through the children. 
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In families in which the parents did not follow their children’s newly found religiosity this 
could lead to ongoing conflicts. For example, Dunya discussed with me how difficult it 
was for her to live at home because she fought constantly with her mother, telling her to 
stop smoking and to watch religious TV channels instead of soap operas, arguing about 
how to bring up Dunya’s younger brother according to Islam.460  
 
The da’wa movement has empowered women to re-evaluate traditional values that were 
generally accepted and taught by their parents’ generation because religious judgements 
and categories like ḥarām and ḥalāl as taught within the movement supersede traditional 
values. Zaynab reflected on the tensions that she experienced and how her new religious 
orientation caused her both pain and freedom in the practical question of whether her 
engagement at ANC justified behaviour that was seen as ‘shameful’ in her traditional 
community. Only after years of standing up to her mother, who had to bear the brunt of her 
neighbours’ indirect accusations, did Zaynab finally reach the inner freedom to say that she 
did not care what people said about her as long as she did nothing sinful. Her later position 
as a religious leader among the women in the mosque, as well as no longer going on her 
own but with a group of women, probably helped to alleviate the gossip.461 Therefore, 
while her turn towards devoutness resulted in a loss of reputation at the beginning, her 
religious engagement provided a new community of women who shared her values. Being 
part of a group made her activities less suspicious. In addition, criticism in her community 
of origin diminished as her new position of religious leadership further strengthened her 
                                                
460 Jansen describes similar observations, comp. Jansen, "Contested identities: Women and 
religion in Algeria and Jordan," 84-86.  
461 Comp. page 169-171 
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reputation. Similarly, Farida’s choice of religious studies over other more prestigious and 
prosperous subjects against her family’s will illustrates her power to set her own priorities 
based on religious versus social gain.462  
 
In these instances, higher religious education has led to a reversion of the authority 
between the generation of young Syrian women and their parent generation: comparing 
this generation of women, who are now in their twenties and thirties, with their parents 
who are now in their forties, fifties and sixties shows major differences in women’s 
education generally. As I have discussed in 3.3, the mother generation of the women in my 
case studies had far less access to education, secular as well as religious, during their 
childhood and teenage years. When the first opportunities for female religious education 
started to come up they were busy with their families. Accordingly, an institute like the 
ANC targeted girls in their high school years in 1975 before they started regular women’s 
lessons that were accessible to the wider public in the 1980s.463 As a result, in a family like 
Sawda’s, the younger sister got the opportunity for education and a religious career while 
her elder sister remained comparatively uneducated and led a more traditional life.464 This 
does not mean that the older generation of women have been unaffected by the trend 
toward religiosity, but comparing for example Zaynab and her mother, both started to 
change their practice towards their Islamic ideal. Zaynab’s mother led a traditional life as 
mother of eight and working as a tailor at home, while Zaynab took the opportunity to gain 
higher education and an unprecedented role in her community and even took on leadership 
within the family. In her wake not only her younger female relatives but also her mother 
                                                
462 Comp. chapter 5.5.3, page 206-209 
463 Comp. chapter 4.2.1, page 103-104, and 4.3.1, page 113-114. 
464 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009. 
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started to attend public lessons at ANC and at the local mosque. During Zaynab’s 
childhood her mother did not lead a religious life, she rarely prayed, did not bring her 
children up to pray and did not read the Qur’an. Taking a step further and looking at how 
her grandmother compares with Zaynab and her mother, according to Zaynab’s account, 
her grandmother apparently was a woman who practised a traditional Sufi influenced 
Islam, yet it seems that she did not pass the practice on to her daughter or her 
granddaughter. In a similar case, Ruba delineates the development of religious 
commitment in her family: Her grandfather practised Islam through prayer and Qur’anic 
memorisation, yet his children opted for the alternative of a more secular lifestyle when 
they grew up, drinking alcohol and neglecting prayer even while demanding the female 
family members to wear hijab for social reasons. Similarly, according to Ruba, her parents’ 
generation made these choices because the older generation had not recognised the 
changes in society: the traditional way of religious perpetuation through imitation did not 
work anymore after concepts like secularism, nationalism and communism offered 
alternatives. It was only when religious leaders started to respond to this challenge through 
religious education and when religious practices were re-invested with meaning that the 
trend in Zaynab’s or Ruba’s family reverted.465 
 
Whereas the Islamic revival among men in Syria also started to gain momentum during the 
1980s, the situation for women was different because the accessibility of in-depth religious 
education still needed to be developed and lagged behind the development of secular 
education. In my research participants’ families, the secular education in schools and 
general optimistic expectations of modernity created a gap during which the questions for 
                                                
465 On Zaynab’s family comp. page 153-155, on Ruba’s comp. page 183-184. 
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meaning and reasons of religious sentiments and practices could not be answered in the 
setting of traditional religious upbringing, and religion seemed to have lost some of its 
relevance.  
 
The situation for the fathers of this generation was different as mosques and religious 
teaching were more accessible for them as they grew up, yet the trend especially among 
educated Syrians was not to be religious. What is even more striking is that aside from two 
exceptions, none of my research participants ascribed an important role to their fathers 
concerning religious upbringing. Either they described their father as ‘open-minded’, 
which is often used as equivalent to an educated secular mind-set, or as traditional but not 
involved, or they did not mention him at all. The area in which the influence of some 
fathers played a role is the overlap between religious and cultural norms concerning female 
sexual moral behaviour, but according to my participants, their involvement was driven by 
culture and tradition.  
 
Yet even if the father was religious as in the case of Farida and Manar, he did not pass his 
religious commitment on to his children because he was away from home to provide for 
his family. The case of Farida illustrates that while she was emotionally open to Islam 
through her father, the challenge to change her life and conform to the religious norms she 
had been taught came from women like her teachers and sister.  
 
The re-evaluation of traditional norms and practices within the da‘wa movement also 
becomes visible in the way that female religious activists relate to their husbands and 
children. If my research participants explain the loss of relevance of Islam in their earlier 
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lives through a lack of meaning, a strong emphasis is put on the different kinds of religious 
upbringing of children through religiously educated mothers, to the degree that it was 
mentioned to me as a ‘sign of extreme devoutness’ if a woman taught her children the 
Qur’an.466 Concerning the relationship between husband and wife the cases of Sawda, 
Zaynab and Farida show young women who hold on to new criteria concerning the kind of 
man they want to marry against family pressure. Sawda explained that she wanted a 
husband who would understand and support her in her religious activism, and who would 
‘value her for her achievements’.467 For this reason, she only got married when she was 
already 30 years old. Zaynab was not yet married, and at the age of 34 refused a suitor who 
did not measure up to her expectations at the time of my field research. Farida got married 
young, but demanded of her husband that he would not hinder her religious activism. On 
the contrary, he accepted a number of far-reaching decisions concerning their family such 
as Farida’s regular absence in order to teach sharia and limiting their potential number of 
children. Measured against the high cultural pressure to get married and the wide-spread 
expectations that the husband’s needs have priority over a wife’s independence - another 
friend, for example, got threatened with divorce for being late coming home from visiting 
her parents; when she told me, she agreed that she had been wrong to do so but thought 
that his reaction was too extreme - the decisions of these women are challenging the 
patriarchal values of their communities, on the basis of religious priorities and their 
confidence in the value of their role as dā‘iyāt, while at the same time all three of them 
teach a very traditional understanding of the male and female roles in society.468 A similar 
discrepancy exists between the teaching on marriage and singleness and the practice. 
                                                
466 Conversation with Lamia, her parents, her sister and her friend, Damascus, 28.11.2006 
467 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009 
468 Similar to Zaynab al-Ghazali, comp. Hoffman, "An Islamic Activist: Zaynab al-
Ghazali," 236-37. 
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Singleness is not an ideal nor in itself understood as an alternative to being married. Quite 
the opposite: The ḥadīth ‘marriage is half of my religion’469 is often quoted, and female 
roles are usually discussed within the limits of being a not-yet-married daughter, a wife or 
a mother. However, a number of my research participants were single or married unusually 
late. Ibtisam, for example, explained:  
To be a dā‘iya you need to be free of obligations. I married late, when I was thirty. 
Not that I had planned this but God planned it to give me this time to study and 
think and become able [for da‘wa]. He gave me this honour.470  
 
Their new role as dā‘iyāt opened up an alternative means to gain respect and status.  
A different case is the development of Aisha’s marriage and use of religious dissatisfaction 
to vindicate her detachment from her husband. 
 
These examples show that my participants who have become dā‘iyāt have gained a voice 
that is heard in their families and communities, even though their da‘wa is not necessarily 
always received positively. As sisters, daughters, aunts or even just neighbours they 
intervene with the way other people dress, eat, talk, and other practices, even in the 
smallest details of behaviour. For example, during a lesson Sawda talked about an instance 
in which she had reprimanded a stranger - a mother of a young child who was eating on the 
minibus. She used this story to encourage her listeners to do the same whenever questions 
of Islamic manners were ignored. Zaynab recollected how she reprimanded her mother and 
sister-in-law about an unresolved conflict and how at the end, she was successful in 
                                                
469 To my knowledge, this tradition is not part of the canonical collections acc. as well 
"Answered: 'Marriage competes half of your religion',"  Accessed 11.07.2013, 
http://www.sunniforum.com/forum/archive/index.php/t-3406.html. 
470 Interview with Ibtisam, Damascus, 11.06.2011. 
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reconciling these two women. Though interference is not a phenomenon that is limited to 
religious activists alone, I have often observed that their demands triggered an exploration, 
whether their criticism was religiously well founded or not, because they claim religion as 
the legitimate basis for their interference. A number of the women whom I have met who 
started to wear hijab had at first rejected the demand from a dā‘iya because they did not 
think that the hijab was necessary. My language tutor Bushra, for example, had started to 
read religious texts about the hijab in order to prove her neighbour wrong, but in the end 
came to the conviction instead that she had to wear the headscarf.471  
 
The influence of the general trend in Syrian society towards religiosity in the lives of my 
participants is not a one-way movement. On one hand, the increasing religious practice 
presented them with the option of a stronger religious identity as well as making changes 
easier because of the growing acceptance of these behaviours. On the other hand, as my 
research participants moved from a general moderate practice towards religious activism 
and more extreme forms of devoutness, they became strong motivators of change in their 
‘communities of origin’. This aspect is illustrated especially in the new voice that younger 
women have gained as a result of their religious activism. 
 
In the next part I want to look at how relationships work in the new community of religious 
women . 
 
 
 
                                                
471 Conversation with Bushra, Damascus, 24.09.2009. 
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6.2.2   The role of the new ‘community of believers’ 
 
The degrees of belonging to a new community vary depending on personal history, choices 
and opportunities. For example, among my participants, Aisha had the weakest connection 
to other religious women as a result of her geographic location and even rejected women’s 
involvement in da‘wa. At the opposite end of the spectrum Sawda had a defined place in 
the well-organised hierarchy of the women’s branch of the Naqshbandiyya Sufi order at 
the ANC.472 The most visible communities are those that form around the women’s 
programme of a specific mosque like the ANC or the Zahra Mosque. The communities that 
I have observed are relatively porous and open to women who attend and remain at the 
fringe of an organisation. Sometimes, as in the case of Zaynab, even women who are very 
instrumental in recruiting other women may choose to forego a clearly defined 
‘membership’, yet may still be part of the religious community on the grounds of their 
personal commitment and activities. The title ‘sister’ illustrates this as it is used generally 
for Muslim women or whenever someone wants to express a degree of closeness. For 
example, Sawda would tell me that I am her sister because I believe in one God. Yet the 
use within the movement can also express an exclusivity, for example, Rajab Deeb advised 
the men during one of his Thursday lessons that they should marry women from among 
‘the sisters’, not just any girl so that there would be unity in religious matters in the home: 
in this context ‘sister’ denoted a devout woman who was at least socially part of the 
networks at ANC. In my experience as a participating observer, outsiders are made to feel 
welcome and at least superficially become part of the group very quickly. The  
                                                
472 On Aisha, comp. chapter 5.3.2; on Sawda comp. chapter 5.1.1. 
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permeability of the community makes it easy to join. At the same time, the community can 
oscillate between openness and more defined belonging. 
 
Becoming part of a religious sisterhood, whether a well defined and organised one like the 
Qubaisiyat, or the women’s branch of the Naqshbandiyya at ANC or the loose, 
spontaneous sisterhood of women who find themselves attending the same lessons and 
cherishing a similar lifestyle, is part of the attraction that the da‘wa movement holds for its 
followers. Even though the idea of the brotherhood and sisterhood of all Muslims is not 
new as such, grounding the identity as a member of a ‘sisterhood’ in the concrete 
experience of a tangible community centred around a mosque or a teacher, the self 
perception as the true community of believers is embodied in communal pursuit of a pious 
character, knowledge and worship as well as networking and help in practical questions. 
The new community of believers partly provides services normally provided by the 
community of origin. The above example shows Rajab Deeb’s interest that male and 
female attendees at ANC should marry each other. In other cases young women have told 
me of wives of sheikhs who have kept a list of eligible men and women and then arranged 
marriages among their husband’s followers.473 Even though this example is mundane in the 
context of Syrian culture, it illustrates that the importance of a ‘religious husband’ that my 
participants expressed is a wide spread phenomenon among devout women. The advantage 
of such an arrangement is not only the hope for greater unity but also an expression of trust 
and belonging to the community, just as traditionally the marriage between cousins used to 
be preferred because of the greater security for the woman if she and her husband belonged 
to the same extended family. In addition, the community of believers takes on economic as 
                                                
473 For example in a conversation with Dunya, Amman, November 2006. 
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well as social roles. For example it provides help in financial matters, with education, 
employment and in many other practical areas of life.474 For example, Dunya received 
financial support from another woman to pursue her sharia studies at ANC. For this reason 
an institution like ANC offers many opportunities through its sheer size. As Böttcher 
(2001) concludes: ‘The bigger the network gets the more attractive it is to potential 
disciples.’475 
 
The case of Sufi orders like the Naqshbandiyya-Kaftariyya at the ANC provides a closely-
knit community. Through their hierarchical structures, new members can quickly find a 
place somewhere within the structure where they can relate to other women who are 
learning together with them and to their teacher. While Böttcher focuses on the strict 
hierarchy of the order,476 according to my observations the ANC also attracts many women 
who do not enter into a formal membership. Yet even those women who remain on the 
fringes like Zaynab still can find their own way of feeling part of the community through 
the concept of a spiritual connection between sheikh and follower.  
 
According to Böttcher the Naqshbandiyya-Kuftariyya becomes the new spiritual ‘family’ 
of the follower as the relationships within the order resemble not only those of siblings but 
also that of parent and child. Each dhikr ends with a reading of the succession of sheikhs 
starting with Muhammad and ending with Ahmad Kuftaro as the ‘spiritual genealogy’ of 
the believer.477 Similarly, the women in Sawda’s lessons often referred to her as ummuna 
                                                
474 Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad: 192-93. 
475 Böttcher, "Portraits of Kurdish women in contemporary Sufism," 202. 
476 Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad: 168ff.  
477 Ibid., 170 and 72f. 
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(our mother), tried to kiss her hand, and then touch it to their foreheads, a traditional 
gesture of love and respect towards parents or grandparents.478  
 
While the female teacher is the personal connection to the Sufi order, the sheikh plays the 
main role as the spiritual source of identity. I observed practices which strengthened the 
sense of belonging, including the different, specific kind of wird (litany) of each sheikh 
that is prayed by his followers during their public and private dhikr. Or, as in Zaynab’s 
case, pictures of the sheikh play an important role in strengthening a connection with him. 
When Dunya entered the branch of the Naqshbandiyya-Haqqaniyya she was given an 
amulet to wear around her neck which encapsulated one of her sheikh’s hairs together with 
a handwritten blessing. She believed that these objects connected her to Sheikh Nazim of 
Cyprus. 
 
Yet even if the Sufi communities that I observed were much more closely delineated, they 
were also partly open, notwithstanding their hierarchical structure: a number of my 
participants who were members of the Naqshbandiyya-Kuftariyya took part in dhikr events 
at the Shadhiliyya order. And Dunya, who started as a disciple of Sheikh Nazim, studied 
sharia at ANC, went to private lessons with a teacher who was a member of the 
Shadhiliyya order and then changed her membership to the Shadhiliyya. My questions 
about what distinguished one order from the other were not usually answered. Rather, my 
participants emphasised that all these groups and the different religious institutes in 
Damascus were united in the common goal of teaching sharia and practising ‘true Islam’.  
 
                                                
478 Comp. as well ibid., 170. though Böttcher only records these habits concerning Ahmad 
Kuftaro and his daughter as the highest male or female leader. 
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Among my participants, those with an affiliation with a defined community of ‘sisters’, 
even if a loose one, were generally more active in da‘wa than those who were not, such as 
Ruba and Aisha. Apparently the group did not only provide them with a sense of belonging 
and practical provisions but also offered female models of religious activism and 
opportunities for women to develop leadership skills. 
In the following section I will look at the way in which these communities empower 
women through offering opportunities of female leadership. 
 
 
 
6.3   Female versus male leadership 
 
The Western question of female empowerment was not usually discussed among my 
participants. In practice, of course, relationships within the da‘wa movement were also 
shaped by social power questions: Who has the authority to teach and to interpret? What is 
the relationship between teacher and disciple? AWestern perspective seems to assume that 
women will strive for female authority and will promote it and see it as a positive 
development. Yet during my research I encountered conflicting responses between one 
woman and another concerning female leadership. The relationship between Sawda and 
her sister may illustrate this. During my meetings with Sawda, her sister was present 
though she did not actively partake in the interviews except telling me that she was eight 
years older than her sister and that the opportunities opened up to her sister had not been 
open to her, apparently because of her age. She never married and had stayed on living 
with Sawda when the latter got married. At this point in the conversation, Sawda turned to 
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her sister and accused her of having stopped doing any household work when Sawda got 
married. Sawda said that she had struggled very much doing justice to both her new duties 
as a wife and her work as a dā‘iya when her sister suddenly ‘went on strike’ and told her 
that the housework was now solely her responsibility.479 In most Syrian families, all female 
members share the housework as soon as they are old enough. Yet I had encountered 
similar cases when a woman stopped working. One of my friends e.g. stopped working at 
home after her mother succeeded in pushing her to get engaged; another did the same when 
her husband started to talk about marrying a second wife. It seems that women are ‘going 
on housework strike’ as an expression of protest. Sawda’s sister apparently tried to push 
Sawda to take up her responsibilities as a married woman at the cost of her da‘wa. Her 
support for traditional gender roles may have been due partly to sibling rivalry, yet this 
example shows that the question of female empowerment is not simply a question of male 
versus female interests.  
 
 
 
6.3.1  Female versus male authority to interpret 
 
The first question I want to discuss is the power to interpret the canonical texts.  
My questions on whether women might bring a specific female angle to the understanding 
of the religious sources which might throw a new light on topics related to women were 
usually rejected by my research participants. Rather, like Aisha,480 some of my research 
participants voiced feelings of reserve towards women in religious leadership. Mostly, 
                                                
479 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009. 
480 Comp. 5.3.2, page 180. 
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these reservations were founded on the perception of a difference in the nature of men and 
women, specifically the perceptual and cultural expectation that women are more 
emotional than men. The emotionality of women is usually not understood as negative per 
se but as enabling and disabling according to different circumstances: it is seen as enabling 
women for their specifically defined roles as mothers and wives but as disabling whenever 
something emotionally difficult needs to be done. One example that I heard at different 
times from different people, both religious and secular, was that a female doctor would not 
be able to operate on her own child because her emotions would make her hands shake, 
while a male doctor would be able to dissociate from his feelings for his child in this 
situation and be able to operate with a steady hand. This claim is then used as an argument 
against women in stressful responsible positions. ‘Steady’, ‘firm’ and ‘resolute’ were also 
the words that Ruba used to describe what made a man potentially more suitable as a 
religious leader than a woman.481 According to her argument, being less emotional enabled 
a man to stick with the correct understanding of the Qur’an and the sunna in issues that 
seem harsh, while a woman’s emotionality might make her less reliable in her 
interpretation because of her empathy. From this point of view, a woman is less qualified 
to interpret texts related to women’s issues because of her experiential knowledge of these 
issues and her subsequent emotional involvement. Interestingly Ruba nevertheless saw an 
important role for women as preachers even though she did not envision them gaining the 
authority to interpret: ‘A man has greater influence because he will have greater 
understanding. A woman has greater influence through her personality.’482 Judging a 
woman’s pity and gentleness as a hindrance in questions of interpretation, Ruba considered 
that those same characteristics allowed people to come close to her and be influenced 
                                                
481 Interview with Ruba, Damascus, 23.04.2011. 
482 Interview with Ruba, Damascus, 23.04.2011. 
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through her example and advice.  
 
Ruba’s point of view of the nature of men and women and the way it affects their 
suitability for religious leadership is not an exception but, according to my observations 
and conversations, a shared conviction of many Syrian women. The question of whether 
women should take leadership roles is not simply declined or accepted. In addition, her 
emotional nature is seen both a strength and weakness for leadership. The benefits of 
female leadership are seen in the unique access to women and opportunity to yield a 
greater influence on women because of the personal and emotional relationship that is 
possible between a dā‘iya and her disciple, which is often described as a mother/daughter 
relationship in which the dā‘iya not only passes on knowledge and practical guidance, but 
also provides emotional care and a sense of belonging. Sawda, for example, kept in touch 
with her followers during the week through phone conversations and visits,483 and when 
she invited me to come and listen to the Friday lessons by Rajab Deeb she made sure that I 
knew where she and her followers were always sitting so that I would not get lost in the 
huge crowd at ANC but would come and join them. Mutual ‘love’ plays an important role 
as the dā‘iya tries to provide personal care for her disciples with her teaching and interest 
in their lives. Consequently the disciples are open towards her teaching and eager to follow 
her example. On the other hand the same emotionality is understood to make a woman 
potentially unreliable as an interpreter and therefore her authority should be derived from 
and controlled by male authority.  
 
                                                
483 Interview with Sawda, 19.05.2009; comp. as well Zaynab’s relationship with me as 
described in 5.2.1, 152. 
 257 
In my observation, self-perception as emotionally moveable also allows women to react in 
‘unorthodox’ ways and express emotional opposition to rulings made according to sharia 
which they rationally accept as God given. For instance, Dunya defended polygamy as a 
good institution when we talked about this in a theoretical conversation. Yet when the 
husband of one of her friends married a second wife she rejected this strongly, grieving 
with her friend and condemning the husband’s infidelity. This apparent contradiction 
puzzled me. In contrast to the Islamic feminists who argue through re-interpretation and 
stand up against polygamy on a textual basis, Dunya’s perception of herself as driven by 
emotions opened a back door to oppose in real life what she had to submit to in theory, 
according to her convictions. 
 
Women who agree with the view of the different nature of men and women will not 
indiscriminately support female authority. Yet the limitations seem to be acceptable to 
many women because of the positive value that is connected to the image of female 
emotionality in Syrian culture. The comparison of the role of the dā‘iya to the role of a 
mother underlines that the capacity for empathy is seen as vital to the wellbeing of those 
who depend on her. It is worth noticing that this argument to restrict women’s authority is 
based on the cultural view of the nature of women, not on doctrine. Therefore a cultural 
change could lead to a different position of female authority. 
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6.3.2  The legitimation of female leaders  
 
Practically, many dā‘iyāt are related to a male leader like Huda Habash, who leads the 
women’s activities in her brother’s mosque, or Wafa Kuftaro, the daughter of Ahmad 
Kuftaro, who is one of the women at the top of the female hierarchical pyramid at ANC. In 
many other cases, the imam’s wife heads the women’s mosque activities. In these 
constellations power is derived twofold: while the leading woman gains her authority 
through her relationship with the male leader, who guarantees the orthodoxy of the 
teaching, the leading man gains indirect access and control over the women’s activities 
through a female leader with whom he can confer unrestrictedly.484  
 
However, there has been a significant change in the role of the female preacher because 
legitimacy to teach is no longer only derived from a male relative but also via religious 
education on academic levels. Huda Habash and others described how the wives of male 
leaders used to teach women without receiving much religious education themselves.485 
Today, women leading the women’s activities at mosques are still often related to a male 
leader but are also religiously educated, many building their legitimacy on academic 
credentials from well-known institutes like the ANC, the Sharia Department of Damascus 
University or the attainment of ijāza. Although the mosque in which Zaynab’s sister 
started the women’s programme486 is an example how being related to the male leadership 
                                                
484 Interestingly, growing up in a German protestant vicarage I observed a similar model, 
which was - and sometimes still is - practiced in traditional German protestant circles, 
where often the wife of the vicar carried the responsibility for the women’s activities at 
church.  
485 Comp. page 103. 
486 Comp. page 172. 
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is unnecessary, still, Zaynab’s sister had the backing of her connection with Rajab Deeb’s 
family. 
 
Generally the question of legitimacy is based on the perceived orthodoxy of a teacher. 
With the broadening of religious knowledge among the population through religious 
school education and media there is a general consciousness that the individual Muslim 
can and should ascertain that the religious teaching he is receiving is ‘truly Islamic’: if 
among women in the da‘wa movement, the legitimacy of female authority depends on the 
adherence to what the individual perceives as orthodox Islam, the same is true when it 
comes to the legitimacy of male teachers. As long as the authenticity of Islam is defined by 
closeness to the original sources – independent of the question of how this authentic Islam 
is seen - the dependency of authority is not only a gender-related question. For both men 
and women who attend mosques and private lessons the question of the orthodoxy of the 
teaching is paramount, and women who judge a teacher, whether male or female, as 
incorrect in their teaching, will stop attending. For instance, Jihan and Bushra who had not 
committed to religious lessons, told me of how they tried out different mosques but left 
because the teaching was not ‘truly’ Islamic.487 Accordingly, the religious education of 
women who have attained degrees in sharia studies has been an important step to 
legitimise female authority through knowledge, albeit within limitations. At the same time, 
general religious education has provided women with the ability to compare what is taught, 
who then personally agree or disagree. The trend to higher religious education can also 
undermine the character of the da‘wa movement as a grassroots movement as women 
demand proof of competence from the dā‘iya. Um Salim, for example, one of the older 
                                                
487 Conversation with Jihan, Damascus, 20.04.2011; Conversation with Bushra, Damascus, 
24.02.2009. 
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women in Sawda’s private lessons, shared her frustrations that all her attempts to start a 
study circle in her neighbourhood had been in vain: ‘My neighbours want a woman who 
has an ijāza or who has permission teach in a mosque.’488  
 
The claim that something is ‘Islamic’ or ‘un-Islamic’ is an argument that women on all 
sides use to legitimise their understanding of their religion. While in this claim the concept 
of the one ‘true Islam’ remains unquestioned, de facto each individual makes decisions that 
potentially lead to a more pluralistic reality also seen among religious Syrian women even 
if the questions that they differ on are not always so obvious underneath the unifying 
surface of the visible aspects of their lives like their clothes, the Qur’anic verses with 
which they intersperse their conversations and their focus on worship. For example Sawda 
and Zaynab, though both educated at ANC, differed on the question of whether a Christian 
per se was condemned to hell or had a chance to enter heaven.  
 
Leadership and authority are not only derived from the power structure in a mosque, but 
also from the willingness of individuals to accept a person as their teacher. Herein lies 
some power for the individual religious woman. This leads to the question why some 
women who attend lessons prefer male leadership even if it is not an issue of authenticity 
as for example the strict hierarchical structure at ANC warrants the correctness of the 
teaching of the dā‘iyāt. 
 
The case of Zaynab shows the example of a woman who prefers to be directly connected to 
the male leader at the top even if it means that her connection is not tangible, nor mutual, 
                                                
488 During Sawda’s private lesson, Damascus, 07.02.2009 
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and she has no direct access to her leader but can only listen to him during public lessons 
from far, separated even by a window pane. Due to her status as a student at ANC she had 
the opportunity to meet female leaders and to connect to one of them, which is very much 
encouraged at ANC. Yet she finds more satisfaction in foregoing such a relationship and 
choosing a male leader instead, overcoming her lack of a tangible relationship through her 
feelings of a spiritual connection. The distance from her sheikh also has some advantages 
as it prevents the leader to be too directly involved in Zaynab’s life and decisions as a 
female dā‘iya might be. At the same time, Zaynab’s claim of affinity and connection with 
Sheikh Rajab also gives her a special position and strengthens her sense of her calling. 
Zaynab is not a singular case.489 Apparently at ANC some women use their claimed special 
relationship with Sheikh Rajab to defy their female leaders: during a lesson, Rajab Deeb 
addressed the problem that some women claim to have direct rābiṭa to him and legitimise 
certain behaviours saying that the sheikh had appeared to them in a dream. This shows that 
the preference of a distant male leader can be a way to circumvent the authority of the 
female leader. 490  
 
Other women prefer a female teacher because she is much more accessible to them, and 
they can seek guidance from her in all kinds of questions, some of which they might be 
embarrassed to ask a male teacher, for examples when it comes to questions of ritual purity 
and sexuality. Especially in a huge institution like the ANC the dā‘iyāt create a sense of 
belonging as the comparison with the mother/daughter relationship shows. The relationship 
                                                
489 Böttcher describes similar cases in: Böttcher, Syrische Religionspolitik unter Asad: 174-
75. 
490 Lesson by Rajab Deeb, ANC, Damascus, 12.03.2009.  
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with the dā‘iya provides the disciples with a role model for piety as the following 
quotation illustrates: 
The dā‘iya calls to God in every movement and part of her conduct, so women can 
imitate her. […] When you [as a dā‘iya] become an example, you are able to 
become an example in your way of dressing, your speech and your works.  People 
will see you and they will love devoutness and learning. They will love the level 
you have reached. [Only then] what comes out of your heart will go into their 
hearts.491   
 
Close imitation of the dā‘iya’s everyday conduct is only possible in same gender 
relationships. Many different activities further this, such as social outings, visits, care 
related to childbirth, weddings and death, and religious celebrations. Typically, women 
who attend the mass lessons on Thursday evenings seek to sit with their dā‘iya and her 
circle of disciples.  
 
Within the da‘wa movement diversity exists when it comes to how female leadership is 
viewed and practised, differing from woman to woman. A distinction needs to be made 
specifically between the dā‘iyāt and the potential disciples: On one hand the women who 
are taking up the role of the dā‘iya gain and use authority. On the other, some of the 
women who attend lessons are not necessarily interested that other women rather than men 
should gain leadership over them. Instead these women seem to prefer to get as close as 
possible to the male centers of power. In these cases the lack of relationship because of 
gender segregation can be outweighed through mystical connection with the leader.  
                                                
491 Interview with Ibtisam, Damascus, 11.06.2011. 
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The limited female leadership through religiously educated female preachers has facilitated 
the participation of large numbers of Syrian women in the da‘wa movement and has 
offered women power in a variety of ways: a dā‘iya, who has not only her own circle of 
disciples but also indirect leadership over study circles started by her disciples, is in a 
position of power over these women through the knowledge that she passes on and her 
judgements of what is right or wrong even if her judgements happen within the limits of 
what is perceived as orthodox. This has very practical implications as women who learn 
with a dā‘iya ask her questions concerning matters of doctrine, religious practice as well as 
advice in important decisions in family, economic or career matters. 
 
 
 
6.4  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have argued that the question of whether Islamism is empowering to 
women or not has to be understood in the context of the complex relationships that each 
woman (individually as well as the movement collectively) has with other individuals, 
groups and institutions on the different levels of society such as family, close community, 
the government and the da‘wa movement. As I have shown in this chapter, the answers are 
too ambiguous to make the hypothesis of female empowerment the main key to understand 
Islamist women’s choices. Notwithstanding the empowerment that happens in the way 
women in the da‘wa movement relate to others, women who are aiming for devoutness are 
often wary of social power. Lessons warn against the temptation of pride and other 
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attitudes that could focus the heart of the believer on pleasing the self rather than God, as 
the following rebuke from Rajab Deeb illustrates:  
Don’t say: I have understanding, I am wise. Pride is the characteristic of the devil. 
So don’t be proud of your good works, especially not of your da‘wa. May God 
forgive us all!492  
 
From this point of view, female empowerment as such is assessed as of doubtful value 
because it potentially fosters an attitude that contradicts the attitude of devoutness, which 
is based on submission to God. Striving for devoutness in practice and attitude, against the 
tendencies of pride and the will to self-determination, is seen as difficult. Therefore the 
objective of ‘religious empowerment’ is an important factor of attraction that needs to be 
appreciated to gain a fuller understanding of my participants’ developments and choices as 
I will demonstrate in the next chapter. 
  
                                                
492 Rajab Deeb during the Thursday lesson at ANC, Damascus, 25.06.2009. 
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7 RELIGIOUS EMPOWERMENT ON THE JOURNEY TO DEVOUTNESS 
 
 
Scholarly discussion in the West focuses on the empowerment of women in the social and 
political context, although Mahmood (2005) observed that the women in her research did 
not intentionally undermine patriarchal concepts and practices.493 In my observation, the 
issues of choice and ability were discussed among my participants in different contexts. 
They talked about making choices such as returning to school or choosing careers, 
attending lessons or changing their clothing with or without the support of their families, 
yet the main use of the terms quwa (power, strength) or qudra (power, ability) in my 
interviews and participant observations were in the context of their struggle against their 
own weakness or inability to live according to their religious convictions or ideals. From 
this viewpoint, the importance of personal empowerment is not so much related to the 
question of freedom of choice over the restrictions of their society as to the empowerment 
to change their own lives and remodel it according to the ideal of a pious Muslim woman.  
 
 
 
7.1  Religious empowerment and freedom of choice 
 
Mahmood (2005) argues that the liberal feminist concept of agency, based on freedom as 
an autonomous choice either to submit or to subvert norms, has limited the understanding 
of pious Muslim women because of the specific way in which they relate to norms through 
                                                
493 Mahmood, Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject: 15. 
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embodying norms with the goal of shaping their desires to accord with those norms.494 In 
this context, it is noticeable how my participants discussed the concepts of freedom and 
obedience. The following examples show how they acknowledged their human desire to 
choose autonomously yet reflected on this desire in the light of sinful pride as opposed to 
obedience. 
 
During one of her public lessons Sawda assessed freedom in the sense of an independent 
choice in terminology that left no doubt of its ‘un-Islamic’ character: ‘It is a sign of 
jāhiliya to do what we want and not to do as Muhammad asked us to do.’495 With the term 
jāhiliya, Sawda defined any choice independent from the religious norm as ignorant 
unbelief. In Islamist discourse, jāhiliya is the very opposite of faith.496 In her lesson, she 
went on to explain that such choices were based on a prideful and wilful ignorance of the 
human position before God, in contrast to the true lack of knowledge that should induce 
the believer to humility and submission to God’s will. To describe ignorance in the sense 
of something that simply cannot be known, Sawda used forms of mā ‘arafa, ‘[to] not 
know’, to distinguish between sinful ignorance - jāhiliya - and non-sinful ignorance. The 
distinction between both kinds of ignorance hinges on the question of pride: Sawda 
compared choices based on sinful ignorance to a young girl’s decision to spend time with 
‘bad friends’ against her mother’s demands thus losing her moral footing through their 
influence: the girl chose out of pride, which hindered her from acknowledging her inability 
to assess the situation correctly because of her lack of knowledge. According to Sawda, 
choices against God’s command are ignorant choices based on pride because the person 
                                                
494 Ibid., 14-15. 
495 Lesson by Sawda at ANC, Damascus, 06.04.2009. 
496 Rippin, Muslims: Their religious beliefs and practices: 226. 
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fails to assess their limited ability to make correct choices independently. This 
understanding of the limitations of human nature explains why the freedom to choose was 
not valued highly among my research participants.  
 
In a similar way, looking at the question of freedom of choice, Manar, a post-graduate 
student of sharia at ANC, explained to me how she understood the fundamental difference 
in the understanding of ‘freedom’ between ‘Western’ humanism and her own worldview: 
I went through many stages in which I wanted to live as I wanted to live. But I 
found that if I live as I want to live, for example, if I want to go and steal from 
someone, that is not freedom. A person is free, but at the same time bound. Of 
course, I later believed that this bondage is the bondage that God gives, not the law. 
The humanists say: your freedom stops when it puts the freedoms of others into 
danger. No, your freedom stops when it goes against God's commands. For 
example, I don't harm anyone else when I drink alcohol. […] or if I watch a bad 
film with immoral scenes.  […] But this breaks the commands of God who 
commanded me to avert my gaze. God has given me two beautiful eyes, and praise 
God my eyesight is ten out of ten so that I can use them in what pleases God. I can 
look, but I look at what is permitted not at what is prohibited.  Now, if I use my 
eyes for things that are displeasing to God, I violate the freedom, which God gave 
me. Then I would be 'outside' freedom, above this freedom. That is not freedom at 
all.497 
 
                                                
497 Interview with Manar at ANC, Damascus, 10.06.2010. 
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Manar distinguishes the concept of freedom as formulated during the Enlightenment from 
a theocentric concept of freedom. Freedom is seen a gift from God, the ability to use the 
faculties with which God has endowed human kind in the way that he prescribed. 
According to this understanding, to step outside these limits means a loss of freedom. In a 
different conversation, Manar explained to me how her experiences with making choices 
against God’s commands left her feeling ‘empty’ and disillusioned with her own ‘power to 
choose’. She felt that she had stepped outside the protection of God’s order. Returning to 
an ‘Islamic lifestyle’ restored her sense of purpose and self-respect.498  
 
A view like Manar’s, which associates freedom only with making right choices in 
obedience to God, has implications concerning religious freedom. Most of my participants 
rejected the freedom to leave Islam. Landis (2003) showed that Syrian school books 
promoted a similar idea because they taught that religious freedom was limited by 
revelations, arguing that beliefs other than the Abrahamic faiths ‘contradict the principle of 
freedom of belief.’499 
 
The identification of disobedience with ignorance and obedience with ‘true’ freedom 
informs the way in which women like Sawda and Manar understand empowerment as 
related to the question of obedience rather than free choice. This different concept of 
individual power seems to be sidelined in Western discussion of Muslim women’s 
religious lives. Many of my research participants have talked about the difficulties they 
find in following their religious ideals. For example, during a group interview with Manar 
and three of her female colleagues in their twenties who were working together at a 
                                                
498 Conversation with Manar at ANC, 12.03.2009. 
499 As quoted in Landis, "'Islamic education in Syria: Undoing secularism'" 21. 
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medical laboratory they discussed why, for three of them, there had been a number of years 
between coming to the conviction that the hijab was obligatory and taking the practical 
step of wearing it.500 Their reasons were mainly related to social prejudice, associating the 
hijab with old age and datedness. They said that it offended their vanity and that they were 
particularly afraid that it would lower their marriage prospects. In the face of these 
obstacles, they said that it needed inner strength to obey. In a similar way, Aisha’s sister 
had made an announcement of her change in dress some time before she actually donned 
Islamic clothing, waiting to have enough ‘strength’ to do so against her inclination towards 
modern fashion.501  
 
In the following sections I therefore look at empowerment in my participants’ quest for the 
power to live authentic religious lives as devout Muslim women. 
 
 
 
7.2  The emulation of Muhammad  
 
The emulation of Muhammad has been part of Islamic teaching and practice since the 
development of the concept of the sunna of Muhammad as the basis for the sharia through 
the medieval scholar al-Shafi’i (d.820).502 Mahmood (2005) writes that her participants 
emulated religious models to acquire their moral characters.503 In this section I will show 
how this notion was instrumental in my participants’ development because the 
                                                
500 Group interview with Manar, Nasrin, ‘Ula and Razan, Damascus, 30.05.2009. 
501 Comp. the case study in Chapter 5.3.2. 
502 Rippin, Muslims: Their religious beliefs and practices: 84. 
503 Mahmood, Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject: 146-48. 
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understanding of devout practice as the emulation of Muhammad enabled them 
emotionally. 
 
 
 
7.2.1 A behaviour-centred approach to changing the heart 
 
When I asked dā‘iyāt about how they called women outside the movement to devoutness, 
the basic answer could be summed up as the appeal to make certain initial changes in their 
everyday lives, mainly to pray regularly, to wear correct hijab and to come to lessons. In a 
similar vein, asked for the meaning of piety, my respondents usually gave me the 
description of a woman who follows these and further religious practices. At the same 
time, they distinguished piety as a quality of the heart that is only known to God from 
religious acts as signs of piety. Notwithstanding the hidden nature of piety, Islamic practice 
was seen as an identity marker of the pious person and a result of the believer’s 
devoutness, as Dr. Halima, a dā‘iya at ANC, explained: 
 
To be pious, one should be a constant observer (murāqib) of God. If you sense 
(idha sha‘arti) that God is with you at all times, this is piety. Whether you are here 
and you are sitting with me, or alone in your bedroom: God is with you. […] If I 
sense this, then: God does not want me to sin, God does not want me to lie, he does 
not want me to steal, God does not want me to commit adultery. And when she is 
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disciplined she becomes more pious.504    
 
At first, a behaviour-centered approach seems to be at odds with my findings that women 
like Zaynab and Ruba diagnosed that their change to be driven by gaining meaning and 
understanding lacking in the traditional religiosity in which they were brought up.505 Yet 
both approaches to change are connected in the call to emulate Muhammad because, for 
my participants, a practice gained its meaning from following his example. As such, the 
emulation of Muhammad answers not only the question of what should change or why it 
should change but also the question of how to change. Many of my interviewees 
experienced the emulation of Muhammad as enabling because the more they were 
confronted by his exemplary life, the more they were motivated by love. They also talked 
about different qualities of love for Muhammad and how a woman would grow from a 
more abstract admiration to a more heart-felt love with the practical changes she made. 
Thus the imitation of Muhammad placed them in a ‘virtuous cycle’ of love, that motivated 
behavioural changes, and behaviours, that intensified their emotional connection with him.  
 
Muhammad embodies the ideal model for Muslims in general because Islamic dogma 
teaches that he was exempt from sin (ma‘sūm min al-khaṭā’). On the basis of this belief, 
his practice, the sunna, has become the authoritative example of Islamic practice. This 
belief plays an important role for women who are seeking orientation concerning the 
correct way to live, as Ruba explained:  
 
                                                
504 Interview with Halima, Damascus, 14.06.2011; similarly Rajab Deeb described being 
pious as murāqiban li-llah, being constantly observant of God. Interview with Rajab Deeb, 
Jdeida, 09.03.2009. 
505 Comp. pages 153-155 and 183-184. 
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Muhammad was exempt from sin because God wanted to send a message through 
him. Imagine if he had sinned. We would all sin like him. So he must not sin. […] 
But we are ordinary people, so we will sin, for sure. We will never reach the level 
of Muhammad. But we always try to be close to the Prophet.506 
 
During religious lessons, other prophets were also painted as role models. The rejection 
suffered by the earlier prophets, Muhammad, and the first Muslims at the hands of those 
who did not believe served to invest the experience of opposition felt by my participants 
(from wider Syrian society or in the global context) with meaning, and inspired them to 
persevere. Stories of the prophets’ successes and divine protection were told to exhort the 
attendees to trust that God would grant them success and protection, if they, too, followed 
the prophets’ example of faith and piety. Emulating Muhammad was particularly depicted 
as empowering a pious lifestyle, because God would reproduce Muhammad’s victories in 
the believers’ lives, both in the personal struggle for spiritual improvement and in the 
general universal struggle of Muslims against non-Muslims. The following quotation from 
one of Sawda’s public lessons on Surah al-Fath illustrates this. The surah talks about 
victory in the context of Muhammad’s failed attempt to enter Mecca to perform the 
pilgrimage and the treaty of Hudaybiyya in 628. Muhammad was able to enter a year 
later.507 Sawda exhorted her listeners: 
 
‘God’s practice’ [sunnat allah, Sura al-Fath: 23] means to follow everything that 
Muhammad did, to reject unbelief, and to always accept what he accepted. Then 
                                                
506 Interview with Ruba, Damascus, 23.04.2011. 
507 M. A. S. Abdel Haleem, The Qur'an: A new translation by M.A.S. Abdel Haleem  
(Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 334. 
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God will surely give victory. For example we see the situation in Palestine today: 
Even if it does not look like it at the moment the believers will eventually always 
be victorious because the Jews fight against God. It was the same in the days of the 
prophet: When a Jew tried to kill Muhammad with a heavy rock, put in place ready 
to use where Muhammad used to pass by, Gabriel stopped him and made him take 
a different way. There is no difference in the way [God helps the believers] today. 
Just as the sun will rise each morning, no matter whether we can see it or not, so 
following Muhammad will always lead to final victory.  
The hijab is part of the sunna. To take it off means to go against God. For example, 
when you go to a wedding party, and take your hijab off in the hall, wearing short 
and low cut dresses, that’s to follow a bad practice (sunna say’a). That’s how it is 
today: Half of the guests sit in hijab, half without. Don’t follow this bad practice! I 
know a woman, even though she was the mother of the bridegroom, she went to the 
wedding in hijab, and she still looked festive. Tomorrow when I will be between 
God’s hands I will say: I told them, I showed them how to do right, but they made 
the choice. Don’t fear people! Don’t worry what they say or think but follow God’s 
practice (sunnat allah).508 
 
In this quotation Sawda used the Qur’anic text to motivate her listeners to emulate 
Muhammad for the sake of victory over the opposition of society: She applied the 
postponed victory in Muhammad’s life to the question as to whether it is possible to be 
socially acceptable and follow Muhammad without making exceptions concerning the 
hijab. She brought up the example of weddings because on these occasions Islamist 
                                                
508 Public lesson by Sawda, ANC, 30.03.2009. 
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women may need to choose between two different loyalties: Their religious convictions 
about dress codes on one hand and loyalty towards their family reputation on the other. 
Interestingly, Sawda made her appeal to act independently of social pressures through two 
historic examples; one with a known final success, and one without: In the first, the treaty 
of Hudaybiyya resulted in the Muslim’s pilgrimage and because of the resulting peace, 
many were won to Islam. In the second example, Sawda claimed a final future victory for 
the Palestinians in the face of opposition and failure today. As her movement from the 
Palestinian situation to the issue of Islamic dress shows, her interest at this point was not 
political Islam, but the question of failure and success for the believers when they imitate 
Muhammad. Her answer was not a simple equation between religious obedience and 
worldly success but an appeal for choosing something that may bring disadvantages, 
opposition and suffering in the short term because of the believer’s trust in the final 
victory. 
 
My participants tried to follow Muhammad in the general principles of faith, love and fear 
of God and as much as possible in the tiniest details of everyday life. They believed that 
God guided and corrected him in the totality of every expression of his life. In practice, 
this often confronted them with the choice between modern secular lifestyles and an 
alternative, which is claimed to be ‘what Muhammad did’, e.g. the choice to use a plastic 
toothbrush or a miswāk, a small twig used to clean the teeth, mentioned in some of the 
aḥadīth.509 A number of my friends started using the miswāk during my field research. 
They preferred this ‘Islamic toothbrush’ because they said that even a small act like 
cleaning their teeth in the same way brought them closer to Muhammad. Additionally they 
                                                
509 E.g. Sahih Muslim, Ṭahāra, trad. 43; al-Bukhari, Maghāzī, bāb 83 
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claimed that the miswāk provided better hygiene than a plastic toothbrush. This example 
shows the extreme literalism with which the ḥadīth literature is often applied for the sake 
of shaping one’s life after the example of Muhammad and also illustrates the additional 
tendency to legitimise such so-called Islamic practices through claims of non-religious 
benefits, in this case, better hygiene.510  
 
Remarkably, this is equally true for the practice of both my participants with a general 
religious knowledge and with a higher religious education. When it came to the question of 
practice - their own or in practice-oriented preaching - they would often claim authority for 
specific practices even if they were aware of the diversity with which the sunna could be 
applied to a certain question. In my case studies, Farida’s discussion of the niqāb illustrates 
this: She agreed that there are different scholarly opinions concerning the face veil and 
reflected on the ‘moderating effect’ that her in-depth studies had on her understanding of 
this diversity. However, when the question became practical she was adamant in her 
condemnation of any practice other than her own.511 In another example, Ruba strongly 
rejected the practice of wiping the neck during ritual washing even though this practice is 
widespread in Syria and accepted practice in the Shafi’i madhhab.512 In preaching and 
practice, the distinction between the authority of the revealed sources, the Qur’an and the 
sunna, and the derived authority of the interpretations of religious scholars seems to be 
blurred. Consequently, interpretations such as the classifications of all acts according to the 
ahkām al-khamsa are often applied without the appreciation of their historical context, 
                                                
510 According to Shepard this kind of apologetic tendency is typically for Islamists. 
Shepard, "The Diversity of Islamic Thought: Towards a Typology," 70. 
511 Comp. 5.5.5, 212-213.  
512 Interview with Ruba, 23.04.2011. 
 276 
distinctions such as those between strong and weak arguments, or ignoring discussions of 
opposing aḥadīth are for the sake of clear and unambiguous orientation. 
 
For my research participants, the shift from imitating traditional religiosity to imitating 
Muhammad is a paradigm shift even if the resulting patterns of behaviour sometimes do 
not seem to be very different. The imitation of Muhammad and his sunna offers 
authenticity because the source of the validated behaviour is considered to be accessible 
through religious learning. This preference reveals a puritan stance. At the same time many 
behaviours that were typical for women in the da‘wa movement followed the cultural and 
traditional paths. The question as to how far a conservative ideal was taken and then 
invested with Muhammad’s sunna, chosen aḥadīth and interpretations, and of how far the 
leadership of the da‘wa movement utilised Muhammad while they actually promoted 
traditional Islam was not really discussed, and in my observation my participants still often 
followed such a practice even if they categorised it as part of taqālīd. Yet the main 
difference was whether they felt free to follow it or not, depending on convenience and 
circumstances. If the emulation of Muhammad limited their freedom of choice to the 
question of obedience in many areas, it also opened up a new way of assessing cultural 
norms and offered to a certain degree, freedom of choice through differentiation between 
taqālīd and sunna. Zaynab, for example, condemned the practice of some mosques, where 
women were not given the space they needed or even excluded from using the mosque 
because historically, during Muhammad’s time, men and women used to worship together. 
At the same time she preferred the traditional set-up to have segregated spaces most of the 
time so that women could interact with each other with more freedom and less harassment 
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from attending men.513 She also argued that this arrangement allowed women to come to 
lessons even when ritual impurity would have excluded them from entering the main 
prayer hall.514 This example illustrates how in this case, her preference was based on the 
moral realities of her society: she argued that the moral decline in later generations of 
Muslims was the main reason why separate facilities for women at mosques were better for 
them today, though not at the time of Muhammad. This example shows both the flexibility 
and the unwavering support with which the ideal of emulating Muhammad’s practice 
interacts with concrete questions of behaviour in the particular circumstances of my 
participants’ lives. The assessment that the Muslim community historically closest to 
Muhammad practiced the purest form of Islam is part of the notion that closeness to 
Muhammad and his practices empowers the believer to live a pious life. In contrast, 
according to this narrative, later communities lost some of the closeness and thus the 
power to change society. My research participants aspire to regain this power through the 
closest possible emulation of Muhammad.  
 
Even though Islamic practices are at the center of many lessons and conversations, 
describing the aim of the da‘wa movement as the morality of the individual and society 
would misrepresent the desire of my participants to shape their hearts through actions. The 
discussion above shows that while moral behaviours are at the surface of many discussions, 
the goal is to empower the believers to emulate Muhammad and gain an inner attitude of 
fear and love of God, which is visible in the moral behaviour of the believer. In the process 
of defining the moral goal of da‘wa, different moral frameworks need to be dealt with: 
cultural moral frameworks, social moral frameworks and religious moral frameworks that 
                                                
513 Comp. 4.3, page 110-112. 
514 Interview with Zaynab, Damascus countryside, 27.07.2009. 
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partly overlap but offer different moral orientations. Cultural as well as social values that 
aim at respectability and appropriate behaviours are not necessarily connected with 
religiosity and the religious norms of what is lawful or unlawful. The terminology that my 
participants used shows that moral values and religious norms are seen as two different 
categories. My research participants used the Arabic term for morals - akhlāq - of non-
Muslims or non-religious Muslims as well as of believers. For example, Tahani, a 
pharmacist in her late twenties, who had started to pray regularly and to attend the 
women’s programme at Zaynab’s local mosque six years ago, told me about her transition 
to greater religiosity, saying that she had always lived a ‘moral life’ but without being 
religious. Morality, according to her, meant that she lived according to the basic human 
values that she had been brought up with, mentioning e.g. abstinence from extramarital sex, 
refraining from murder and stealing, or showing respect to older people and suppressing 
one’s anger. In her opinion, these moral values were the same in all religions.515 Similarly, 
the dā‘iyāt that I talked with often questioned me  as to whether I, as a Christian, lived a 
moral life. Moderate Muslim friends would also often emphasise the communalities 
between Christianity and Islam, saying that the only thing that mattered were a person’s 
morals. In addition to those moral values mentioned, honesty, generosity and caring for 
others were acts that were frequently discussed under the label of akhlāq. Obviously, there 
is an overlap between observing these moral values and religious observance. A second 
area of behaviours is described with the term adāb, ‘etiquette’, and often used in 
combination with ‘tradition’: To follow adāb wa taqālīd was mostly used with a negative 
connotation of adhering to cultural customs without thinking and assessing their legitimacy, 
                                                
515 Interview with Tahani, Damascus countryside, 27.07.2009. 
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such as Zaynab’s rejection of the expectation that she should be home at a certain time.516 
Yet adāb was also used in the religious context for respectful and polite behaviour that 
should be imitated. Sawda would teach about adāb especially during her public lessons in 
which she focused more on practical application than with her private study group. She 
included behaviours such as eating manners, clothing issues that were not regulated as 
lawful or unlawful such as bare feet, not being late for lessons or the invocation of the 
name of God before certain actions in the category of adāb.  
 
While akhlāq and adāb were to a great extent acquired through upbringing and other 
interactions within the cultural context, the evaluation of specific behaviours and their 
inclusion among endorsed religious practices depended on whether they were seen as 
rooted in the example of Muhammad or not.  
 
Interestingly, practices that were mainly discussed as identifying someone’s piety were not 
simply any religious practices, but particular issues were emphasised: clothes, fasting, 
relating to the other gender, partaking in communal religious activities like lessons and 
dhikr, private religious activities such as Qur’an recitation and dhikr and ritual prayer. Of 
the five pillars, only fasting and prayer seem to be seen as strong identifiers of piety while 
the creed, the pilgrimage and alms giving play a less prominent role. Even texts that deal 
with other topics covered in the original sources are often used as spring boards to focus on 
clothing, fasting, worship and cross gender issues, as the quotation from Sawda’s lesson in 
7.2.1. illustrates. The focus was on practices that were achievable for women and not too 
commonplace. Pilgrimage, for example, though highly desired, was not an achievable goal 
                                                
516 Comp. 5.2.4, page 169-170. 
 280 
for many Syrian women and so was talked about in the context of trusting God in the face 
of being unable to go. The creed, on the other hand, makes no distinction between a devout 
or a ‘traditional’ Muslim. Gender issues are not part of the five pillars yet they have 
become enormously important in lessons and conversation. Aside from the reasons of 
visibility and cultural reactions that I discussed in 6.1., practices related to gender relations 
are specifically in the power of women and relevant to their everyday lives. Any changes 
in this area have a great impact on her perception by others and her self-perception as a 
more or less pious person. Therefore they have a high potential to be experienced as 
religiously empowering. Other parts of the sunna are not experienced as religiously 
empowering women because they are not part of their normal practice, for example 
Muhammad’s role as a political leader and decision maker. The focus on some areas and 
indifference towards others shows that the claim of a simple, direct following of 
Muhammad is an ideal, not the reality. Rather, some practices have gained importance in 
accordance with the attempt to distinguish the pious believer from those with general 
religious practice as well as the secular.  
 
However, all my participants voiced that their love for Muhammad and God was the 
greatest motivation to change their lives. 
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7.2.2  Devout practice and love 
 
Fatima Mernissi (1991) described how her early childhood bond with Muhammad 
motivated her to make sense of the image of Muhammad with which she was confronted in 
later years, and to research a number of aḥadīth that did not fit with her childhood image 
of Muhammad: having been taught that Muhammad was someone who cared for women, 
she describes how the claims that Muhammad had discriminated against women puzzled 
her and eventually led to her research of these claims.517 Mernissi’s early upbringing 
together with her other convictions estranged her from the Islamist image of Muhammad. 
My participants share with Mernissi the emotional bond with Muhammad that went back 
to their childhood, even if this led to choices that were in stark contrast with Mernissi’s. 
Their preceding love for Muhammad was a strong motivator to desire change as 
adolescents or adults. Zaynab, for example, explained that as a child she was told about 
Muhammad’s achievements as a prophet, to admire him, and to see him as the source of 
truth, all these being positive religious sentiments that she grew up with.518  
 
While the image of Muhammad is contested between different parts of the Muslim 
community, each one claiming Muhammad for themselves, in parallel to their claim of 
living the ‘true Islam’ my participants such as Zaynab apparently did not question this 
claim. Rather, the image taught in the da‘wa movement seems to resonate with many 
Syrian women, and therefore their childhood love for Muhammad was a gateway for them 
into the movement. The dā‘iyāt use the prior attraction to Muhammad to motivate women 
                                                
517 Fatima Mernissi, The veil and the male elite: a feminist interpretation of women's rights 
in Islam  (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1991). 64-65. 
518 Comp. page 155. 
 282 
to desire to adhere to his teachings and stir up dissatisfaction at falling short, as Ruba said: 
‘When I hear about Muhammad it makes me feel that I have fallen short and then I want to 
do better. He gives me strength.’519  
 
During my interviews and conversations I was told again and again that to love 
Muhammad was a way to love God. For my participants, Muhammad had become the 
human mediator of love for a transcendent God.. Furthermore, for those of my participants 
who were involved with Sufism, the sheikh and the dā‘iya were mediators of love, not only 
Muhammad. Also, other believers could take this role of mediator: Farida started to love 
God through love for her father. Or even, as Hiyam, one of Sawda’s disciples, said: ‘We 
start to love God when we have friends who love God.’  
 
Love as the emotional motivator that enables women to change their lives and their 
attitudes towards piety is understood first as the experience of relationships between 
tangible people. The closer one is to another person, the greater the possibility of love. The 
vast and detailed sources on Muhammad’s life facilitate the feeling of emotional closeness 
to him. Therefore, lessons and conversations are interspersed with stories that highlight 
Muhammad’s character and personality.  
 
However, the inter-human love is only the ‘beginning to practise love’, as Zaynab 
explained: 
Though my choice to love [romantically] was a mistake, I experienced love and 
because of that I know more about love. When we talk about the love of God, or 
                                                
519 Interview with Ruba, Damascus, 23.04.2011. 
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God's prophet, to love the sheikh means that you are beginning to practice that love. 
If you love a person you think about him night and day, and you feel as if he 
watches you every moment. But it is God who comforts you every minute.520 
 
To love the sheikh is a way to love God, because if you love anyone, you also love 
what your beloved loves. Of course if you read a book about God, maybe you will 
also love him, but it is very different to receive this love from person to person, 
face to face.521 
 
In these two quotations, love for a religious teacher and for Muhammad is basically 
identified as love for God, albeit an initial love that still needs the concrete object of love 
to be ignited.  
 
In this sense, according to my research participants, Muhammad is not only the messenger 
who brought revelation of God’s commands and as such facilitates religiously correct 
behaviour, but he is also the human mediator of the emotional bond that gives women the 
strength to live accordingly. 
 
The claim that the da‘wa practice among Syrian women aims at the emulation of 
Muhammad, facilitates Islamic revival among women on a number of levels: First of all, it 
builds on the emotional bond that most Syrian Muslims have formed with Muhammad 
since their childhood. The shift from emulating taqālīd to emulating Muhammad results in 
limited independence from societal pressures while it builds on the social and religious 
                                                
520 Interview with Zaynab, 27.07.2009.  
521 Interview with Zaynab, 11.06.2011. 
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norm of reverence for Muhammad at the same time. Secondly, it gives structure to their 
change and clear orientation as every sermon tells women in very specific terms that there 
is a right way to live and that it is in their hands to do so and experience major changes. 
Part of the attraction of the da‘wa movement is that nothing is left vague or subjective 
when it comes to practicing ‘true Islam’ but that it promises certainty and satisfaction 
through achievable goals. Doing this by following Muhammad’s example is perceived as a 
guarantee of authenticity. Thirdly, following through with these practical changes allows 
women to experience a stronger emotional bond with Muhammad, which motivates a 
greater ability to obedience and realisation of their own ideal selves. As loving Muhammad 
mediates loving God, emulating Muhammad’s practices is seen as the way to grow closer 
to God. Women who have struggled with an inability to follow through with desired 
religious practices on their journey to devoutness experience obedience as empowering.  
 
The emphasis on love and the notion that love for a human being mediates divine love 
demonstrates the underlying Sufi influence on my participants. In contrast, Mahmood 
writes that the participants of the mosque movement in Egypt focused mainly on humility 
and fear of God as pious attitudes.522 In both cases the attitude was seen as both the means 
and the end of closeness to God, a way to practice devoutness and an aspect of devoutness 
itself. Noticeably, Mahmood writes that her participants practised fear through listening to 
fear-inducing preaching and prayer.523 In a complementary way my participants practised 
dhikr with the goal to love God more and often encouraged each other with reminders of 
God’s great mercy:  
 
                                                
522 Mahmood, Politics of piety: The Islamic revival and the feminist subject: 140-42. 
523 Ibid., 144. 
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How do I think about the blessing that God has given me?  If I want you to love me, 
I present to you a gift. Then you think about this gift and love me. So God, what 
has he granted me? He's given me a strong body, he's given me beautiful skin, he's 
given me beautiful eyes that I can see with. I think: The others don't see how much 
you love me, oh Lord.  You have given me these eyes.  He has given me beautiful 
hair. He has given me a good nose, healthy hands, feet, all these things, and so I 
love him and I meditate (udhkur) on him, and increasing the dhikr gives me love.524 
 
This quotation illustrates how my participants intentionally reminded themselves of God’s 
gifts to induce love in their own hearts. As love enables them to desire obedience, and 
obedience is aimed at fulfilling the obligatory, many of my participants incorporate 
practices that go far beyond farḍ in their desire for greater devoutness. In the next section I 
look at the role the concept of aḥsan plays in facilitating my participants’ developments, 
because it explains why they chose more extreme forms of religious practice. 
 
 
    
7.3  Ḥasan wa aḥsan: Reaching for perfection through doing ‘better than good’ 
 
Describing Muhammad as a model that is possible to imitate, yet unattainable in his perfect 
trust, love and submission to God means that there is no limit to the degrees of piety that a 
woman can reach. There is a tension between the teaching of moderation as a characteristic 
of Islam and the painting of ideals that leave the listener unsatisfied with what is ‘good’ 
                                                
524 Interview with Dr. Halima, Damascus, 14.06.2011. 
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and in constant desire of what is taught to be ‘better’. One of the outstanding 
characteristics of the dā‘iyāt in this study is the ardent radicalism with which they pursue 
excellence in their devoutness. The distinction between what is obligatory and what is 
additional helps them not to lose touch with other, less committed Muslims, but it is also 
used to legitimise their attempt to reach higher and higher degrees of devoutness, in hope 
of becoming closer to God. In the practice of da‘wa, the obligatory and the supererogatory 
are clearly distinguished in theory, yet when other Muslims are called to follow their 
example through persuasion or pressure this distinction loses some of its weight because 
practicising the supererogatory is closely linked with image of the ideal pious woman: 
these practices are depicted as expressions of love of the true believer because they are not 
obligatory.  
 
The idea of good acts beyond the obligatory is already present in the classical distinction of 
acts according to the ahkām al-khamsa, which classify acts roughly into ḥarām and ḥalāl 
and distinguishes four different categories of ḥalāl acts: obligatory, recommended, neutral 
and disliked. The second category, which is called mustaḥabb, ‘recommended’, describes 
acts that are not commanded but rewarded by God. Even though my participants rarely 
used this terminology, the concept of aḥsan and the special reward for good acts beyond 
the obligatory came up regularly to promote an alternative ‘pious’ lifestyle while still 
pursuing the imitation of Muhammad.  
 
The concept of aḥsan could be used very broadly. For example, women were told not to 
waste their time with meaningless socialising or media consumption but to use all time that 
was not filled with their duties as wives, mothers or employees with religious activities, to 
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improve themselves or promote Islam: They should go to lessons, read the Qur’an, do 
dhikr and other nawāfil, and use their time for da’wa if they are visiting. To motivate 
women to use their time in these ways they were taught that the smallest act for the sake of 
doing ‘better’ will bring them reward in the next world, as the following quote from Sawda 
illustrates: 
It is better to go to lessons than to listen to TV programmes. There is more reward. 
For every step I take going to a lesson there is reward. Sheikh Ahmad even said to 
us, because someone asked, what about if we come to the lesson by car? He said: 
Even for every turn of the wheels there is reward.525 
 
Another often discussed example was the niqāb, which the women in four of my case 
studies categorised as aḥsan, and one as farḍ. While there is very little debate among 
Syrian Muslims about which acts are farḍ, aḥsan is by definition a relative category and 
based on the judgements of different groups. Preaching against the waste of time, for 
instance, also shows an apologetic agenda as other Syrians often accuse religious women 
of squandering their time and going to lessons only to socialise,526 while other behaviours 
and attitudes, such as extreme veiling, were often categorised as tashaddud or taṭarruf by 
Muslims outside the da‘wa movement. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
525 Interview with Sawda, Damascus, 08.06.2011. 
526 Shirine Dakouri, for example, made this accusation in my interview with her, 
Damascus, 12.12.2009. 
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7.3.1 Religious empowerment through supererogatory worship 
 
The area that played the most important role was supererogatory worship because it was 
seen as instrumental in empowering women to devoutness. Acts of worship that go beyond 
the obligatory play a special role as methods to gain discipline in religious practice. 
Observing the obligatory prayer was an area of struggle that my research participants 
discussed again and again. While the hijab was seen as especially difficult because of its 
public nature, prayer was perceived to be so for the opposite reason: its intimacy and lack 
of a communal aspect for women at most times. Specifically, the demand to wake up 
during the night to pray the early morning prayer before dawn was mentioned. In one of 
her lessons Sawda discussed this problem, admitting that she didn’t know a single woman 
who did not sometimes miss this prayer, fell asleep whilst praying it, or made her prayers 
void through messing up the words in her sleepiness.527 Besides practical advice such as 
going to bed earlier so that one felt more rested in the early morning hours, Sawda 
suggested extending the time of prayer with personal supplications, dhikr and Qur’an 
recitations. Similarly, as I have described in 5.5.2 Farida had discovered that extending the 
obligatory prayer to include the additional prayers had helped her to become committed.528 
 
The forms of worship that are promoted fall mainly under the categories of dhikr or 
nawāfil. According to Wensinck the term nāfila, the singular of nawāfil, is used most 
commonly for prayers added to the obligatory prayers on top of the sunna prayers.529 
While my participants called prayers sunna if they were part of the regular practice and 
                                                
527 Sadwa, private lesson, 14.3.2009. 
528 Comp. page 203.  
529 A.J. Wensinck, "Nafila," in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, ed. C.E. 
Bosworth, et al. (Leiden-New York: Brill, 1993), 878. 
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were seen as specifically recommended, though not commanded, by Muhammad, nawāfil 
was often used in a less defined way. It could mean more added prayers and some of my 
participants very strongly supported the custom of praying the ṣalāt al-tahajjud (up to 
thirteen extra prayer units) between the last evening prayer and the early morning prayer. 
This custom is also backed up by a number of aḥadīth  - for example Bukhari has a whole 
chapter on the ṣalāt al-tahajjud. Among my participants, nawāfil could also be used in a 
more general way for further added prayers. According to Ruba, the main difference was 
that nawāfil in the common use were prayers that could not be traced back to a specific 
recommendation of Muhammad though in a general sense they were based on his example 
of adding prayers.530  
 
During interviews and participation in lessons women said that they got the power for 
stricter religious observation through practicing dhikr and nawāfil. At first sight it seems 
strange that expanding a task that was experienced as difficult resulted in greater 
observance. Yet spending more time in prayer and organising their everyday lives even 
more around extended prayer times can be understood like any other exercise that keeps 
the mind more focused on a desired target. Praying nawāfil also added the positive 
emotional expectation that they would gain reward for these prayers, and especially grow 
in closeness to God. These expectations are founded on Sura 17:79 and a well-known 
ḥadīth qudsi that says:  
‘When My servant seeks to approach Me through supererogatory works, I finally 
love him. And when I love him I become the hearing through which he heareth, the 
                                                
530 Interview with Ruba, Damascus, 23.04.2011. 
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sight through which he seeth, the hand with which he graspeth, the foot with which 
he walketh’.531 
 
Zaynab explained to me that dhikr is an exercise to cleanse the heart and transform the 
believer to become closer to God. Practice results in effortless dhikr as a permanent inner 
attitude. In this sense, dhikr acts as a tool for religious empowerment because practices that 
are experienced as struggles eventually flow spontaneously from the heart of the pious 
person. Zaynab’s own experience with reaching a state of involuntary dhikr illustrates 
this:532 she repeatedly described her reaction of great joy when she realised with surprise 
that her years of consciously practising dhikr had finally caused her mind to focus on God 
without effort or conscious decision, because her years of discipline and exercises had 
changed her towards greater awareness of God. 
 
Doing what is aḥsan is also seen as a natural expression of love. Huda Habash compared it 
to her love for her children:  
Especially women are much more engaged in additional acts of worship. Maybe 
because they are more emotional [they] love those kinds of activities. [...] Nāfila 
means addition. But as to the meaning in the life of the believer, it is an act of love, 
and increases love. Everyone who loves will do more than what is necessary. I love 
my children. So will I just clothe them and feed them? No! I will sit with them, 
joke and play with them. [...]533 
 
                                                
531 Al-Bukhari, Riqāq, bāb 38, as quoted in: Wensinck, "Nafila." 
532 Comp. page 166-167. 
533 Interview with Huda Habash, 23.12.2009. 
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She went on to explain that expressing love for God through supererogatory worship will 
increase that love: 
Sometimes a woman will ask me, how can I reach a higher level? How can I 
become a lover of God? Maybe I have been preaching about being a lover of God 
and longing for him. Of course every believer will be take an interest in this 
subject. She will be more zealous about loving God than anything else in her life. 
[...] The more she has learned and experienced quietness and meditated, the closer 
she has come to God, and the more she wants to learn and meditate.534  
 
The concept of ḥasan wa aḥsan facilitates the women’s da‘wa movement at various levels. 
It motivates a desire in my participants for ongoing change towards a more drastic 
religious lifestyle because aḥsan is associated with special rewards in the afterlife. It 
facilitates religious observance especially as it relates to prayer. The example of constant 
dhikr and nawāfil show that it opens the door to a religious practice that multiplies the time 
that the believer spends in prayer and other forms of worship and intensifies her religious 
experience. The combined practices of increasing nawāfil and dhikr throughout their daily 
lives meant that, for my research participants, worship and worldly life became more and 
more interwoven as they practiced praying and meditating on God as much as possible.  
 
Finally, the category of aḥsan is used to avoid the accusation of extremism because it 
allows for a degree of relativity and subjective preference. If aḥsan practices are explained 
as expressions of love, it can be used to validate behaviours that are otherwise not 
legitimised through the Qur’an and the sunna.  
                                                
534 Ibid. 
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7.4  Empowerment and the religious self-perception 
 
Having looked at various concepts concerning religious practices and how they shaped my 
participants’ desires and experiences of becoming devout, I will now discuss how their 
self-perception as Muslims from the outset of their journeys has affected their experiences 
and the way they have interpreted them in retrospect.  
 
 
 
7.4.1  The concept of fiṭra  
 
Zaynab started the narrative of her journey with the words: ‘fiṭrīyan (by constitution) we 
were Muslims.’ Like her, a number of my participants such as Sawda, Farida, Ruba and 
Manar mentioned the concept of fiṭra to describe the origin of their Islamic identity. The 
meaning of fiṭra is ‘human constitution’ or ‘disposition’. The term is specifically 
connected with the belief that God created human spirits before he created the material 
world. Then he made a covenant with the spirits, who agreed to submit to him and worship 
him alone. Accordingly every person is born a Muslim because of his or her primordial 
covenant with God. For my participants, this concept played a role in giving them certainty 
about their beliefs. Some told me of childhood experiences like Zaynab who remembered 
the closeness she felt with God as a child.535 Dunya also explained that she had an intrinsic 
early knowledge of the existence of God: ‘It is impossible for me to ever doubt Islam. I 
always knew from my earliest childhood that there is one God, my Lord, who created 
                                                
535 Comp. 5.2.2, 156-157. 
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everything.’536 While these early memories could alternatively be interpreted as results of 
early socialisation, the concept of fiṭra shaped them into markers of my participants’ 
Muslim identity. 
 
At the very beginning of da‘wa stands the axiomatic conviction that the recipient of the 
da‘wa knows that God the creator exists and that there is a common basis from which 
to start. When asked, Sawda said that she had not come across atheists in her work. 
Obviously this conviction that everyone is at least a believer in the existence of God 
does not fit all Syrians, but a broad majority. This assumption means that at the 
beginning of da‘wa stands the acceptance of each woman as a believer: whatever may 
be wrong in her life from the dā‘iya’s point of view, she does not need to change her 
identity in a radical way but only to unfold who she already is. When my participants 
used metaphorical language like ‘coming to life,’537 the image was about motivating 
and empowering a change towards the fulfilment of their nature. Khulud, one of the 
dā‘iyāt who taught during Sawda’s private lessons, explained the change like this:  
We were dead, now we are alive! We were like a train wagon that was 
disconnected from the engine, there was no movement. Now we are connected! 
The teacher is our engine, our connection to God.538  
 
This metaphor illustrates why for my participants, ‘religious empowerment’ through 
da‘wa was important even if not identity changing: without the teacher they lacked the 
power for their journey, once connected, it was in their natures to ‘move’ and follow 
                                                
536 Conversation with Dunya, Damascus, 15.03.2007. 
537 Comp. 1.1, page 3. 
538 Group interview, 22.11.2008. 
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her example of greater devoutness. This approach can be very attractive, even 
flattering. Of course, it can also be received as an assumption. In my personal 
experience I have felt both: a desire to concede the common ground that a dā‘iya 
ascribed to me, as well as to reject the feeling of being patronised by assumptions about 
my innermost convictions.  
 
Women who interpret their religious change within the framework that they have always 
been Muslims, stress continuity and development rather than discrepancy with their past. 
Because of this concept, becoming devout is experienced as satisfaction and a 
strengthening of their identity and the question of restricting and submitting themselves is 
not necessarily experienced as negative but as an appropriate means for religious 
excellence. Rajab Deeb compared the believer who lives according to God’s commands for 
the sake of developing his inherent aptitude for a God-centred life with an athlete: 
The West does not understand why you can live as Muslims, why you deny 
yourselves pleasures. For example the athlete when he trains for a competition 
denies himself everything that is against his success. He does everything he can for 
the sake of reaching the highest perfection of his physical form. The Muslim is like 
him. You train to get to the highest level of yourself.539  
 
The concept of fiṭra facilitates the desire to become devout because of the unquestioned 
demand of submission to God that the research participants have grown up with. 
Experiences of dissatisfaction and failure are interpreted in the context of fiṭra and so the 
conclusion of seeing oneself lacking and at fault because of religious weaknesses is 
                                                
539 Lesson at ANC, Damascus, 23.07.2009.  
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coherent. Accordingly, the experiences of changing, gaining religious strength and leading 
lives that adhere more closely to the ideal are often described as leading to inner 
fulfilment, peace and satisfaction. 
 
The belief in fiṭra assigns responsibility to live up to the primordial covenant with the 
believer. At the same time, the idea that the agency for their development belongs to God 
is another important concept that gives religious meaning to my participants’ experiences, 
as I will show in the next section.    
 
 
 
7.4.2   Divine intervention 
 
One concept that my interviewees talked about again and again was the idea that the 
ultimate factors that made them change were events that God orchestrated. A first 
impression suggests a tension between this and their narratives, which describe many small 
and big choices from clothing to education to marriage. Yet this idea throws light on the 
role that choice and ‘social empowerment’ play from my participants’ point of view, who, 
rather than focussing on the question of their choice focussed on the way they saw God 
intervene in their lives. They contemplated the question of choice mainly in the context of 
opposition: firstly, in the context of rejecting Western prejudices of the suppression of 
Muslim women, and secondly in the context of resistance to their religious practices from 
their families or society. In these contexts, they focussed on choice against the accusation 
that they lived how they did because of social or cultural pressures. One example is how 
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Farida recounted her reactions to the niqāb ban in 2010. She told me in detail about the 
process she went through to know how she should respond to it, thinking what it meant to 
her and discussing the issue with her husband before taking a stance against the 
government policy.540 Talking about the notion of divine intervention and agency, then, did 
not mean for my participants that they did not also experience incidences when they 
needed to make a choice. Yet the interpretation of certain events, experiences and emotions 
as obvious divine acts seems to play a more important role in their religious self-
perception. 
 
For example, Farida interpreted her biological development as a special divine mercy 
because her late menarche prevented her from becoming responsible for her religious 
obligations before she was able to fulfil them. This example in particular shows how 
human choice and divine intervention were seen together in my participants’ minds, as 
Farida recounted at the same time the process that she underwent to choose the hijab and 
learn commitment to prayer. In this case, seeing God’s agency in the events of her life 
made her thankful and reinforced her commitment to God. 
 
The case of Zaynab also underlines this notion. She recounted again and again how she 
was moved towards religiosity without her intention: She ‘did not know’ how it happened 
that she was emotionally drawn to Rajab Deeb; the connection she felt with him was like 
‘falling in love;’ finally she even started her da‘wa without intention, the teaching simply 
flowed from her heart. The fact that she became the religious leader of other women even 
though there was nothing in her upbringing that could have predicted it, filled her with an 
                                                
540 Comp. page 212-213. 
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additional sense of wonder. All these experiences showed Zaynab that God intervened in 
her life and that his will was the ultimate reason for her journey to devoutness. 
 
The belief in divine intervention as the vital reason for my participants’ personal histories 
is coherent with their understanding of the question of empowerment. In a world where 
lives are divinely ordained, personal freedom of choice against other peoples’ choice is not 
of primary importance. However, considering where one’s life is situated in God’s 
ordinance and whether experiences are seen signs of God’s calling and mercy, is of utmost 
significance. Zaynab’s case illustrates the significance of this thought when she told me of 
her great joy at discovering that her heart was full of dhikr without her intention. The lack 
of intentionality rather than her conscious choice was, for her, a sign of her love for God. 
 
My participants ascertained their identity as pious Muslim women both via choices and 
involuntary experiences. Their choices, in so far as they led to religious practices, were 
seen as possible though ambiguous signs of the state of their hearts, as discussed in 7.2.1. 
Experiences, on the other hand, that were interpreted as divine intervention to move them 
towards devoutness were signs of God’s mercy. Therefore, to understand their experiences 
as divinely orchestrated legitimised and authenticated their religiosity. The tension 
between choice and determination echoes the classical debate on free will and 
predestination, and as such is not surprising. However, in the lives of my participants both 
were part of their experience and played important roles in the way they made sense of 
their developments. The notion of divine intervention specifically reinforced the emotional 
desire for moving on as these experiences validated their religious identities. 
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7.4.3  The eschatological perspective 
 
One of the strongest motivators for Muslim women to become religious is the conviction 
that there will be a Day of Judgement, and that God will either punish or reward them. 
However, as with other doctrines, it was important that this belief became the personal 
orientation towards which they lived in order to become a factor of change in their lives. 
Whereas the concepts I have discussed so far were mainly associated with positive 
emotions such as love and satisfaction, eschatological angst as well as hope was another 
motivator.  
 
Syrians that distance themselves from the da‘wa movement often give as one of their 
reasons the mixed approach of targhīb wa tarḥīb.541 But the method to draw women to 
piety through the apparent dichotomy of desire and fear is coherent with the understanding 
of final judgement. In the lessons and conversations that I witnessed targhīb (inducing 
desire) was by far the most readily applied method, which is not surprising: the ultimate 
goal of the message of da‘wa is to cause the believer to love and trust God. However, 
concerning my participants motivation to change, fear of judgement was mentioned in 
different ways by most of them. Each had a different story of how the abstract knowledge 
that they grew up with started to shape their religious consciousness. 
 
Rabi’a’s recollections illustrate this: 
I had a dream, and this dream really shook me. I saw the light of God, and I saw 
something like the day of resurrection.  It was in my grandfather's house, which is 
                                                
541 So e.g. in Dakouri, "dawr al-mar'a fi ta'sis al-wa'i al-dini" 6. 
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very large. And the time of my judgement had come. He said to me: ‘I gave you 
three days and now I will judge you.’  When I woke from my sleep I was very 
unsettled: ‘What?! What was this?  Where am I deficient?’  I said, ‘I am missing the 
hijab’.  So I became mutaḥajjaba at once. Just one week earlier […] my friend had 
asked me: ‘When will you veil?’  I said to her: ‘Not for some time yet.’ […] When I 
took the veil I didn't even have the right clothes to wear with it that were long or 
anything.542 
 
Other women have also mentioned the emotional disturbance they experienced when the 
belief in the Day of Judgement became real to them. Farida for example remembered how 
her whole class of middle school girls would cry at the end of her religion classes when the 
teacher spoke about heaven and hell. Some dā‘iyāt aim to bring a fear of Judgement Day in 
their preaching when they use the approach of tarḥīb. There is whole genus of TV 
programmes that are popularly called al-ḥijāb aw -l-nār, ‘hijab or hell.’543  
 
However, fear is not the predominant motivation. As discussed in 7.3, beyond the question 
of sin and punishment there is hope for rewards. Interestingly, Farida who was the most 
extreme in her religious practice among my participants, also talked a lot about the special 
rewards that she hoped for. 
In heaven the greatest reward is to be closest to God. The material rewards like trees 
and streams, food and house and so on, that is only for those who have remained on 
the very basic levels. But those who loved God here will love God in heaven, as 
                                                
542 Recorded interview with Rabi’a at her home, Damascus, 27.07.2010. 
543 Reuter made similar observations: Reuter, Gelebte Religion: Religiöse Praxis junger 
Islamistinnen in Kairo: 193. 
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much as they love him here. So for them, to be close and to love God with all their 
hearts will be the greatest happiness.544 
 
For many of my participants, fear was seen as an initial stage, and the need to induce fear 
as a sign of the immaturity of the believer. For example, Zaynab remembered that her first 
steps to practising dhikr were based on her sadness over her sin and her conviction that she 
needed forgiveness. Yet years later she had moved from fear to the experience of great joy 
because her love had born fruit and she started to constantly remember God. In this vein, 
Roula, an architect who engaged in da‘wa in her spare time, compared women at the 
beginning of their journey to devoutness to her children when they were young. She 
explained that at an early age threatening punishment could be appropriate, but that as 
children grew older they had to desire good for themselves in order to live moral lives. She 
continued: 
Likewise, in a person’s relationship with their Lord there are many different 
emotions. But the most important emotion with God is love, and it is this which 
stops you doing something that would anger God. Yes, the emotion of love is what 
makes you yearn for paradise because God will be pleased with you because you 
will be amongst the people of paradise. It is not paradise that is sought, but rather 
that God be pleased.545 
 
 
 
 
                                                
544 Conversation with Farida, Al-Nabak, 16.09.2009. 
545 Interview with Dr. Rula, Damascus, 15.06.2011. 
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7.5  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have looked at how my participants made the Islamic doctrines of fiṭra, 
determination and divine judgement their own through associating them with their 
experiences and using them to give meaning to their choices.  
 
My research participants intentionally discussed the question of religious enablement much 
more often than the question of social empowerment of women. The struggle for total 
religious observance and the desire to overcome the gap between the ideal and reality is 
reflected in these discussions. Consequently, the desire and experience of religious 
empowerment is an important factor in the success of the Islamic revival among Syrian 
women and to ignore it leads to an incomplete picture. 
 
The choice to become religious and ‘submit’ to God’s commands is a choice, albeit a 
choice to have less open choices in a society in which other women are choosing different 
ways to live. To understand how Syrian religious Muslim women make this choice, it is 
important to notice that there is a difference in the way choice and freedom are evaluated 
between Western literature and my research participants: Zaynab, Sawda and other women 
increased the legitimacy of their choices through denying that they were their personal 
choices or emphasising divine intervention and determination as the driving power behind 
their life stories. This means more than simply an umbrella of divine determination under 
which women live and make their choices. It means in addition, that freedom of choice as 
it is understood in the West is not, in this milieu, seen as something necessarily worth 
striving for. 
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The question of power as female leadership and power as empowerment to religious 
practice are not without connection, as women who are looking for a leader are choosing 
the person who enables them in the best way. Even if among my participants female 
preachers were invested with positions in mosques through men, it is the attending women 
who will come or stay away and in this way also give social power to the dā‘iya. The 
relationship between teacher and follower is not simply a one-sided power hierarchy, 
which can be illustrated by those women who choose to follow a ‘harsh’ dā‘iya whose 
approach to preaching is more fear-inducing than the milder approach of another preacher: 
the authority of the preacher is dependent on the choice of women who voluntarily listen to 
her because they experience greater empowerment to change their lives. On the other hand, 
the example of Zaynab546 shows a woman who followed a male leader rather than a female 
leader, preferring an ideal closeness to the centre of spiritual power at ANC to the concrete 
involvement of a female leader, which not only placed her outside the hierarchical 
structure of ANC but also meant that eventually her younger sister, rather than herself, 
became the official leader of the women’s activities in her local mosque. 
 
 
 
  
                                                
546 Comp. 5.2.3, page 162-166. 
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8 CONCLUSION 
 
 
In my analysis I have tried to offer a nuanced understanding of the attractions of Islamism 
for many Syrian women. On my own journey to understand my participants, I have learned 
how necessary it is to question the Western assumptions of the universality of modern 
understanding and the primary value of freedom. Submission as a religious value cannot be 
grasped in terms of Western liberation theory: attempts to do so fall short because they do 
not give the whole picture. For women like those in my research focus group, value is 
found in religious fulfilment and satisfaction in shaping their lives according to their 
religious ideal. As I have argued, for my participants, divine commands and determination 
are more relevant categories than freedom and choice, because they offer meaning and 
purpose. 
 
While my participants’ accusation  - that Western research misrepresents women - was 
directed primarily at the Orientalist image of oppressed Muslim women that has been 
largely left behind in recent research, research that tries to explain their motivations and 
desires through exclusively secular patterns similarly uses hypotheses foreign to my 
participants’ understanding and presentations of themselves. Devoutness is seen as an 
inner quality for which women aim. For them, it is a goal in itself, for the sake of being 
close to God and rewarded in paradise. Interpreting devoutness as a means for other gains, 
such as social mobility and the participation in public space, is in their view a sceptical 
approach that misrepresents both themselves and Islam. That said, social implications have 
not been not discounted in my analysis, but they are seen as a means not an end. In many 
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areas, social changes and new opportunities for women preceded the development of 
female religious activism and acted as a precondition for it. The religious developments of 
my participants could only have taken place in the context of a society changing under the 
impact of modernity: without the end of female seclusion, the secular mass education and 
the development in new strategies of da‘wa, which included a new place for women and 
specifically the new role of the female dā‘iya, the women’s da‘wa movement would not 
have happened. These changes explain why Muslim women have been turning to an 
Islamist devoutness at this time.  
 
I have argued that even though aspects of female empowerment play a role in facilitating 
the women’s  da‘wa movement, these aspects are also present in the secular and 
moderately traditional sections of Syrian society  and therefore cannot explain sufficiently 
why some Muslim women turn to Islamism. The da‘wa movement as an educational 
movement has created new ways to include large numbers of Muslim women as teachers 
and activists as well as students. In this sense, it has adapted the role of women within the 
movement to modern Syrian society and thus caters for modern women who have grown 
up with the expectation of education and the hope of a purpose and influence in society. 
Despite this, my participants took on two apparently opposed roles; agents of change and 
propagators of submission. This is illustrated primarily in the way that women in the da‘wa 
movement have gained authority and partially in the new ways they relate to men that 
challenge traditional patriarchal patterns: women use their new religious competence to 
oppose men outside of the movement, yet within the movement, the male role of supporter, 
initiator and legitimizer of female authority is not challenged. In the first case, female 
authority is a necessary means to propagate ‘true Islam’ in contemporary Syrian society, 
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yet the second case shows that female authority is not a goal in itself. For my participants, 
the question of submission or authority hinges on the question of orthodoxy.  
 
However, even though my participants consider that female empowerment is irrelevant to 
the question of orthodoxy, this focus potentially opens up the development of future 
concepts of authority regardless of gender. 
 
Furthermore, focussing on the biographical particularities of individuals like Sawda, 
Zaynab, Aisha, Ruba and Farida, I have aimed to understand Islamist women as persons 
rather than symbols of the polarisation between the West and the Muslim East. They share 
with other human beings the desire to make sense of their existance, as in their narratives 
each one remembered different experiences and interpreted them according to their 
personalities, preferences and development. Their common focus on devoutness and their 
desire to love, trust, and be mindful of God within an Islamist framework contests usual 
perceptions of Islamism. Upon analysis of my data, this study therefore challenges the 
common view of Islamism which tends to categorise Muslims into those with a spiritual 
interest, such as Sufis and Modernists and perhaps Traditionalists on one side, and those 
only driven by their political and social causes such as Islamists on the other. For my 
participants, there was no contradiction between an Islamist focus on ‘true Islam’ and a 
Sufi influenced spirituality.  
While there were few changes in behaviours and practices for my participants compared 
with more traditional forms of Islam, the major changes my participants experienced were 
in intention and meaning, their perception of themselves and their identity. They saw 
themselves as women who were distinguished by the knowledge of why they were doing 
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certain religious acts and since these acts had gained meaning for them, they were 
becoming more diligent. They were free to go against traditional norms if they 
contradicted religious norms and refrained from ‘normal ways of living’ if they were 
obstacles to their religious developments. At the same time, other ‘normal’ acts were re-
interpreted or re-claimed as religious acts. An area of special significance is the female 
emotionality that was claimed for Islam as love that empowered women to orthopraxis and 
activism. This combination bridges the dichotomy between an emphasis on orthopraxis on 
the one hand and emotional contemplation on the other and seemed to offer a religiosity 
that was able to integrate the different aspects of life in a way that my participants 
experienced as especially fulfilling. 
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9 APPENDICES 
 
 
 
 
9.1  Glossary of Arabic terms  
 
 
abāya   floor length, loose black outer garment with long sleeves 
adāb    customs 
adhān   call to prayer 
aḥsan   better 
al-ḥamdu li-llah  praise be to God 
allahu akbar  God is great 
ānisa    title used for a female teacher 
‘aqūba   punishment 
awqāf (ministry of) religious endowments; (ministry of) religious affairs  
‘awra   lit. ‘genitalia’, term for the part of the human body that needs to  
    be covered 
‘ayb    shameful 
dā‘i, pl. du‘āt  preacher 
dā‘iya, pl. dā‘iyāt female preacher 
da‘wa   lit. ‘invitation’; diverse activities propagating Islam and  
    religious observation 
dayn    debt 
dhikr    act of remembering God through meditation and supplication 
dhimma   protected communities under sharia law, usually adherents of  
    monotheistic faiths 
fajr    first prayer before daybreak 
farḍ    religious obligation 
fiqh    Islamic jurisprudence 
fātiḥa   first Sura in the Qur’an 
fiṭra, adv. fiṭrīyan human constitution 
galabiya   long, loose dress with long sleeves, often worn as a house dress 
ḥadīth, pl. aḥadīth tradition; an account of what Muhammad said or did 
ḥalāl    permissible; lawful (religious use) 
ḥalaqāt   religious study circles 
ḥarām   forbidden; unlawful (religious use) 
ḥasan, comp. asḥan good 
‘ishā’   last prayer of the day at night time 
jāhiliya    lit. ignorance; a term used traditionally for the pre-Islamic period of 
 polytheism 
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ijāza  permission to teach a specific religious topic 
ijtihād  independent reasoning 
ikhṭilāt   (cross gender) mixing 
iltizām   commitment to fulfil one’s religious obligations 
khimār   usually a black veil that covers the whole head including the eyes 
kufāra   compensation 
madhhab,    one of the orthodox law schools (e.g. Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali,  
pl. madhāhib Hanafi) 
maghrib   sunset; short for prayer after sunset 
maḥram   close male relative 
makrūh   hated; one of the ahkam al-khamsa 
mandīl   piece of cloth used as hijab and face veil 
manteau   floor length loose coat 
mawlid, pl. mawālīd religious holiday, esp. in celebration of Muhammad’s birthday 
miswāk   twig used to clean the teeth 
mujāhada   exercise 
mujāhidūn   fighter 
multazima, pl. -āt a woman who is religiously observant, comp. iltizam 
munaqqaba, pl. -āt a woman who wears the niqab 
mustaḥabb   recommended 
mutadayyina, pl. –āt a religious woman 
mutaḥajjaba, pl. –āt a woman who wears the hijab 
mutakhallifīn  backward people 
mutamassikīn  people who hold strongly on to something 
muttaqiyya, pl. –āt a devout, pious woman 
mutashaddida  a strict woman 
nafila, pl. nawāfil supererogatory worship 
niqāb    face veil, usually of black colour, leaving the eyes unveiled 
qinā‘a   conviction 
qudra   strength; ability 
quwa    strength; power 
rābiṭa   spiritual connection 
shaḥāda   Muslim creed 
subhan allah   glory to God 
sunna   not obligatory, but often recommended, practice following the  
    example of Muhammad 
ta’anīth   concept of creating “women only” spaces 
tadayyun   becoming religious 
tafsīr    Qur’anic commentary 
taḥmīd   saying ‘al-ḥamdu li-llah’ 
tajwīd    art of exact Qur’anic recitation 
takbīr   saying ‘allahu akbar’  
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taqālīd   traditions 
tāqiyya   a woman who is pious  
taqwa   piety; devoutness 
targhīb   making someone desire something 
tarḥīb   making someone fear something 
tasbīh   saying ‘subḥan allah’ (glory to God) 
tashaddud   strictness 
taṭarruf   extremism 
‘ulamā’   religious scholars 
umma   the community of all Muslims 
‘umra   minor pilgrimage 
‘urūba   Arabism 
wājib    obligatory 
wird    prayer 
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9.2.  List of interviews and lessons attended 
 
 
The interviews and lessons are listed in chronological order.  
Names in italics are pseudomyms as used in my writing. 
Abbreviated titles:  A. for anisa (as used for a da‘iya) 
    U. for ustaz (as used for a lecturer) 
 Sh. for Sheikh (as used for a religious leader) 
 
Interviews: 
Joumana, Damascus, 06.10.2006 
Aisha, Afreen, 22.10.2006  
Um Ali, Damascus, 25.11.2006  
Nahla, Damascus, 15.03.2007  
Leila, Damascus, 23.06.2007  
A. Amal, Damascus, 27.06.2007  
U. Muhammad, Damascus, 03.07.2007  
Miriam, Damascus, 17.07.2007  
Jihan, Damascus, 10.03.2008 
Maha, Damascus, 18.11.2008  
Group interview during A. Sawda’s private lesson, Damascus, 22.11.2008  
Group interview during A. Sawda’s private lesson, Damascus, 29.11.2008  
Jihan, Damascus, 26.03.2009  
A. Hiyam, Damascus, 09.04.2009  
Group interview with A. Manar, Nasrin, ‘Ula and Razan, Damascus, 30.05.2009 
Bushra and her mother, Damascus, 07.07.2009  
A. Zaynab, Damascus countryside, 27.07.2009  
Tahani, Damascus countryside, 27.07.2009  
Sh. Rajab Deeb, Jdeida, 09.03.2009  
Sh. Rajab Deeb, Jdeida, 10.03.2009  
A. Sawda, Damascus, 19.05.2009  
Dr. Jamal Barout, Aleppo, 04.12.2009  
Bushra, Damascus, 10.12.2009 
Shirin Dakouri, Damascus, 12.12.2009  
Bushra, Damascus, 14.12.2009  
A. Huda Habash, Damascus, 23.12.2009  
Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni, London, 16.03.2010  
A. Manar, Damascus, 10.06.2010  
Rabi‘a, Damascus, 27.07.2010  
A. Ibtisam and her mother, Damascus, 23.11.2010  
Karim, brother of Rabi‘a, Damascus, 23.11.2010  
Ruba, Damascus, 23.04.2011  
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Ruba, Damascus, 01.05.2011  
A. Sawda, Damascus, 08.06.2011  
A. Ibtisam, Damascus, 11.06.2011  
Huda Habash, Damascus, 13.06.2011  
A. Halima, Damascus, 14.06.2011  
A. Roula, Damascus, 15.06.2011  
A. Farida, Damascus, 16.06.2011  
A. Huda Habash, Damascus, 18.06.2011 
A. Zaynab, Damascus, 18.06.2011  
Dr. Muhammad Habash, Damascus, 19.06.2011  
A. Sawda, Damascus, 22.06.2011  
 
 
 
 
Attendance at lessons and mawalīd: 
 
- Regular attendance at the Sharia Faculty of Damascus University, October 2005 – May 
2006 
- Irregular attendance of Huda Habash’s Wednesday lessons at Zahra Mosque, Damascus, 
November 2005 – September 2007 
- Mawlid of Shadhili order, Damascus, 08.03.2007 
- Mawlid of Naqshbandiyya-Haqqaniya order, Damascus, 14.03.2007 
- Attendance of two private mawlids with Um Rami, Damascus, April 2008 
- Regular attendance of Sawda’s private lessons in her home, Damascus, July 2008 – June 
2009  
- Mawlid at Sawda’s home, Damascus, 26.07.2008 
- Irregular attendance of Ramadan Buti’s Monday lessons at Iman Mosque, Damascus,  
October 2008 – November 2010 
- Regular attendance of Sawda’s public lessons at ANC, Damascus, March 2009 – July 
2009 
- Regular attendance of Rajab Deeb’s Thursday lessons with Zaynab at ANC, Damascus, 
March 2009 – May 2010 
- Lesson for women taught by Rajab Deeb, ANC, Damascus, 31.05.2009 
- Irregular attendance of Friday lessons at ANC, Damascus, March 2009 – November 2009 
- Mawlid at Kuwaiti Mosque, Damascus, 15.02.2011 
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